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Serial Killers on the Other Side of the Bars:  
“Bestial Humans—Human Beasts”1
Péter RUZSONYI2
Serial killers are present all over the globe. Their acts shock and—not surprisingly—
anger the public. This study will—for the first time in Hungary—focus on serial 
killers convicted in Hungary by analyzing their crimes and their behavior during 
incarceration.
This paper has the as-yet unprecedented aim of providing a general picture 
about serial killers on the “other side” of the prison bars, and within the prisons 
themselves. Besides dealing with the life and activities of the serial killers before 
their incarceration on international level, it will also put forward a comprehensive 
picture about the origin and meaning of the term “serial killer”, all the while 
discussing the general attributes of those who belong to this category. The study 
will also provide an overview about the main ideas on making distinctions and 
conducting classification into different types and examines the issues that are 
related to female serial killers.
We will also analyze the actions of serial killers incarcerated within Hungarian 
prisons and evaluate their behaviour within the institution in order to predict their 
likely conduct using a completely novel risk assessment procedure.
Our study also has a second part in which we will address the peculiarities 
pertaining to the punishment of life without parole, especially as 67% of the 
currently incarcerated Hungarian serial killers have received this sanction for 
their deeds.
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“Serial killers fail to think of other people as human.” [10]
Katherine Ramsland
Introduction
If we browse through the channel list of an average television capable of receiving signals 
from about 30–50 channels, it is very much likely that the Hungarian broadcasters’ repertoire 
will include at least ten movies dealing in some way with serial murders. The editors have 
every right to believe that such shows would have a positive increase on their view count. But 
what reasons lie behind the popularity of such stories? Would an increase in frequency also 
result in an increase of quality?
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Ludovika Workshop.
2 Ph.D., Correctional Brigadier-General, University Professor, Pro-Dean, Head of Department of Corrections, 
Faculty of Law Enforcement, National University of Public Service; e-mail: ruzsonyi.peter@uni-nke.hu
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People tend to have an affection towards grim and/or terrifying things, but they preferably 
experience these within the safe and secure premises of their homes, having their remote con-
troller within reach. Should the scenes become unbearably gruesome, they can simply switch to 
another channel and avoid any unpleasant consequences. In our daily lives, of course, solving 
such a problem is a far more difficult undertaking. In the last 200 years, 650 serial killers 
had been focused on by the police in the United States. These criminals “are responsible for 
a minimum range of 3,500 homicides to a maximum of 5,650 homicides.” [1: 42]
The estimations on the number of serial murderers unleashed at any given time within the 
United States are varied. Hickey believes that currently 30–40 criminals are active [1] while 
Holms and Holms believe that this number is closer to 200. [2] According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter: FBI), the numbers are even more staggering: they claim 
“that at any given time between 200 and 500 serial killers are on the loose and that they kill 
3,500 people a year”. [3: 6]
Despite these haunting numbers, basically no American citizen considers him/or herself 
as a potential victim and the whole notion seems unreally distant and terrifying for a regular 
person.
The attention of the media reaches unrealistic heights when they have a chance to open 
up a topic on serial murderers, thus they often contribute to the increasing fear among the 
citizens. “Breaking” news based on gossips and assumptions tend to make the work of the 
law enforcement authorities more difficult. Even after their capture, perpetrators keep staying 
on the front page of tabloid magazines until their incarceration when the public quickly loses 
its interest. The attention of both the media and the experts dissipates rather quickly.
This is the part where the tasks of the prison services begin. What can and what should 
be done with these criminals? Providing an answer to these questions is a difficult endeavour 
since when viewed from the perspective of penology, this field is barely more than a blank 
space. We simply lack the required theoretical and practical knowledge and experience, not 
only because of the scarcity of relevant and available academic literature, but also because 
of the fact that the number of serial murderers in Hungary is—luckily—relatively low. In 
our study we endeavour to expand the knowledge that may facilitate providing satisfying 
answers to the questions above.
The Meaning and Origin of the Term “Serial Murderer”
Despite the fact that the first homicides bearing some of the definitive marks of “serial mur-
ders” have only been classified as such around 1700–1800 (e.g. Jack the Ripper), it is almost 
absolutely certain that such offences had existed even before this period. The limited form 
documentation and the rudimentary investigations at that time meant that even if these per-
petrators were detained for some reason, their previous crimes remained undiscovered. [4]
The author of the first academic publication on the topic was dr. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, 
a German–Austrian physician and forensic medical expert, psychiatrist and sexologist. He 
analyzed violent and sexual offenders and the crimes they had committed. His discoveries 
were published in 1886 in his textbook Psychopathia Sexualis,3 in which he described several 
3 Original title: Psychopatia Sexualis: eine Klinisch-Forensische Studie. 1886.
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case studies related to sexual homicides, serial murders and other crimes having a sexual 
nature. [5]
The term “serial murderer” was coined by Hughes [6] in 1950 in his work entitled The 
Complete Detective. This was merely a literary term until 1976, when—during the investiga-
tion of the Son of Sam case—FBI special agent Robert Ressler suggested the introduction of 
the term into the professional terminology after a consultation with the Behavioral Science 
Unit of the FBI.
The most widely accepted definition of “serial murderer” was provided by Douglas et 
al., [7] who stated that: those persons are considered serial murderers who commit at least 
three separate murders in separate locations, with an emotional cooling-off period between 
them. This length of the cooling-off period may differ with each individual and can last for 
days, weeks, months or even years.4 [7]
The importance of emphasizing the different locations and separate dates stems from 
the fact that these are the factors that differentiate serial murderers from mass5 and spree 
murderers.6 [7]
Authors Canter and Wenting [8] and Salfati and Bateman [9] added one small, but im-
portant detail to the definition provided above. They expanded the list of factors previously 
given with the condition of “unlawful killing”, thereby excluding the lawful use of firearms 
and other weapons by law enforcement officers and its consequences.
Ramsland’s argument further clarifies the “classic” definition: he points out that some of-
fenders “bring their victims to the same location at different times” and kill them there. [10: xi]
In our study we accept both amendments as valid conditions.
The General Characteristics of Serial Killers
General Approach
An average persons’s knowledge on serial murderers is shallow. According to Ramsland, 
“the public wants monsters to be obvious, and many popular culture productions reinforce 
that naïve hope that they’re largely on the fringes of society. But monsters do live among 
us—easily and with little detection, because the clever ones know how to adapt and to deflect 
suspicion.
Many people believe that serial killers are loners and losers, unable to maintain careers or 
relationships. They’re supposedly undereducated, narcissistic, and searching for short-term 
gratification.” [10: 177–178]
The dangers emanating from forming incorrect stereotypes are emphasized by Morton 
and Hilts as well. They argue that “the majority of serial killers are not reclusive, social 
misfits who live alone. They are not monsters and may not appear strange.” [11: 3]
4 Holmes and Holmes determied that the length of these periods is at least a month. We believe that the 
existence of such a limiting factor is not satisfyingly proven since the personality and as such the reactions 
and emotions of serial murderers differ in each individual.
5 Mass murderers kill more than three victims at the same location and time.
6 Spree murderers kill three or more people consecutively at three or more different locations.
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Morton and Hilts believe that since determining every single factor that may exert an 
influence on the human behaviour is impossible, attempting to collect all the determinants 
that might cause a person to become a serial murderer would be a futile effort as well. Based 
on their experiences at FBI, the authors tried to collect key characteristics the existence (or 
lack) of which might tipify serial killers: [11: 11–12]
• Predisposition to serial killing, much like other violent offenses, is biological, social, 
and psychological in nature and it is not limited to any specific characteristic or trait.
• The development of a serial killer involves a combination of these factors which exist 
together in a rare confluence in certain individuals. They have the appropriate biologi-
cal predisposition, molded by their psychological makeup, which is present at a critical 
time in their social development.
• There are no specific combinations of traits or characteristics shown to differentiate 
serial killers from other violent offenders.
• There is no generic template for a serial killer.
• Serial killers are driven by their own unique motives or reasons.
• Serial killers are not limited to any specific demographic group, such as their sex, age, 
race, or religion.
• The majority of serial killers who are sexually motivated erotized violence during 
development. For them, violence and sexual gratification are inexplicably intertwined 
in their psyche.
• Both the serial murders and the perpetrators themselves have enjoyed widespread at-
tention in the last 200 years. Since satisfying answers to the questios of the gener-
al population were unavailable, they were substituted by myths and preconceptions. 
Based on the determinants provided by Hickey, we compare these myths with scien-
tifically proven facts.
Table 1. Myths versus Facts. [1: 5–6]
Myth Fact
They are nearly all white. One in five serial killers is black.
They are all male. Nearly 17% are female.
They are insane. Insanity is a legal term. Very few offenders
(2%–4%) are legally insane.
They are all lust killers. Many are, but several cases do not involve
sexual assaults, torture, or sexual mutila-
tions.
They kill dozens of victims. A few have high body counts but most kill 
under 10 victims.
They kill alone. About one in four have one or more part-
ners in murder.
Victims are beaten, stabbed, strangled or 
tortured to death.
Some victims are poisoned or shot.
They are all very intelligent. Most of them are of average intelligence.
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Myth Fact
They have high mobility in the United 
States.
Most offenders remain in a local area.
They are driven to kill because they were 
sexually abused as children.
Many kill as a result of rejection and aban-
donment in childhood.
Most serial murderers cannot stop killing. Some serial killers stopped killing for sev-
eral years before they killed again or until 
they were caught.
Most serial killers want to be caught. Like anyone, they learn and gain confi-
dence from experience. Many want-to-be 
serial killers end up in prison after their 
first murder. Some become very adept at 
concealing their identities and may feel as 
if they will never be caught.
Serial Killers and Psychopathy—Terminological Overlaps and 
Attempts at Providing Definite Answers
In professional literature, the term “sociopath” is often used as a synonym for the terms 
“psychopathy” or “antisocial personality disorder”. The term “psychopath” was originally 
used by psychiatrists and psychologists to define a series of symptoms including impulsivity, 
recklessness and disregard for other people. During the 1950s, psychiatrists suggested using 
the term “sociopath” for persons suffering from psychopathological disorders thereby mak-
ing a difference from the incomparably more severe psychotic disorders. Towards the end of 
the 1960s, psychiatrists initiated another terminological change by proposing the use of the 
term “antisocial personality disorder” (APD) instead of the words “sociopath” or “psycho-
path”. Many experts currently working on the field of psychopathology disagree with this 
suggestion since they believe that there are significant diagnostical differences among these 
terms. In our case, however, these differences are not that important since when focusing 
on the topic of serial killers, the basic characteristics that are relevant to the majority of the 
offenders are similar in each of the professional terms above. [12] We will use and interpret 
them as synonyms to each other.
In the year 2005, the FBI hosted a multi-disciplinary symposium with the participation 
of the field’s 135 most accomplished professionals. Their aim was to determine and collect 
the similarities that can be found in the personalities of serial murderers. In their written 
conclusion, the participants emphasized that “understanding psychopathy becomes particu-
larly critical to law enforcement during a serial murder investigation and upon the arrest of 
a psychopathic serial killer. The crime scene behavior of psychopaths is likely to be distinct 
from other offenders. This distinct behavior can assist law enforcement in linking serial 
cases.” [11: 15]
Morton and Hilts also analyzed the connection between serial murderers and psychopats. 
Based on his discoveries he argues that not all psychopaths necessarily become serial mur-
derers, but rather it is the serial killers themselves who possess some or more traits which 
are usually found within psychopats. Those psychopaths who perform a series of murders 
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consider human lives worthless and show severe indifference toward their victims. This 
tendency is particularly true in the case of those whose intent to kill is derived from sexual 
motives and who are able to locate, follow, attack, rape and murder new victims without the 
slightest trace of remorse. Morton and Hilts conclude with an important statement: “psychop-
athy alone does not explain the motivations of a serial killer.” [11: 14]
The Differences Between Serial and Mass Murderers
Although the main topic of this paper is serial murder, we also intend to provide a brief 
outlook on mass murderers as this effort will help us point out the difference within these 
categories.
This chart depicts the significant differences between the two types of offenders.
Table 2. The significant differences between the two types of offenders. [1: 27]
Mass murderer Serial murderer
Murder is a means of control over life √ √
Usually arrested or killed at crime scene √
Often commits suicide after the crime √
Eludes arrest and detection √
Likely to travel and seek out victims √
Evokes long-term media/public attention √
Kills individuals √
Kills several in short period of time √
Murders viewed as single incident √
Murderer is usually white male √ √
Motivated primarily by material gain or revenge √
Victims usually female √
Firearms are the common choice of weapon √
Kills in spontaneous rage √
It is apparent that with regards to the offense, there are strong differences between the 
behaviour of mass murderers and serial murderers. The most significant distinction between 
them is that mass murderers most often commit a single, large-scale offense with victims 
who are unknown to them. They are indifferent to the consequences of their actions and have 
no intention to escape from the premises. As a matter of fact, many of them commit suicide 
on the spot. Contrary to mass murderers, serial killers murder specific, carefully picked 
individuals after which a psychological “cooldown” phase begins. They spare no effort in 
avoiding exposure and arrest.
Apparently, the differences between the offences committed by mass murderers and serial 
killers are significant. On the other hand, by analyzing the motives behind the subjects of the 
two categories, a certain sort of connection can be discovered. Fox and Levin agree with this 
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assumption by stating that the “typologies of serial and mass murder often have a troubling 
but unavoidable degree of overlap among their categories.” [13: 442]
Attempts at Typifying Serial Killers
The typification of serial murderers is based on one of three fundamental systems. (1) Some 
authors perform it according to a method based on certain factors such as the offenders’ 
behavior during the time of the offense, the conditions of the perpetration and the general 
characteristics of the vicinity. Another group (2) creates classes based on the perpetrators’ 
leading motives while other professionals (3) combine the two principles of systemization.
Sorting Based on the Location and Conditions of the Offense
Branson’s attempt is based on certain factors pertaining to the life and behaviour of the 
perpetrators, both during and after the committing the offence. Based on his findings, he 
created the categories of “organized” and “disorganized” offenders.
Table 3. The categories of “organized” and “disorganized” offenders. [4: 34]
Disorganized, asocial offenders Organized, nonsocial offenders
 – IQ below average: 80–95 range  – IQ above average: 105–1207 range
 – socially inadequate  – socially adequate
 – lives alone, usually does not date  – lives with a partner or dates frequently
 – absent or unstable father  – stable father figure
 – family emotional abuse, inconsistent  – family physical abuse, harsh
 – lives and/or works near the crime scene  – geographically/occupationally mobile
 – minimal interest in news media  – follows the news media
 – usually a high school dropout  – may be college educated
 – poor hygiene/housekeeping skills  – good hygiene/housekeeping skills
 – keeps a secret hiding place in the home  – does not usually keep a hiding place
 – nocturnal (nighttime) habits  – diurnal (daytime) habits
 – drives a clunky car or pickup truck  – drives a flashy car
 – needs to return to crime scene for reliv-
ing memories
 – needs to return to crime scene to see 
what police have done
 – may contact victim’s family to play 
games
 – usually contacts police to play games
 – no interest in police work  – a police groupie or wanabee
 – experiments with self-help programs  – doesn’t experiment with self-help
7 The IQ of the “organized” serial killers may at times be extraordinarily high. Such example was Ted Bundy 
(IQ of 124) who killed more than 30 young women and Gary Heidnik (IQ of 130–148) who had six female 
victims. [14]
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Disorganized, asocial offenders Organized, nonsocial offenders
 – kills at one site, considers mission over  – kills at one site, disposes at another
 – usually leaves body intact  – may dismember body
 – attacks in a “blitz” pattern  – attacks using seduction into restraints
 – depersonalizes victim to a thing or it  – keeps personal, holds a conversation
 – leaves a chaotic crime scene  – leaves a controlled crime scene
 – leaves physical evidence  – leaves little physical evidence
 – responds best to counseling interview  – responds best to direct interview
Canter et al. warns that humans rarely fit into any pre-determined offender categories: “the 
concept of Organized and Disorganized offenders is not a genuine psychologically based 
distinction but, rather, is a commonsensical, day-to-day speculation about differences 
between people.” [15: 310]
Douglas et al. were not satisfied either with having only two categories, so they introduced 
a “mixed” one, the members of which may possess traits from each of the categories above. 
This system—just like the previous ones—does not take the motives of the perpetrators into 
account. Based on further analyses of the offenders’ personal traits and crime scene charac-
teristics the group of experts implemented another change: a perpetrator can be organized, 
disorganized, mixed or sadistic. [7]
Typification Based on the Offenders’ Motives
The motive-based classification of serial killers was first performed in 1988 by R. M. Holmes 
and DeBurger and was later fine-tuned by R. M and S. T. Holmes (this is the version that 
eventually gained widespread recognition). Based on their findings they classified the perpe-
trators into four categories:
1. Visionary Type: these murderers kill as a result of command hallucinations, delusions, 
or visions whose sources customarily include the forces of good or evil. These offend-
ers are typically psychotic, leaving the crime scene in utter disarray. The homicides 
occur quickly with no extensive acts of torture.
2. Mission-Oriented Type: the goal for these slayers is to kill certain types of people or 
to rid society of particular types of individuals. These serial murderers target victims 
based on their ethnicity, occupation (e.g. prostitutes) and/or age. Additionally, they de-
termine whom to assail based on whether the person is deemed unworthy, undesirable 
or somehow less than human.
3. Hedonistic Type: these offenders murder as a result of sensation seeking or otherwise 
derive some sort of pleasure from their killings. The authors divided this type of assail-
ant into two subcategories: the lust killer and the thrill killer.
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4. The lust killer murders principally for sexual gratification even if this does not entail 
traditional intercourse. However, sex or multiple sadistically erotic acts with a live vic-
tim are common. Orgasm or sexually arousing behavior (i.e. masturbation) is the driv-
ing force for this offender, even after the person has killed the victim. Moreover, this 
attacker may also be sexually excited and/or satisfied from the murder itself. Ritualistic 
displays of sexual mutilation, facial disfigurement, cannibalism, body dismemberment, 
vampirism and necrophilia are routinely featured in this type of homicidal act.
 The thrill killer murders for the visceral excitement the assailant experiences. Howev-
er, once the victim is dead, the offender loses complete interest. As a result, the process 
of killing is prolonged as long as possible through extended acts of torture. The use 
of restraints and the presence of bite marks and burns on the victim’s body are char-
acteristic behaviors for this type of slayer. Sadistic acts whose frequency is prolonged 
as long as possible prior to death, a concealed corpse, manual or ligature strangulation 
and an animated victim during multiple sexual acts all characterize the patterns and 
motives of this type of assailant.
5. Power/Control Oriented Type: these offenders harbor deep-seated feelings of inadequa-
cy or attempt to compensate for a perceived lack of social or personal mastery over them-
selves by thoroughly dominating their victims. The primary motive for these offenders 
is not sexual in nature. Instead, these assailants desire complete and unfettered control 
over and subjugation of their powerless victims, including also the postmortem period. 
A profound sense of omnipotence—having the ultimate power of life or death over one’s 
victims as they cower and plead for their lives—fuels this type of serial killer. The act of 
murder is extended in order to increase the felt sense of gratification. [17] [2] [18]
 The categories created by Holmes and Holmes have been considered essential ever 
since, despite the fact that the system had become the subject of constant criticism from 
those who wished to create a new form of typology. Among these, the study of Canter 
and Wentink enjoys paramount importance. They analysed the reliability of the Holmes 
and Holmes system and addressed the following criticism in their conlusion: [8: 7–8]
• reliability and validity of data collection;
• lack of empirical testing of the model;
• definitional issues;
• overlap of criteria between types;
• the question of mixed types.
The authors suggested the use of a new type of classification which—based on the motives 
behind the murders—enables the classification of perpetrators into one of the following sub-
categories:
1. Visionary: Suffering from a break with reality, the visionary serial killer murders be-
cause he has seen visions or heard voices from demons, angels, the devil or God telling 
him to kill a particular individual or particular types of people. His quick, act-focused 
killings are seen as a job to be done.
2. Mission: The mission killer is focused on the act of murder itself. He is compelled to 
murder in order to rid the world of a group of people he has judged to be unworthy or 
undesirable.
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Hedonistic: This type of sexual killer is subdivided into the following two groups:
1. Lust: The lust killer kills for sexual gratification; sex is the focal point of the murder, 
even after he has killed the victim. This type of murderer derives pleasure from the 
process of the murderous event. Various acts such as cannibalism, necrophilia and 
dismemberment are prevalent in this type of murder.
2. Thrill: The thrill killer murders for the pleasure and excitement of killing. Once the 
victim is dead, this murderer loses interest. This type of killing often involves a long 
process involving extended acts of torture.
3. Power/Control: This killer derives pleasure and gratification from having control over 
the victim, and considered to be a “master” at what he does. His motives are driven 
by the need for power and dominance over another human being. The longer he can 
extend the process of murder, the greater his gratification. [8]
Douglas et al. also conducted an in-depth study of the motives behind the serial murderers’ 
offences. They determined four fundamental motives: manipulation, domination, control and 
sexual lust. [7]
In this decade, professionals have been experimenting with more nuanced types that 
analyze previous ideas. Criminal psychologist Robert J. Homant and criminologist Daniel 
B. Kennedy studied multiple professionals’ suggestions at typification. Focusing mostly on 
the motivations of sadistic, sexually-driven serial murderers established the following three 
types of offenders: [19]
1. “Trauma Control Model”, based on the work of Eric Hickey: an occurrence of a great-
ly traumatizing experience during childhood or infancy of the perpetrator which in-
duced a vulnerability or psychological disposition to hot-tempered, impetuous, con-
fused and mistrustful reactions. These people usually blame various external factors 
and consider them the reasons behind their deeds. They react aggressively to outside 
stimuli as a way of attempting to restore their disoriented inner balance or self esteem.
2. “Motivational Model”, based on the work of John Douglas, Ann Burgess, Allen Burg-
es and Robert Ressler: the serial murderer is “created” as a result of the five follow-
ing factors: uneffective/incapable social environment, childhood crises, escape into 
a fantasy world, interpersonal failures and various negative attributes, characteristics 
and behavioural manifestations that from their point of view validate and rationalize 
dominance and certain restraints.
3. “Lust Murder as Paraphilia”, based on the work of C. E. Purcell and Bruce Arrigo: 
this behaviour is the result of a disease, the wrongly functioning neural pathways caus-
es the body to mingle sex-related and agression-related impulses. [16]
The result of the latest (2006) typification created by the FBI is a new motivational system 
containing the following seven categories for serial murder: [11: 18]
1. Driven by anger: feels passionate anger or hate against a given subgroup of society or 
society as a whole.
2. Crime as a form of enterprise: the offender gains some sort of advantage from the 
murder (be it financial or else). These crimes are most frequently drug-related or have 
a connection to organized crime and crime gangs.
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3. Financial gain: the offender obtains money or some sort of monetary compensation 
as a result from the murders. Typical examples would be the “black widow” type mur-
ders, murders committed during robberies or murders that are related to certain (insur-
ance, social security) frauds.
4. Ideological murder: the offender commits murders in order to serve a group’s (or his/
her own) peculiar notions and goals. Typical examples to this category are the terror-
ists or other people who target a certain racial, ethnic group or a gender.
5. Domination, arousal: the perpetrator enjoys his/her leverage over the victims and/or 
becomes aroused by murder.
6. Psychosis: the perpetrators suffer from a severe mental disorder which is the main rea-
son behind the murders. Symptoms may include the hearing of distorted voices and/or 
visual hallucinations and paranoid, spectacular or bizarre visions.
7. Sexual nature: the main motives are the sexual needs/perversions of the murderers.
Typification Taking into Account Conditions and the Offenders’ Motivation
The principal aim of typification is to facilitate criminal investigations and thus contribute to 
the (quick) arrest of serial murderers. This endeavour requires a systemic compilation of the 
offenders’ motives and the characteristics of the offense. As a result of this undertaking, the 
FBI created a new type of classification which recognizes the following three groups: [20]
1. Medical Killer: highly intelligent people working in the field of healthcare or pharma-
ceutics and who know how to kill without being noticed for a longer timespan.
2. Organized Killers: they are also highly intelligent and plan their actions in detail while 
taking every precaution in order not to leave any traces behind. They are often psy-
chopaths who follow and observe their victims for days. They can easily establish new 
acquaintances and often have a charming, good-natured behaviour. They either hide 
the victim’s body or place it in a visible location so that it would be found easily. They 
usually establish contact with the investigating authorities and try to follow the inves-
tigation from as close as possible.
3. Disorganized Killers: they usually kill without planning and chose their victims spon-
taneously. They do not try to hide either the bodies or their tracks. They are usually un-
intelligent and highly antisocial. They move frequently and have no families, friends, 
or anyone else they might stay in closer contact with. The main reasons behind the 
murders are frequently “voices from above”, “whispers” and other delusions.
4. The various methods of typifications and the knowledge systematized within them 
contribute to the expansion of the information at the authorities’ disposal and thus earn 
a more detailed and complex image of serial killers. These structures significantly im-
prove profiling and facilitate the capture of offenders. During his work, Ramsland had 
analyzed the cases of more than a thousand serial killers. He concluded that “there are 
many motives that drive these offenders, they come from diverse backgrounds, and for 
almost every claim that has been made about them there are exceptions that weaken or 
undermine it.” [10: x]
Russell takes a largely similar approach. He notes that in the past decades a vast number 
of experts had been trying to oversimplify the psychology of these murderers. However, 
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whenever these authors tried to created a “genuine” system, there was always somebody who 
found counter-examples which undermined the original efforts. [21]
In our opinion, no typification attempt is futile since they still expand the knowledge of 
the authorities and also helps them in achieving new points of view.
Female Serial Killers
Experts calculate that female serial killers take up 10–15% of the global population. [22: 179]
Offences where the perpetrator is a woman occur everywhere in the world. Based on 
regional allocation, Scott provides an analysis of the female serial killers who were active 
between 1600–2003.
Table 4. The female serial killers who were active between 1600–2003. [19: 183]
Country Offenders
United States 52
Canada and Mexico 4
England 11
Europe (except England) 25
Russia 1





When analyzing the chart we have to keep in mind that there are many countries—for example 
China, Japan, North Korea, Russia (especially the former Soviet Union)—which refused to 
allow any investigations conducted by other countries or human rights organizations. It is 
likely that—due to various political reasons—these countries kept the cases involving serial 
murder a secret. There are several regions where no data collections have been initiated until 
the recent period.
A Historical Outlook
Hungarian criminology contains several serial murder cases where the perpetrator was 
a woman.
1. Erzsébet Báthory, the Bloody Countess
The first “documented” case had taken place during the very beginning of the 17th century 
and is linked to countess Erzsébet Báthory (1570–1614). Lore has it that during searching for 
the secret of youth, the vain lady did not refrain from sacrificing youg virgins. She flogged, 
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mutilated and tortured the girls she had had collected and then hanged them upside down 
in order to obtain their blood. According to the charges brought up against her, she was 
responsible for the death of more than 600 victims. She was accused with “keeping several 
young girls and virgins and other women within her quarters before ruthlessly killing or 
executing them using all sorts of instruments”. Based on this indictment, Erzsébet Báthory 
had been—without a trial and a verdict—put into solitary confinement in a bricked up room 
within the castle of Csejte. She died soon after, at the age of 54.
We have to note that we do not consider the documentation of the Báthory case credible. 
The internal political situation during that era was extremely unstable, therefore it is likely 
that the trial itself was mostly the consequence of the Habsburgs’ scheming who wanted to 
get a hold of the Báthory–Nádasdy wealth. Contemporary documents prove that most of the 
questions during the investigations were aimed at certain isolated events and that most of the 
answers had been extorted through means of torture. László Nagy argues that the basis for 
the well-known story originates from a jesuit priest’s note drafted more than a hundred years 
after Báthory’s death. Taking into account the facts listed above, the credibility of the story 
above is strongly debatable. [23] Klára Szabó emphasizes that current investigations do not 
necessarily support the suspected criminality of Báthory. Even if they accept the fact that she 
used to treat her subordinates cruelly, they do so by acknowledging the fact that back then this 
manner of treatment was a generally accepted—albeit vicious—form of punishment. [24]
2. Zsuzsanna Fazekas, née Zsuzsanna Oláh, the murderous midwife
Despite the fact that from a chronological aspect this case is the second one, it can well 
be considered the first that has completely been uncovered and proven. The murders were 
committed during the first third of the 20th century by several women living in the village 
of Tiszazug. An investigation began in 1929 against multiple midwives who had poisoned 
their husbands using arsenic retrieved from flypapers. The poison was brewed and circulated 
by one of the midwives, Zsuzsanna Fazekas, née Zsuzsanna Oláh. [25] [26] A significant 
number of homicides were discovered during the investigation: only in the cemeteries of 
Nagyrév and Tiszakürt, the corpses of 162 adults males had been exhumed—all of them 
likely victims. During the trial, 28 suspects (out of which 26 were women) stood before the 
judges and proven guilty for 162 cases of voluntary homicide. [27] Mrs Fazekas committed 
suicide after the verdict, three others were executed, 10 received life in prison while the 
rest received determinate sentences ranging from 5–10 years. The real scope of the case is 
unknown to us even today due to the fact that no exhumations were conducted within the 
region of Tiszazug as the authorities tried to close the case as quickly as possible. Even 
without exact data, it is likely that the women of Tiszazug are responsible for the deaths of 
hundreds of men.
3. Viktória Fődi
Viktória Fődi (1886–1940) lived in Átokháza, the region between Mórahalom and the plains 
close to the Serbian border. She had changed her appearance as early as the 1910s, donning 
male clothes and leaving her old husband. She took on day jobs where her newly found attire 
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helped her earn more wages, especially during the years of World War I when most of the 
men had been drafted into the military.
Her renown increased in 1919, after her first murder and she had become known as the 
enforcer of the plains of whom the men harassing their wives had every right to be afraid. 
The robustly built woman living as a man killed for money. She was only convicted for two 
murders, but according to the legends, she was responsible for the deaths of at least 30 men.
The homicides were executed in a similar manner and were masked as suicides: the vic-
tims seemingly hanged themselves on the upper supporting wooden bars of the stables. What 
truly happened was that Viktória Fődi had whipped the horses in order to lure the farmers out 
and have them check what happened, after which she threw the loop of the rope (which was 
thrown over the girder) around the neck of the victim, pulled him up and killed him, masking 
the murder as a suicide.
Local lore has a lot more homicides than the official records and most of these are known 
as “rightful vengeances”. It is believed that she had given up her muliebrity in order to protect 
local women. Viktória Fődi had been living as a man until and even after her condemnation. 
She kept smoking a pipe, wore pants and visited bars—these attributes were indispensable 
for men back then. Her true gender was discovered later in prison—to the surprise of her fel-
low inmates. She had been sentenced to death but the verdict was later overruled by Regent 
Miklós Horthy to life. She died in prison in Budapest in 1940. [28] [29] [30] [31]
4. Ágnes Pándi
Ágnes Pándi was born as a Belgian citizen, after her parents had moved from Hungary to 
Belgium. She had been subjected to multiple atrocities during her childhood: her father 
raped her while still young and kept forcing himself on her. Nobody assumed that between 
1986 and 1989 the Brussels house of the seemingly decent family (with the father being 
a Hungarian–Belgian dual citizen and pastor) would serve as a location for one of the most 
terrifying series of homicides in Belgian and Hungarian criminal history.
Under her father’s influence and command, she shot her step-sister, her mother (who was 
living separately) and then later killed her other step-sister. She was also an accomplice to 
the murder of two other members of her family. She had been sentenced to 21 years in prison 
and was released in 2010. She currently lives in a convent. (Her father, András Pándi had 
been sentenced to life in prison in 2002 for the murder of six family members. Together with 
his daughter, he killed two ex-wives and four children. He died in prison at the age of 86.)
The Typology of Female Serial Murderers
The Hungarian Prison Service currently does not house any female serial murderers. Despite 
this fact—in order to obtain a more detailed insight—we consider it necessary to briefly 
address the motives behind the offences committed by them.
The typification of female serial murderers was first conducted by Michael D. Kelleher 
and C. L. Kelleher in 1998. They classified single serial murderers into the following five 
categories: [32]
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1. black widow: her victims are spouses, partners, relatives;
2. angel of death: who kills elderly people under her care (usually in a healthcare facili-
ty), mostly because of mercy and/or pity;
3. sexual predator: whose motives behind the murder are sexual;
4. revenge: kills out of hate or jealousy;
5. killer for profit: murders for financial gain and/or as a collateral offence while com-
mitting another crime.
6. Silvio et al. performed an in-depth study of the attributes related to female serial killers 
based on which they classified the offenders into the following categories: (1) black 
widow; (2) angel of death; (3) vengeful murderer; (4) killers for profit; (5) team killers; 
(6) sexual predator. [33]
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Each of these systems contains a subgroup called “angel of death”. Lubaszka, Shon and 
Hinch argue that classifying every healthcare worker into the “angel of death” or “doctor 
death” subgroups is a doubtful practice, since the group itself is extremely complex and thus 
using a common category would oversimplify it and hide some significant differences. It is 
likely that we would not be able to discover their method of selection and their practice of 
“working” without anybody noticing. [34] By analyzing the relevant academic literature, 
Lubaszka came to the conclusion that serial murderers working in the field of healthcare 
differ significantly from “regular” serial murderers. They have different methods of choosing 
their victims, different behaviour on the crime scene and resort to different practices in order 
to avoid detection. [35]
We have to accept the fact that as far as the state of current scientific inquiries go, a flaw-
less classification system does not exist yet. The critical statement of Ferguson et. al. provides 
an adequate depiction of the situation: “Unfortunately, no one definition of serial murder will 
achieve the ability to identify and distinguish serial murderers without error. It is unlikely that 
all offenders will so easily conform their behavior to match established categories”. [36: 292]
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What are our options then? We believe that there is no need to become desperate since 
imperfections in our knowledge does not mean a complete lack of understanding. Experts are 
already very well aware of several attributes relevant to serial murderers and their knowledge 
is continuously expanding, providing them with new aspects and methods through which 
an even more detailed picture can be obtained. Finding the reasons behind the serial murders, 
discovering ways to avoid it and capturing the perpetrators as soon as possible is in every-
one’s best interests.
We believe that the issue of serial murders is one of the most vivid examples of dynamic 
systems. Due to newly gained practice and experience, previously unknown connections 
have been discovered. There are many disciplines that can facilitate the creation of a typi-
fication system which is “currently the best” and contribute to the continuous expansion of 
professional knowledge.
Prison and incarceration affairs is a field that can benefit from the newest knowledge on 
serial murderers since new and more effective methods can be created and introduced to this 
subgroup of prisoners. The field can also conribute to this special effort by collecting the 
experience gained during executing the incarceration of sentenced serial murderers.
Serial Killers in Hungarian Correctional Institutions
Registry Anomalies
At the very beginning of our research, we seemed to be facing a fundamental difficulty: no 
one was able to determine the number of serial killers who were detained in Hungarian prisons 
at the given time. Despite the fact that we based our inquiry on an internationally accepted 
definition, our experience was that hands-on available information on the topic was nowhere 
to be found. Another issue was that the prison registry system used in Hungary derives its 
basic principles from the categories provided by Act C of 2012 (hereinafter: Criminal Code), 
which does not recognize serial killers as legally separate entities. Taking into account all these 
factors, our sole option was to gradually narrow our list in order to proceed with our inquiry.8
The total number of detainees on our chosen day (12 January 2016) was 17,388. Out of 
recognition to the principles dictated by the concept of the presumption of innocence, we 
excluded those who were on remand. (On the given date, there was one remand prisoner 
charged with an offence that agrees with what is provided under the definition of serial 
murder. This person will not be mentioned in this study by any means and his/her attributes 
and characteristics will not be included either.) For the rest of our inquiry we focused on the 
remaining 13,171 convicts, 235 detainees and 162 other inmates subjected to court-ordered 
psychiatric treatment (hereinafter: psychiatric treatment). The next step was to filter out those 
who had committed an offence falling under the umbrella term of homicide.9 We determined 
8 Determining the precise number of serial killers and obtaining all the relevant documents for further analysis 
would have been impossible without the immense help of the following departments of the Hungarian Prison 
Service Headquarters: the Incarceration Affairs Service, the Central Department of Transfer and Registry 
and all the governors and staff of the relevant correctional institutions. We are grateful for their devoted and 
valuable assistance!
9 In this paper, the following offences fall under the term of homicide: murder, attempted murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, murder of a newborn, abortion, aiding and abetting suicide.
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that on the said date there were 1,240 prisoners and a further 62 people subjected to psychi-
atric treatment who had committed such an offence before their incarceration.
From this already narrowed roster, we selected those who caused the death of more than 
one person (according to the provisions of Chapter XV, Section 160 of the Criminal Code). 
After we had narrowed the scope of the likely candidates, we managed to lower the number 
of subjects to 137 convicts housed in 21 different institutions located in Hungary. This was 
the last part of our research where we could turn to the Central System of Registry for assis-
tance. For the rest of our inquiry, our primary method was to process the appropriate registry 
documentation of each relevant prison manually in order to obtain the exact number of serial 
killers determined as such by the definition of serial murder.
After the provided data had been processed, we determined that on 12 January 2016, 16 
serial killers were housed in Hungarian prisons, out of which 15 (№1–№1510) were convict-
ed, and 1 (№16) subjected to psychiatric treatment. As a rule, we were only focusing on the 
data relevant to the 15 convicted prisoners during our research. Exceptions were made on 
four separate occasions: (1) we included №16’s attributes during the analysis of the motives 
behind the serial killers’ offences and the resulting classification; (2) we also included them 
in the analysis of attempted suicides; (3) during the illustration of the frequency of life sen-
tences made without the possibility of parole (hereinafter: life without parole), and finally 
(4) we added the relevant data of another prisoner (№17) during calculating the frequency of 
acts of self-harm. As this person committed suicide in 2015, the relevant data is not included 
in this study. Despite—and partly because of—this fact, using his data was justified and 
important for providing adequate answers to three of the questions above.
Characteristics of Hungarian Serial Killers
Classification based on placement and sentence length. Currently, six Hungarian correctional 
institutions serve as the serial killers’ place of detention.
Table 6. Hungarian correctional institutions which serve as the serial killers’ place of detention.  
[Edited by the author.]
Name of prison Number
Budapest Strict and Medium Regime Prison: №6, №8, №11, №12, №13, №14, №15 7
Márianosztra Strict and Medium Regime Prison: №10 1
Sátoraljaújhely Strict and Medium Regime Prison: №9 1
Szeged Strict and Medium Regime Prison: №1, №3, №4, №5, №7 5
Tiszalök National Prison: №2 1
Forensic Psychiatric and Mental Institution №16 1
Total 16
10 In this paper the names of the serial killers serving their sentences in Hungarian correctional institutions will 
not be provided. Instead, we assigned a specific number to each of them, which serves two purposes: (1) we 
acknowledge the personal rights of each prisoner (2) by using these numbers consistently we ensure that the 
data provided below will be easily linked to a “virtual person”, thereby providing adequate source material for 
possible future inquiries.
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Table 7. Composition of prisoners based on sentence length.  
[Edited by the author.]
Length of sentence Number
Life without parole: №4, №5, №7, №8, №9, №11, №12, №13, №14, 
№15
10
Life with parole: –
Determinate (years) prison sentence: №1, №2, №3, №6, №10, №16 6
Total 16
The Motive Behind the Offences
Typification was conducted based on relevant registry data and available information and was 
performed according to a special system of classification widely used by the FBI. [11: 18]
Table 8. The Motive Behind the Offences. 
[Edited by the author.]
Motive Number
Anger—Passionate fury or hatred against a subgroup or society as 
a whole: –
0
Criminality as a form of enterprise: №2 1
Financial gain: №1, №3, №5, №10, №11, №12, №13, №14, №15 9
Murder based on ideology—targets are the members of a specific race, 
gender or ethnicity: №7, №8, №9
3
Lust for domination and/or arousal: the perpetrator enjoys the leverage 
gained over the victim and/or becomes aroused by killing: №6
1
Psychosis—the perpetrator suffers from a serious mental disorder which 
serves as the principal factor and reason behind committing the murders: 
№16
1
Sexual nature: №4 1
Total 1611
The frequency of main motives leading up to the offence in Hungary differs significantly 
from the internal proportions provided by international research. While serial murders of 
sexual nature represent the largest proportion on an international scale, in Hungary they 
were a driving factor only in the case of one person. In Hungary, the most decisive and 
frequent motive behind the offences is financial gain (subgroups 2 and 3; total of 10 persons, 
amounting to 62.5%).
Hereinafter, our detailed analysis will be limited to the scope of convicted prisoners only. 
We decided so because the offence committed by the person sentenced to psychiatrictreat-
11 In this case, the motives of all 16 perpetrators have been categorized meaning that the data of person who 
had been sentenced to court-ordered psychological treatment to be carried out in the Forensic Psychiatric and 
Mental Institution will also be taken into account.
P. RUZSONYI: Serial Killers on the Other Side of the Bars: “Bestial Humans—Human Beasts”
(16) 3 (2017) 23
ment (to be performed in the Forensic Psychiatric and Mental Institution) does not com-
pletely agree with the criteria of serial murder. Although the profile of the offence meets two 
conditions (four victims, murders committed separately with delays between them), the time 
between the murders was exceptionally (three consecutive days) low. Despite the claim of 
Douglas et al. [7] who state that the length of the “cooling off” period can vary greatly with 
each individual, the daily murders led us to the conclusion that this period had not occurred at 
all. The person in question suffers from a grave mental disorder—his/her deeds were dictated 
by visions and inner voices—which in turn led him/her to eradicate his/her entire family 
after he/she had “merged” with the demon. In our opinion, the most adequate procedure was 
to include this person’s data during the motive-based classification (since there is a separate 
category dedicated to perpetrators suffering from some sort of mental disorder), but exclude 
it from the remaining part of the inquiry.
Characteristics of the Serial Murderers’ Prison Socialization
In our opinion, serial murder is the most radical form of violent offence and serial killers 
are the most vivid benchmarks of the negative attributes that are usually associated with 
murderers. Our formal-logical conclusion therefore is the following: if we can achieve any 
sort—noting even the smallest increment—of improvement in the personality of these con-
victs, then there will be even more hope for success for the rest of the prisoners.
The serial killers’ successful reintegration into society—with the exception of a very 
small number of cases—cannot be a viable goal. As most of them will never have the option 
to return to society as a free person, the principal and exclusive aim will be to ensure their 
successful adaptation to the prison environment.
Staying in Contact—Link to the External World
According to Ágnes Solt, three-quarters of prisoners had had a relationship that later ceased 
to exist. The most important reasons for the loss of friends, distant relatives and acquaintanc-
es were the physical distance and time. These two attributes slowly erode such relationships 
as those within them may begin to think that such a limited form of contact is not worth 
maintaining. On the other hand, in the case of closer relatives and immediate families, it is 
not these factors that cause these relations to wither but arguments, debates, divorces and 
deaths take their place. After analyzing the reasons behind the disappearance of contacts, 
we can conclude that those sentenced to life without parole belong to a strikingly different 
category. In their case, futility and the feeling of pointlessness are the chief factors that play 
a role in breaking bonds. The author in her research emphasizes the tendency according 
to which “the mental state of the prisoners gradually deteriorates due to the conditions 
experienced by them. Their disillusion, hopelessness and desperation gradually increase as 
decades pass.” [37: 92] This process is even more apparent in the case of convicts sentenced 
to longer periods “who, over time become introverted and mistrustful while their self-esteem 
deteriorates”. Their social activity fades as they drift into the routine-like schedule of each 
day. Their external relations gradually erode and finally terminate, causing them immense 
suffering and pain. [37: 98]
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Collecting the specific reasons that played a role in the deterioration of the serial killers’ 
relationships (family and friends) was beyond our powers. However, we are able to provide 
a brief “snapshot” of the situation experienced on the given date.





№2; №3; №7; №8; №10; №11; №12 №1; №4; №5; №6; №9; №13; №14; №15
As a rule, we can ascertain that the relationship of seven (four among them sentenced to life 
without parole) convicts was stable, while the remaining ones (eight persons out of which six 
having a life without parole sentence) were irregular. Apparently, 75% of those sentenced to 
life have disorganized relationships, making it even more obvious that in their cases, social 
relationships tend to loosen up as friends and families slowly give up on these convicts.
Table 10. Regular and irregular relationships in the context of spent years.  
[Edited by the author.]
Passed years Regular Irregular
0–5 №14; №15
6–10 №7; №8; №10; №11; №12 №9
11–15 №1; №4; №5
16 + №2; №3 №6; №13
The identified correspondences differ in many aspects from the expectations set by academic 
literature.
1. In the analyzed sample, two convicts had been admitted in the timespan of five years. 
Despite the relatively short length of the time that passed, their relationships are irreg-
ular and unstable, although the principal reason behind this phenomenon may well be 
the fact that they are foreign citizens having no relatives living in Hungary.
2. 86% of those convicts who had been in prison for 6 to 10 years have regular relations. 
This is way beyond previous expectations.
3. As far as maintaining contacts is concerned, the “milestone” of relationships for serial 
killers in Hungary seems to be 10 years of incarceration. The links of those who had 
spent more than 10 years within became unstable and irregular. This tendency agrees 
with the expected outcome put forth by academic literature.
4. №2 and №3, who had been in prison for 21 and 18 years respectively, set a completely 
different pattern by being able to maintain stable and regular relations. There is a great 
chance that this unprecedented example is because each of them has been convicted for 
multiple offences, and as such their chances to be released in the future are significant.
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Adaptation Difficulties, Rejection of the Situation:  
Intentional Self-harm, Attempted Suicide, Completed Suicide
The indicators put forward by international research seem to agree regarding suicidality. 
They boast statistical evidence to prove that the number of suicides committed by convicts 
sentenced to longer periods increases as time passes. [38] In addition, a number of authors 
emphasize that those who have been sentenced to life are even more threatened. [39] [40]
While analyzing the changes in suicide attempts admitted by the prisoners, Ágnes Solt 
has come to a similar conclusion. She claims that “the number of prisoners who attempt 
suicide increases depending on the time spent incarcerated. While out of those who had spent 
8 years in prison only one-tenth claimed to have attempted suicide, in the case of those with 
decades of incarceration this number is almost 25%.” [37: 93]
As for serial murderers, even though our analysis is solely based on assessing and process-
ing the documented cases but due to the peculiarities in their incarceration and continuous 
control, chances for latency are practically nonexistent. The survey data is a lot more concrete 
than the subjective assessment of “admitted suicide attempts”, therefore our results—mostly 
owing to their objectivity—are more precise and closer to reality.
Out of the currently incarcerated serial killers, the earliest admission was performed in 
1995 (№6), and as such the scope of the analysis extends to the last 21 years. During this 
timeframe, one prisoner (№17) committed suicide in 2015. Statistically, this number is so 
low and the scope of those concerned is so limited, that in itself it is insufficient for making 
far-reaching conclusions. If, however, this number is coupled with the number of attempted 
suicides and the acts of self-harm, then the results can be significant and thus worthy of 
further statistical examination.
Table 11. The statistics of the prisoners. [Edited by the author.]
Prisoner no. Admission Attempted suicide Self-harm
occurrence date occurrence date
№12/life without 
parole





2015 two occasions 2015
№17/life without 
parole
2004 completed 2015 three occasions 198512 
2004 
2006
The completed suicide (№17), the attempted suicide (№14) and the six deliberate acts of self-
harm (№12 once; №14 twice,13 №17 three times) expressly shows the subjects’ rejection of 
their experienced situation which they find intolerable. They felt like they had to do something 
in order to permanently “escape” from the unbearable conditions or at least—through the pain 
12 During serving a previous sentence.
13 №14 resorted to self-harm on two consecutive days. Grotesquely, on the second occasion he etched the word 
“life” into his arm.
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caused to themselves—alleviate the mental pressure. Among the reasons of these uncalculated 
and sudden acts we can point out the fact that all three of these persons had been sentenced to 
life and their designated accommodation was a special section reserved for prisoners sentenced 
to longer periods. The maximum-security conditions coupled with constant and enhanced 
control and the incomprehensibly infinite nature of time induced a mental crisis within them. 
Garami [41] adds that the punishment itself leads to consequences such as depression, which in 
turn may be accompanied by or lead to social isolation and suicide attempts.
The development of the “negative mood” within the subjects may have been further 
facilitated by their inconsistent and irregular relationships (from this regard, №12 is in the 
most favourable situation as he or she is being visited every 2–3 months; №14 has irregular 
relations, while №17 has never had any such contacts causing the “external world” to perma-
nently close for him.) A characteristic of their monotonous daily life is that none of them has 
participated in activities such as education, training or vocational courses.
Violent Misconducts/Offences
While analyzing the behaviour of inmates within a prison, it is important to assess their 
relation with the staff and their peers besides their acts of self-harm. The best indicator that 
can be used to this end is the number and nature of violent misconducts committed by them.








Violence against staff member
Threatening other prisoner
Violence against staff member
№4/Life without parole 2002 2004 Preparation for terrorist attack, 
preparation for escape, attempted 
escape
№5/Life without parole 2002 2004 Preparation for terrorist attack, 
preparation for escape, attempted 
escape
№6 1995 2002 Violence against other prisoner
№14/Life without parole 2011 2014
2015
Violence against other prisoner
Violence against other prisoner
№17/Life without parole14 2004 2007 Violence against other prisoner
A total seven convicts (44% of the incarcerated serial killers) committed violent misconducts 
10 times altogether. Four of the prisoners attacked other prisoners on five occasions (25% 
of the serial killers), while one convict attacked staff members twice. Not only these 
14 №17 committed suicide in 2015.
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misconducts are already way over the number of similar acts perpetrated by the “normal” 
prisoner populace, but the ones such as “escape” (№1), “preparation for terrorism and escape, 
attempted escape” (№4 and №5) are the most dangerous. During planning these acts, the 
perpetrators do not refrain from the idea of harming or even killing members of the staff, or 
taking them hostage, some of them actually incorporate such a deed into their plans. We are 
yet to find another group in Hungarian prison history where the number of such dangerous 
misconducts is so elevated and concentrated. In our opinion, the alarmingly high number of 
these acts (19% of the serial killers became involved in such an act—while the statistical 
data of 2015 for misconducts committed by the whole prison population in general was 
only 0.03%) can be attributed to two reasons: (1) two out of the three perpetrators had been 
sentenced to life without parole, therefore—according to relevant Hungarian regulations—
there is no lawful alternative for them to leave prison and what is more, the severity of their 
punishment cannot be increased, meaning that they feel like they have nothing to lose. (2) 
These convicts have already got used to murder, as №1 killed three, №4 killed nine and №5 
killed four persons.
The reasons for the fact that none of these attacks resulted in grave, life-threatening inju-
ries or death are manifold:
1. a significant part of the convicts in question is housed in the special “HSR” (long-term 
special section) part of the prison where the professional experience and training of 
staff members is above average;
2. due to the smaller number of prisoners within this subgroup, each of the convicts re-
ceive more attention from the staff members, who therefore become quickly notified 
about the onsets of personal and private issues;
3. the inmates spend most of their time alone;
4. their movement outside of their designated cells is carried out with a constant and strict 
supervision and security measures;
5. the monitoring of the specially designed cells is extensive, frequent and thorough.
Rewards
Rewards are one of the most important pedagogical tools used within the institutions. This 
tool can be and must be used in all of the subgroups formed by prisoners. Csóti emphasizes 
that in the case of inmates sentenced to longer periods, “in order to create a foundation for in-
dividualized decisions, there is a great need among those working with such prisoners for an 
efficient exchange of information and genuine teamwork. Ever since the beginning we have 
been advocating the inclusion of prisoners with long-term sentences to the rewards system, 
during which we mostly focus on strengthening personal relationships and supplementing the 
personal needs for such convicts”. [42: 28]
Turning back to serial killers, it is worth analyzing the number of rewards obtained by 
them from two aspects:
1. The prisoners’ acceptance of the regime and their resulting way of life can be esti-
mated by the number of rewards they have received. This, however, will only provide 
grounds for the individual analysis of each convict. In order to obtain a more detailed 
picture and to make comparing the behaviour of the prisoners possible, we calculate 
the quotient of the number of obtained rewards and the years spent in incarceration.
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Table 13. Statistics of the rewards. [Edited by the author.]
№1 №2 №3 №4 №5 №6 №7 №8
Total 20 12 37 26 16 10 1 0
Reward/year 1.3 0.6 2.0 2.0 1.2 0.5 0.1 0
Table 14. Statistics of rewards. [Edited by the author.]
№9 №10 №11 №12 №13 №14 №15
Total 1 13 3 2 13 2 8
Reward/year 0.1 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.6
The number of received rewards annually by each prisoner is nearing 1 (0.9). Nevertheless, 
these items should not be interpreted on their own as the result may easily mislead the reader 
into thinking that the prisoners are actually very cooperative. The situation is of course a lot 
more complex. There are serial killers whose behaviour is exemplary—at least it may seem 
that way. Those two convicts who colleted the largest number of rewards (№3 obtained 37 
rewards in 18 years; №4 received 26 rewards in 13 years) may easily be considered “model 
prisoners”, but such an assumption would be a grave mistake considering the fact that №4 is 
a psychotic person who displays significant talent in simulation. Not even the psychopathic 
murderers live up to the academic expectations, though: the other psychopath (№6) collected 
“only” 10 rewards in 21 years.
2. Another factor also worth addressing is the dynamism of prisoner cooperation as it 
will allow us to get a better picture of each inmate’s willingness to cooperate and its 
course. In order to proceed, we classified the prisoners into categories using three-year 
intervals based on their admission related to the latest crime they had committed.
Table 15. Categories of the prisoners. [Edited by the author.]
№1 №2 №3 №4 №5 №6 №7 №8 №9 №10 №11 №12
1.‒3 yrs. 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 2 1
2.‒3 yrs. 4 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
3.‒3 yrs. 0 1 0 10 6 3 0 0 0 8 1 1
4.‒3 yrs. 9 0 9 10 4 0
5.‒3 yrs. 4 1 15 3 1 4
6.‒3 yrs. 8 13 2
7.‒3 yrs 2 0
Total 20 12 37 26 16 10 1 0 1 13 3 2
P. RUZSONYI: Serial Killers on the Other Side of the Bars: “Bestial Humans—Human Beasts”
(16) 3 (2017) 29
Table 16. Categories of the prisoners. [Edited by the author.]
№13 №14 №15
1.‒3 yrs 0 1 8






Total 13 2 8
Each of the serial killers received close to 11 (10.9) rewards. In addition to discrepancies 
(№3–37 rewards; №8–zero rewards) among the individuals, we can also point out deviations 
in time. During the first six years, 11 serial killers received a total of three or fewer rewards. 
Moreover, what is also apparent is the fact that most of the subjects become more cooperative 
from the third three-year interval. One of the possible reasons for this phenomenon was 
pointed out by Solt, who claims that longer periods have the positive effect of improving 
the prisoners’ control over their conduct thereby contributing to their adaptation and limiting 
the number of impulsive, hasty and aggressive acts. [37] Boros seems to agree with the 
conclusion above, claiming that “the rational structure of the prison system, the framework 
of motivations and the organization of the daily lives of prisoners all incline these people to 
adapt and thus create and develop this self-control”. [43: 24]
Matovics states that analyzing the behaviour of convicts sentenced to life led him to 
conclude that these people are characterized by a cooperative, conformist attitude. However, 
due to the nature of their sentence and the fact that they are housed in the isolated sections 
of the cell blocks, their feeling of vulnerability is higher than what is found in the members of 
the standard prison populace. This is what makes it difficult for them to accept the refusal 
of their petitions and often consider these events as personal insults from the decision-mak-
ers. They react sensitively to the behaviour and mood of the staff and their decisions made 
concerning their daily matters.” [44: 105]
Disciplinary Measures
Besides rewards, punishments (using correctional terms: disciplinary measures) can also 
be used as a pedagogical tool. The number of disciplinary measures conducted against the 
populace in question is significantly low when compared to the rewards obtained (average: 
3.4 punishments/person, which means 0.37 punishments annually).
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Table 17. Statistics of the disciplinary measure. [Edited by the author.]
№1 №2 №3 №4 №5 №6 №7 №8
Total 5 10 0 2 2 7 0 0
Measure/year 0.3 0.5 0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0 0
Table 18. Statistics of the disciplinary measure. [Edited by the author.]
№9 №10 №11 №12 №13 №14 №15
Total 0 0 4 1 4 14 2
Measure/year 0 0 0.6 0.1 0.2 2.8 0.4
The chart indicates that five of the convicts (№3; №7; №8; №9; №10) display their 
cooperativeness by not performing any misconduct at all. The disobedience of another four 
prisoners (№4; №5; №12; №13) is not significant. Among all the serial killers there is but 
one convict who actively constantly rebels against the internal order within the institution.
Determining the Indicator of an Inmate’s Cooperativeness
Determining an inmate’s level of cooperativeness in an objective and systemic way is difficult. 
Nevertheless, we will still endeavour to create a new system of evaluation. In our opinion, an 
indicator that helps to determine the cooperativeness of an inmate and the stability of such 
behaviour can be created using statistical methodology.
Our approach is the following: the number of committed misconducts will be deducted 
from the number of rewards a prisoner has obtained. (“Regular” misconducts are “rewarded” 
with a score which will be multiplied by violent misconducts as follows: violent acts against 
fellow prisoners multiply by this score by three, violent misconducts or their attempt against 
staff members and the prison system itself will multiply the score by four). Based on the 
results we have assembled five different groups:
If the difference between the two items:
1. is positive, at least three and the result exceeds the years spent incarcerated, then the 
prisoner is exceptionally cooperative (++);
2. is positive and at least three, but the result falls below the number of years spent incar-
cerated, then the convict is cooperative (+);
3. is around zero (–1; 0; 1), then two general subgroups can be established:
4. (3–1) if the number of rewards and punishments does not exceed three, then the pris-
oner is neutral (+0);
5. (3–2) if the number of rewards and punishments exceeds three, then the prisoner is 
irregular and unpredictable (–0);
6. is negative, but does not exceed 3, then the prisoner is not cooperative (–);
7. is negative and exceeds 3, then the prisoner is openly hostile and dangerous (–).
P. RUZSONYI: Serial Killers on the Other Side of the Bars: “Bestial Humans—Human Beasts”
(16) 3 (2017) 31
Table 19. Indicator of the inmates’ cooperativeness. [Edited by the author.]
Number №1 №2 №3 №4 №5 №6 №7 №8
Reward 20 12 37 26 16 10 1 0
Regular  
misconduct






prisoner = 3 
points
1 staff = 4
1 staff + 1 
prisoner = 7
0 1 staff = 4 1 staff = 4 (1) = 3 0 0
Indicator 20 – 8 = +12 12 – 15 = –3 37 – 0 = +37 26 – 5 = +21 16 – 5 = +11 10 – 9 = +1 1 – 0 = +1 0 – 0 = 0
Years spent 15 21 18 13 13 21 7 7
Evaluation + – ++ ++ + –0 +0 +0
Table 20. Indicator of the inmates’ cooperativeness. [Edited by the author.]
Number №9 №10 №11 №12 №13 №14 №15
Reward 1 13 3 2 13 2 8
Regular  
misconduct
0 0 4 1 4 12 2
Violent  
misconduct




0 0 0 0 0 2 prisoners = 6 0
Indicator 1 – 0 = +1 13 – 0 = +13 3 – 4 = –1 2 – 1 = +1 13 – 4 = +9 2 – 18 = –16 8 – 2 = +6
Years spent 7 7 7 7 17 5 5
Calculated 
value
Evaluation +0 ++ –0 +0 + – +
The behaviour of the serial killers based on the evaluation system above:
• Three convicts are exceptionally cooperative (20%)—two of which have multiple sen-
tences, one has been sentenced to life without parole
• Four prisoners are cooperative—one of them having multiple convictions, three have 
been sentenced to life without parole.
• Four prisoners are neutral—all of them having life without parole sentences
• Two prisoners are irregular and unpredictable (13%)—one with multiple sentences, 
one sentenced to life without parole.
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• One prisoner (7%) is not cooperative—multiple convictions.
• 1 prisoners (7%) is openly hostile and dangerous—life without parole.
Based on the analysis we are able to determine that:
1. during prison socialization, seven (47%) convicts not only did accept their situation 
but are also cooperative with the system and conform to the internal order. Three 
of these prisoners had been convicted multiple times, while four of them are sentenced 
to life without parole;
2. four prisoners have a neutral attitude—each of them sentenced to life without parole;
3. four prisoners completely renounce the prison system, their sentences and their cur-
rent situation while either occasionally or constantly rebelling against the rules. Two 
of these convicts had been convicted multiple times, while two of them are sentenced 
to life without parole.
Significant differences between convicts imprisoned for life and convicts who have multiple 
sentences within these subgroups are not to be found. The sole exceptions to this fact are those 
whose behaviour is neutral, as all of them have life sentences without parole. An explanation 
to this could be that out of the four relevant prisoners three persons were only convicted 
in 2016. It is possible that they opted to “wait out” and alter their behaviour significantly, 
hoping that it might influence the court and the verdict. Their behaviour will probably change 
and stabilize later when they perceive the fact that they will remain in prison for the rest of 
their lives.
Out of the convicted serial killers in Hungary, 67% have a sentence of lifelong imprison-
ment without parole.
In the next part of our inquiry, (Life sentence without the possibility of parole—“We do 
not allow them to live, we do not let them die”) we will address the issue and characteristics 
of this special—and internationally debated—form of punishment, the imprisonment of life 
without parole.
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The Effect of High Oxygen Level (Kaqun)  
Water and the Ability to Use It  
to Maintain Military Combat Tone
Iván SZALKAI1
In the last decade, the nature and purpose of wars have changed, along with 
the rules and methods of conducting military activities. The problem of chronic 
stress has come to be a significant factor in foreign peacekeeping and policing 
missions. Physical training and psychological methods have been covered so far 
in the preparation and management of the stock in extreme environments. Our 
examination of the neurobiological side concerns the process. We assume that the 
biological state of the 60-year-old healthy population is closest to the situation of 
younger, distressed people.
We studied the effect of water with high oxygen content (Kaqun water) on 
cardiovascular and mental functions of elderly people in a randomized, double-
blind, control group study. We have examined the plethysmogram, the standard 
deviation of the pulse in relaxed state and under load with the tools of heart rate 
variability (HRV) analysis, the speed of vasodilation (flexibility), blood pressure 
(systolic and diastolic), oxygen saturation, simple reaction time (SRT) and 
cognitive reaction time (CRT). We experienced significant changes in the reduction 
of systolic blood pressure, reflex time and cognitive time, stress index.
These are early signs of changes in chronic stress. The use of Kaqun water has 
normalized the status of test subjects. Based on this—as well as our experience—the  
use of Kaqun water is also recommended in operational conditions to increase 
combat ability, regeneration and rehabilitation.
Keywords: water with high oxygen content, Reactive Oxygen Species (ROS), 
hypertension, reflex time, cognitive time, vascular stiffness, distress, chronic stress, 
combat capability
Introduction
In the last decade, the nature and purpose of wars have changed, along with the rules and 
methods of conducting military activities. Whereas from the Second World War to the be-
ginning of the Gulf War massive armies fought against each other, in the modern age smaller 
units fight for specific goals in peacekeeping and policing missions, as well as in the current 
military activities in Iraq and Syria. In such military activities and battles, the role and the 
workload of individuals increase, which makes an individual more valuable than before. 
The usage of modern weapons systems, the required mental and physical performance cause 
stress, even if it is different in character from that experienced in earlier wars. These factors 
1 M.D., Rtd. Colonel, external instructor, University of Miskolc, Health Faculty; e-mail: szalkai1@outlook.hu
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emphasize the importance of the individual soldier, and the importance of enhancing or 
maintaining his physical and mental capabilities.
In the performance of its international obligations, new environmental pathognomic 
factors have appeared in the operating environment of our national military, and these factors 
will become more and more probable in the near future. In our missions conducted in crisis 
zones, we have already encountered the stress-inducing effects of extreme weather, heavy 
workload and the need for independent decisions. These factors affect the adaptive and reac-
tive ability of the body (both in a biological and psychological sense). The types of effects on 
the human body: the performance of the body and the adaptability of the circulatory system 
also decrease, certain mental processes slow down, and the fluid balance may be upset.
In NATO, it is becoming more and more important to assess human factor by unified 
principles. Physical eligibility assessment and fatigue management has come up as a new 
demand. More research shall be done and appropriate measuring instruments and systems 
should be developed to learn more on the performance of soldiers working in extreme con-
ditions, their physiological reactions, internal processes, the limitations of their mental and 
physical capacity and the causes of those limitations. These experiments shall focus primarily 
on the effect of sensory experience on the autonomic nervous system, the circulatory system, 
its adaptation, and the operation of mental processes. One indicator and consequence of the 
increased stress is the hypoxic state, so the monitoring and treatment of that should be a top 
priority. Hypoxia and the changes taking place in the body as a response to that are of primary 
importance for the functioning of the body.
Presently, the targeted selection of the military staff has already reached a high level.
However, two factors appear to be necessary to improve the process and solve the above 
problem:
1. Biological stress reaction shall be measured, which can be a starting point in the prepa-
ration of the individual.
2. A new methodology shall be introduced, which, applied at the service location, en-
hances the ability of the individual to adapt to environmental circumstances, and helps 
to speed up the process of physical as well as mental adaptation.
The ability of a person to work and fight is affected by the vegetative nervous system, in 
particular, and by the condition of the circulation, stress sensitivity and mental state, especially 
memory. Measuring these parameters (tremor, HRV analysis, nerve conduction velocity and 
reflex time, and working memory time-usage time) appropriately traces the individual’s work 
and combat ability. Combat capability can be maintained and improved by enhancing the 
above parameters:
• The outside world and the individual’s biological system are in close relationship.
• The biological system can be taught, trained, and the upset balance of the body can be 
restored by suitable methods.
• Balance is the result of a process whose precondition is achieving and maintaining 
homeostasis.
Oxygen as a highly reactive substance is an essential element in the formation of free 
radicals. ROS and Reactive Nitrogen Species (RNS) play an important role in controlling the 
functions of the body, such as:
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• They stimulate the functioning of the immune system and also form the main antimi-
crobial substance of the phagocytes.
• The release of the free radical is an aspecific stimulus of the cellular immune system, 
and antiviral and antitumor immunity is initiated. This process is also verified by our 
own measurements.
• Reactive nitrogen radicals play a significant role in the formation and disappearance 
of pulse wave-associated vasodilation. Reactive nitrogen radicals play the role of the 
primary neurotransmitter in the synaptic transmission of information.
The pathological role of low oxygen levels has been demonstrated in military operations 
mainly involving diving, airborne and mountain troops. In the latter case, staying 4,500 m 
for a short time (less than 4 hours) or between 2,500 to 3,500 m for more than 4 hours fall 
in different categories. [1] [2] High mountain oxygen deficiency can lead to acute high-
altitude disease, chronic high-altitude sickness, cerebral edema, and pulmonary edema. [3] 
Acclimatization takes 5–9 days (controlled by instruments), but according to US military 
authors, the adaptation process lasts longer. There have been experiments with special 
respiratory muscle training, but they brought visible results at heights above 4,000 m. [4] 
Oxygen is a basic element for life, this is well known. We know less about the role of water in 
the intra and extracellular space. Kaqun water is a specially produced water for consumption 
and bathing (functional water), whose physical properties, pH, oxygen level are different 
from the normal drinking water (OTH permit 420-2/2007, OKI expert opinion: 6212/2011). 
Kaqun water is a fluid, which contains 16 mg oxygen per litre, pH value is between 7.5 
and 8.5 (slightly alkaline) and it has a lower osmotic pressure than cytoplasm, whose effect 
mechanism is:
• The modified absorption and utilization conditions, reducing the size of the water clus-
ters, where the average cluster size is 4–8 water molecules because of the tetrahedron 
structure. This size can penetrate through the openings of the cell wall along with the 
dissolved substances in them.
• A high rate of oxygen, which is believed to be the consequence of reduced hydrogen 
ration and so the oxygen molecules are inherently reduced in the electron content.
• A burst-like pro-oxidant (ROS) effect, which acts as a signal for the body, enhances 
apoptosis, accelerates cell regeneration, enhances the function of natural killer cells, 
promotes vasodilation and potentiates the body’s antioxidant enzyme system.
• The alkaline effect due to the rearrangement of the water molecules, which reduces 
acid deposition and so tissue edema, as well.
We associate the deceleration of memory, neural and cognitive functions with old age. 
We assume this is due to the accumulation of pro-oxidant radicals, metabolites accumulating 
in the body and the decrease of neural and mental activity.
The decline of neural and mental functions is one of the early signs of ageing, which can 
be objectively determined by measurements.
The aim of the study is:
• To justify or reject the hypothesis that the consumption of Kaqun water influences:
 – basic mental functions;
 – has to have an impact on the operation of the autonomic nervous system;
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 – influences blood pressure;
 – affects vasodilation.
• To examine whether these effects depend on the dosage.
• To examine the rate of development in time and durability of the effects.
Method of Examination
The study was a placebo-controlled, randomized, double-blind trial.
The materials: Kaqun water, placebo: tap water in Kaqun bottle.
Basic thesis: reactivity to the outside world of the average population about 61 years old 
is similar to a young, hardened population, but in a state of chronic stress.
A total of 60 people took part. They formed 4 groups of 15 people each:
1. Consumption of 0.5 l Kaqun water daily;
2. Consumption of 1 l Kaqun water daily;
3. Consumption of 1.5 l Kaqun water daily;
4. Control group; consumption of 1 l water daily.
Table 1. Group characteristics. [Edited by the author.]
Composition Age
Male Female Total Average
1. 5 8 13 65.69 years
2. 3 12 15 63.73 years
3. 3 8 11 68.36 years
4. 2 7 9 66.44 years
Total/Average 13 35 48 65.93 years
The dropout during the examination was not due to side effects. One volunteer complained 
about headache, but the relationship with water consumption could not be proven.
The study included volunteers of both sexes between 50 and 75 years of age, who did 
not consume Kaqun water nor bathed in Kaqun water for 2 months prior to the study. Health 
status was appropriate for their age. The sorting of the people was done in order of arrival. 
The members of the control group were selected in another city so they did not meet with 
the test group.
When selecting the sample, the following criteria had to be fulfilled by the volunteers: 
self-sufficient, or still active worker in the given age group, lives an active social life, has 
average health status. The examination consisted of the following tests: Serial reflex time 
(SRT)—testing the dominant hand 32 times. We analysed the average P200 time, filtering out 
the 3 highest values we deem as a learning phase. We also examined the wave of the P200 
time. The normal value is 200 msec.
1. Cognitive reflex time (CRT)—recognizing different sounds, signalling with the push 
of a button, making it more difficult with counting backwards, pushing the button and 
simultaneously saying the number. The length of the test is 32 times. The normal value 
is 300 msec. In the examination we did not include the 3 highest values and values un-
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der reflex time. We deemed the highest value a learning value, which falsely stretches 
the results and the values under 200 msec are not the results of a cognitive process.
2. Heart rate variability (HVR) measurement, standard deviation, standard deviation % 
in normal condition and after 10 squats (30-watt load). We recorded base data and the 
differences. The standard deviation data represent the stimuli of the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic nervous system, so they can be used as a stress index. We determine 
the minimal and average value of vasodilatation, which shows the flexibility of the 
capillaries.
3. Measuring oxygen saturation.
4. Blood pressure and heart rate were recorded. The heart rate was measured in a relaxed 
state and after load in every 10 second cycle, the fit index, i.e. the time when the heart 
rate reached the relaxed heart rate after load.
Instruments for Measuring
Oxygen saturation: Innomed joint-stock company Oxycard device, which records the oxygen 
saturation of the peripheral blood and the average heart rate.
Other tests: Kellényi’s tremometer, which records the time between a signal and the re-
sponse. A software dynamically records the measures valued after statistical analysis.
Statistical analysis: Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) analysis, linear correlation and regres-
sion analysis, standard error analysis, normality test, dependent variables (equality of aver-
ages test, stochastic homogeneity test), and to assess the significance level of the changes.
Five measurements were performed on the selected subjects, at the beginning, then on the 
7th, 14th, 21st and 28th days.
Figure 1. Evaluation of blood pressure.  
[Edited by the author.]
The blood pressure was measured before everything else, after at least 10 minutes’ rest. 
The results are as follows (comparison of median values). The number in parentheses is the 
biggest value of reduction.
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Kaqun water significantly reduces systolic blood pressure. In the 1.5 l/day p = 0.0147, in 
the 1 l/day group p = 0.0259, while in the 0.5 l/day group this is p = 0.0174. The data 
of the control group do not follow the moving of test groups. Rather, it has increased slightly. 
The result is significant.
Figure 2. The change of the diastolic blood pressure. In the control group  
the pressure increased, in the Kaqun group it depended on the decreased dose.  
[Edited by the author.]
The diastolic blood pressure was in the normal value for each group. There was a significant 
decrease (p = 0.0416) found only 1.5 l/day group, although it was noticeable in the other 
Kaqun groups, as well. The data of the control group rather increased.
Relaxed Vegetative Index Analysis
The vegetative index is the quotient of the average R-R distance divided by the standard 
deviation. The heart frequency is controlled by the autonomic nervous system, an immediate 
reaction can be seen to the body’s physical and psychological effects. [5] [6] The hypothesis 
of the study is that the consumption of Kaqun water improves the body’s cope with stress to 
physical impacts. Heart frequency is an immediate indicator of the body’s physical and psy-
chological effects. The rating is monitored between the R–R peaks, and the standard deviation 
of this. The standard deviation shows the vividness of the autonomic nervous system (change 
of sympathic and parasympathic effects). Among customers who have increased sensitivity 
to stress and use 1.5 l Kaqun Water pro die, the decrease is significant (p = 0.0135). In one 
litre/day group decreasing of stress index was significant (p = 0.002726). Where the group 
used 0.5 l /day water, the result was not significant.
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SRT Analysis
The change in reflex time shows the difference in the speed of the nerve impulses. The meas-
urement was done with the classic method, push-button reply to acoustic stimuli. The time 
between the sounds was random. We kept the lowest values, the three highest values were 
excluded. We observed among the elderly people the low degree slowdown of the reflex time.
Figure 3. Change of reflex time. The effect depends on the dose, the 1.5 and 1 l/day are similar, 
the control is not changed.  
[Edited by the author.]
It is noteworthy that the reflex time of the studied population differs only slightly from the 
normal 200 msec value. During the reflex examination we have excluded all disturbing 
factors, the volunteers only focused on the automatic execution of the task. During the test, 
the standard deviation shows fatigue, lack of attention and concentration of the test subject. 
The greatest improvement is seen in the worst-case group. Therefore, the use of water accel-
erates the reflex time and also improves the concentration.
Cognitive Reaction Time
The study of the time requirement of cognitive processes measures the usage time of the 
work memory in case of divided attention. It can be seen that compared to the base time, 
significant acceleration can be seen against the control group. The normal range of cognitive 
time is 300 msec. Significance levels: 1.5 l/day group starting position is higher than 300 
msec – p = 0.024937; 1 l/day group p = 0.00098; 0.5 l/day group p = 0.00403.
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Figure 4. Change of cognitive time. The results of every water group were significant.  
[Edited by the author.]
The rate of memory usage (consciousness) is determining the organization’s operation and 
maintenance of survival. This is a prerequisite for adaptation for the load. Cognitive time 
plays a major role in the rapidity of position recognition, task solving, decision-making, i.e. 
in the survival of military personnel in combat situations.
Oxygen Saturation Analysis
The consumption of water with high oxygen content should result in the increase of oxygen 
saturation, the improvement of the body’s oxygen supply. The increase in saturation was 1% 
in the control group. The reason for the 1% increase is probably the bodies being filled up 
with water. By comparison, we have experienced saturation increase in the 1.5 l/day Kaqun 
group. The linear correlation analysis considered the changes in the 1.5 l group significant. 
The data raise the possibility of the filling of the bodies with water improves oxygen satura-
tion in itself.
Table 2. Oxygen saturation. [Edited by the author.]
1.5 l/day 1 l/ day 0.5 l/day Control
Change in % 2 0.73 0.54 1
Dosage, Efficacy and Maximum Time of Effect Appearance
An important question is in what dosage should the water be consumed and when does the 
maximum impact appear at the given dosage.
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Table 3. Evaluating efficacy. [Edited by the author.]
Sist. RR Diast. RR Veg. index SRT CRT Saturation Total points
1.5 l 2 1 3 1 3 1 11
1 l 1 3 1 2 2 2 13
0.5 l 2 2 2 3 1 3 13
We put in this table depending on the scale of changes first, second or third place. From this 
we can prepare the dosage suggestions. So:
• Consumption of 0.5 l daily is recommended to increase the CRT.
• Consumption of 1 l daily is recommended to decrease systolic blood pressure and 
reduce stress sensitivity.
• Consumption of 1.5 l daily is recommended for other cases.
The appearance of maximum impact generally falls on the third week in case of both the 1.5 l 
and 1 l dosage, and then the values decrease. The exception is in the cognitive time but even 
here the difference between the third and fourth week is minimal. Therefore, basically the 
three-week consumption followed by a one-week break is the recommended dosage.
Evaluation
The high oxygen content “ionized” waters basically change the cluster structure of water, 
modify the H-O rate in favour of the oxygen, thus changing the electrical activity of the 
water molecules, as well. The osmotic pressure of this water (300 mOsm/l) is higher than 
the  osmotic pressure of the cytoplasm (280 mOsm/l). This pressure difference also helps 
the lower sized clusters of water molecules flow into the cell. The structure of water clusters 
determines its effect. [7] This influx is also supported by the transport proteins of the cell 
membrane. [8]
Cellular metabolism contains such redox processes, where even under physiological 
conditions oxygen with oxidative properties (Reactive Oxygen Species—ROS) and nitrogen 
(Reactive Nitrogen Species—RNS) compounds are created. They include free radicals with 
one or more unpaired electrons on their external electron shell, such as hydroxyl radicals, 
 superoxide radicals, nitric oxide radicals or lipid peroxyl radicals and highly reactive mol-
ecules without radical properties such as hydrogen peroxide or hypochlorous acid. Due to 
the effect of Kaqun water, the number of free radicals in the body increases, which starts 
biological processes representing dangerous signals for the body. Although free radicals and 
reactive compounds created in a specified concentration and location do plan an important 
role as signals for the physiological functioning of the cells. [9] Due to their great reactive 
properties, they play a regulatory role in the signal transduction pathways, since getting into 
interaction with signalling molecules and enzyme proteins, they can influence their functions.
Nowadays more and more studies confirm the signalling role of the redox system. 
The  redox signal triggers specific regulatory processes (e.g. apoptosis at cellular level, vas-
odilation at tissue level. [10] Redox processes have a role and place in the operation of the 
body, they cannot be considered as clearly negative participants, although they play a role in 
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many lesions and diseases. Nowadays the regulatory role of free radicals is considered more 
primary as their pathological role, which is not about free radicals, but about the pathology, 
exhaust the body’s control system. The oxygen molecule is not dangerous, but during trans-
formation with electron uptake free radicals are developed and these have harmful effects, 
as well.
The life span of free radicals is in vivo 10‒7, 10‒4 sec which enables them to act as signals 
and exert their effects not only at the place of creation but further away, as well. The physio-
logical location of the creation and control of free radicals is in the cell mitochondrion. Here 
the continuously created free radicals are neutralized by the superoxide dismutase enzyme. 
In the presence of iron or copper ions, it is very aggressive. Hydroxyl (OH) radical is created, 
which stays for 10‒9 sec. No enzyme is able to neutralize this (Fenton-reaction). As we have 
seen it, this reaction also has a role in water polymerization. The control of the body takes 
place in the earlier, peroxide phase.
Should the balance of the pro-oxidant and anti-oxidant system be upset, degenerative 
diseases begin; this is called oxidative stress.
The living cells continuously create and maintain an extreme, complex, 3-dimensional 
electric, i.e. redox pattern as electrical systems. The most efficient and quick physiological 
(and pathological) control is done by reactive oxygen and nitrogen derivatives. In the aerobe 
cells, the coordinated mitochondrial network consumes 90% of the oxygen used, securing 
the energy provided by adenosine triphosphate (ATP) for cellular processes. This dynamic 
mitochondrial energy and the redox system change from moment-to-moment depending on 
the intra- and extracellular signs. When the oxygen is reduced compared to the current energy 
demand of the cell (reduced oxygen supply or increased energy demand) the coordinated 
intracellular mitochondrial network issues a hypoxic redox signal with the increased ROS 
emission. The increased ROS emission, as a secondary messenger system induces a coordi-
nated complex response with redox-sensitive factors and molecules.
The oxidative processes in the body are bound to two compounds, the ROS and RNS 
group. The RNS enzyme has three different isoforms. The neuronal nRNS (in central and 
peripheral neurons) and endothelial eRNS (mainly in endothelial cells) continuously express 
calcium and calmodulin dependent enzymes. The inducible iRNS are created in immune 
cells and several other cell types. The transcriptional activation of iRNS can be caused by 
endogenous mediators (chemokines, cytokines) or exogenous factors (bacterial toxins, viral 
infections, allergens, ozone, hypoxia, tumours, etc.).
The effects induced by ROS in the signal transduction pathways can be divided into four 
main groups: [11]
• By increasing the IC concentration of certain ions (e.g.: Ca2+), contraction and cell 
migration are triggered.
• By activating certain transcription factors (AP–1, NF-κB, HIF–1), inflammation is in-
duced.
• The matrix can modify the proteins of the extracellular matrix by affecting the metal-
loproteinases.
• Reversibly inactivates such protein tyrosine phosphatases like mitogen-activated pro-
tein kinases (MAPK), which by representing an important IC signal transduction path-
way ultimately activate transcription factors (e.g.: c-myc, p38), which control apopto-
sis, cell growth and differentiation.
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ROS and RNS also operate as neurological signals; they play a role in the neural signalling 
processes, in the formation of neuroplasticity and memory. Nitric oxide (NO) is a free 
radical molecule capable of freely diffusing through the cell membrane and can act as 
a neurotransmitter, neuromodulator and signalling molecule. It controls the neurotransmitter 
emission, and through this way the synaptic activity and can control the excitability of 
midbrain dopamine neurons. However, neurotransmitters also have antioxidant and free 
radical catching properties, thus they regulate neurotransmission and the protective effects 
towards neurons.
The consumption of Kaqun water creates a reactive radical peak (-OH, O2- and H2O2) 
from the moment of consumption for about 20 seconds, which with the above-mentioned 
mechanism, on one hand enhances the effect of free radicals and promotes apoptosis, the 
stimulation of immune system, on the other hand it provokes the body’s own antioxidant 
system. [12].
Several mechanisms may be responsible for the effect of Kaqun water:
1. Creation of free radicals, which has a direct vasodilational activity and plays a sig-
nalling role; quickens the neurotransmission speed as a neurotransmitter (decrease of 
reflex time) and information processing on the nerve cells (improvement of memory 
time).
2. Improved energy processes due to the higher oxygen consumption of mitochondria.
3. Improved oxygenation due to the indirect effect of the fluid compartments filling up.
Lucas found [13] that training enhances the Hgb level in the brain of elderly people with 
a parallel improvement of the cognitive functions. This coincides with our own observations. 
Shpirer et al. have published [14] about the decrease of attention in people with apnea due 
to hypoxia.
Such pathologies are rooted in the warming climate and the shifting weather zones that 
influence the general reactivity of the human body. The appearance thereof is expected 
mostly in the form of cardiovascular diseases, the increased dehydration of the body, such 
as nephrolithiasis, increasing amount of harmful metabolic products, old-aged dehydration 
symptoms.
The performance, persistence, and reactivity of the human body are influenced by various 
factors. These have already been analysed in detail in the Euro-Atlantic literature, but the 
analyses have not considered the results of Oriental life sciences and their theoretical-log-
ical-empiric world. Oriental medicine describes the world organically, in the context of 
environment and man. These are the descriptions of currently known scientific results from 
another logical-empirical approach. This experience is valid even now and gives the oppor-
tunity to interpret and utilize the scientific based results of the two areas.
The preservation and maintenance of the capacity to work nowadays means more than 
the self-fulfilling and serving interest of the self, or the manifestation of the ego. For society, 
it is now an important economic and future determining interest that the working capacity 
of the population and the fighting efficiency of the army is guaranteed. The two areas are 
inseparable; the working ability of the population is a support (sustenance) toolkit and frame 
of reference, it also defines the “labour task”, the fighting efficiency of the army.
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The morbidity data of Hungary, and the very fact that they are lagging behind the majority 
of European and post-socialist countries prove that our solutions applied by us so far are not 
efficient, thus both the theoretical and practical approaches need to be restructured.
One of the compensation methods for ambient effects is adaptation. The method of adap-
tation can be social, technical, system organizational, but one should not disregard individual 
biological adaptation that can be the result of a personalized method. With the help of the test, 
we would like to define how the techniques established as a result of the screenings tracking 
biological functions built on personal characteristics can support a given person’s adaptation 
against the changes of ambient circumstances.
The results of the test provide a solution for the following problems:
Increasing the stress-bearing capacity of military forces used in modern warfare is possi-
ble by regulating the vegetative nervous system, accelerating brain function, reflex time and 
cognitive time, and improving physical performance. This effect can be achieved and main-
tained without any other side-effect by applying Kaqun water. Although it is not discussed 
in the present study, the cellular immune system intensifying the effect of Kaqun water is 
widely known, similarly to its wound cleansing and healing effects—primarily if applied 
as a bath treatment. All these make it ideal to apply it as a mobile (containerised) service in 
camps.
The results of the research—over and above the narrower focus military application—are 
also highly beneficial on a social level. The increasing number of the elderly is characteristic 
of modern societies; this process has already started in Hungary, but practically it is present 
in every modern state, including India and China. Taking care of the elderly alongside with 
the present policy principles brings about a significant increase in costs and expenses, not 
only due to the payment of the pension, but also because of the increasing demand for certain 
services (social and healthcare).
In connection to the climate change, social adaptation was put into the forefront, regard-
ing elderly care; social reactions have been studied which currently means a restriction on 
care services due to the economic situation. The improvement of individual stress processing 
ability and adaptability enhance the working and self-sustaining ability of the individual, 
thus betters the quality of life, lifetime, and the keeping of self-evaluation. The social effects 
thereof would save billions of HUF in the sector of the active healthcare only.
Military Use
In asymmetric war operations and peacekeeping procedures, our soldiers are situated and 
acting not in a moving front line, but rather in camp circumstances. As a result, they use 
half-stationary water treatment systems placed in containers. These systems can be connected 
to a mobile Kaqun water system also installed in a container, and as a result, either the 4-tube 
bathing system or the 10,500 l/day Kaqun drinking water manufacturing system can also be 
established. Soldiers are supplied with special drinking water from this system. The Kaqun 
water manufacturing unit can be fed from either tap water or from the water arriving from 
the water treatment facility. If using water treatment container, the connecting tap should be 
installed behind the first demineralizing round, and the Kaqun water production system can 
operate by using this water. In the case of drinking water production, there is no by-product, 
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whereas in connection with bathing, a thermal load of the used bathing water of 34–36 cen-
tigrade needs to be considered.
The application of Kaqun water in military circumstances:
1. Maintaining and intensifying physical performance; for this, the consumption of 1 litre 
of Kaqun water per day is enough.
2. Improving mental performance.
3. Compensating environmental pathologic effects with the help of Kaqun water con-
sumption and bathing.
4. Stress reduction after deployment by applying one 50-minute bath per day. With the 
already existing 4-tub system the bathing of 60 persons can be performed per day.
5. Healing superficial wounds, injuries. [15] [16]
The Use of Kaqun Water for Rehabilitation Purposes
In order to use the previously described effects, the Las Vegas Kaqun Bath has concluded 
a contract with the Veterans Charity Ride to Sturgis program of the White Hearth Foundation. 
In this program, the rehabilitation of injured soldiers wounded in recent wars is performed.
Injuries, problems of the soldiers:
• fractured or amputated limbs due to explosion and the replacement thereof with pros-
thetic devices;
• post-traumatic syndrome (sleep disturbance, panic disorder, social inclusion disorder);
• gunshot wounds;
• scull—brain injury;
• locomotion disorders and resulting;
• overweight.
In preliminary studies primarily with veterans with posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSDs), 
there was a significant improvement in pain, insomnia, tense nervous system, and drug use.
Summary
The raised oxygen (Kaqun) water has special characteristics. Oxygen and free radicals in 
the tissues stimulate the body’s energy system and are thus suitable for the prevention and 
treatment of chronic stress (battle stress, fatigue, PTSD).
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Operational Capability Enhancement of NATO 
Rotary-Wing Forces1
Tamás BALI2
Operational experiences of the recent past have revealed the significance of the 
helicopters and their combat and combat support capabilities in the asymmetric 
warfare environment. Recognizing the importance of the helicopters, the 
commanders of operations required an increasing number of rotary-wing assets 
onto the battlefield which has been traced back for various reasons by the 
participating nations. The situation becomes more complicated by the serious 
capability disparities among the rotary-wing forces already on the battlefield. 
The gaps in combat support lead consequently to the overall operational capability 
reduction in NATO forces. In my study, I look for solutions on how to increase 
the number of helicopters on the operational theatre, and how to enhance 
the operational capability of NATO rotary-wing forces.
Keywords: helicopter, operational capability, NATO, smart defence, training, 
interoperability
Preface
Operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the significance of the heli-
copters and their combat and combat support capabilities in the asymmetric warfare environ-
ment. Recognizing the importance of the helicopters, the commanders of operations required 
an increasing number of rotary-wing assets onto the battlefield which has been traced back 
by budgetary and political reasons by the participating nations. This consequently led to 
the situation where helicopter deficiency became common at warzones. This problem was 
officially laid down even on NATO strategic level in 2009.3 [1]
In many cases, a nation cannot provide their helicopters due to their pilot training insuf-
ficiencies or simply there are not enough rotary-wing assets at their hand which can cover 
all home defence tasks and allied missions abroad. International deregulation also causes 
problems on required operational pilot qualifications and the way they must be reached. 
Pilot training procedures differ in each country. Moreover, some of the training elements 
can hardly be flown4 (or it is even impossible) at home bases due to the given countries’ 
geographical possibilities.
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Zoltan Bay Ludovika Workshop.
2 Ph.D., Colonel, Deputy Commander of HDF 86. Szolnok Helicopter Base; e-mail: bali.tamas@hm.gov.hu
3 The document entitled BI-SC Priority Shortfall Areas names 50 NATO essential operational capability 
shortages.
4 These can be: mountainous flight training, brown-out (desert) training or flight training over broad water 
surface.
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There are significant differences amongst the flying hours of a nation’s helicopter pilots. 
In some countries,5 pilots get specific training focusing on special operations since it can an-
swer best to the asymmetric challenges, while in others, there is no trace of a specialization. 
Here, helicopter pilot training covers the whole spectrum of training elements for each of the 
participating pilots. Obviously, the flying hours provided for them cannot be adequate for 
everything. Their pilot proficiency level will never reach the proficiency level of those, who 
concentrate on only one proficiency segment but on a professional level. Thus, significant 
proficiency differences can be observed amongst them on the operational theatre. This prob-
lem was highlighted by the document entitled Standardization of Qualification for NATO 
Helicopter Crews in Support of Land Operations of the NATO Joint Air Power Competence 
Centre (hereinafter: JAPCC). [2]
The different rotary winged aircraft (hereinafter: RW) platforms used by NATO nations 
do not help the situation. For those who use Western built helicopters, it is not a problem to 
meet the present operational challenges but with the Russian RW assets we can see the other 
side of the coin. Those military installations leg far behind the Western ones; along with 
this their upgrade to NATO standards proved to be a very expensive task. It is so expensive 
that many nations cannot even afford it for themselves. For example, in the case of Eastern 
helicopters, self-defence capability, secured voice and data communication, night and infra 
vision poses challenges. It is reasonable enough that during allied operations interoperability 
is hardly interpretable when the RW assets have different capabilities and the pilots have 
disparate proficiencies.
So, all in all, how can the operational capabilities of the NATO RW forces be improved? 
How can the number of the helicopters be increased on the operational theatre? Can it be 
a solution the utilization of the so called Smart Defence Concept,6 [3] which was announced 
at NATO’s Chicago Summit in 2012 to balance the defence expense’s decreasement?
NATO’s Smart Defence Concept
There are few people in Europe who have not been affected by the economic crisis erupted in 
2008. During the subsequent period, we had to face economic challenges, financial recession 
and an austerity policy at state level. This economic policy affected the defence sector as 
well, moreover, the budget constraints influenced it mostly. This could happen since there 
has not been any military action since the end of World War II in Europe, consequently it 
has become low priority to maintain strong military force for the nations. In order to bridge 
military capability gaps caused by the above-mentioned challenges, NATO’s reaction was to 
utilize Smart Defence.
The program itself was firstly (officially) described in February 2010 by Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen NATO’s former Secretary General, then it received an increasing role at the 
NATO Summits. This obviously does not mean that the idea had not been arisen beforehand, 
on the contrary, it received ever growing attention just after the outbreak of the economic 
crisis.
5 Apart from the United States, these are (as an example) Poland and the Czech Republic.
6 Due to the declining defence spending, NATO leaders adopted the so called “Smart Defence” concept in May 
2012, Chicago, based on which the member states have agreed to share their military assets and operational 
capabilities.
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Smart Defence is based on capability share, since to create and maintain all-embracing 
military capabilities for each of the individual nation’s economy poses a huge burden. That 
kind of a concept has become evident for the allied nations in which they can share their own 
capabilities for cost-effectiveness. Upon the notion, each of the allied nation must seek its 
national strength in its defence sector, then their capability improvement must be concentrat-
ed toward these areas to be able to offer them to the Alliance later. The emerging capability 
gaps—in case of necessity—can be filled on cooperation with other countries. With this, 
NATO persuades the allied members for the international cooperation in order to help the 
Alliance itself with the nation’s economic, industrial and political potential. [4]
However, some topic-related questions emerge:
1. Are the NATO allied nations willing to give up their weaker home defence capabilities 
and rely entirely on other nations?
2. What will happen in a case of an interest-conflict between two cooperating allied na-
tions? Will they further provide their full capabilities to each other or serious resistance 
develops?
3. Is the nationalist way of politics still viable for some of the member states, or do they 
have to sacrifice a part of their national sovereignty by reducing some of their home 
defence capabilities?
This undoubtedly affects a NATO-sensitive area, namely the deepness of integration amongst 
the member nations (or—oppositely—do they incline to maintain their national autonomy?). 
Will the Alliance’s interest overwhelm the member nation’s? The answers for these questions 
defines the realism of the Smart Defence concept.
Even at a communication level the member states support the concept; still, it is worth 
briefly overviewing what they actually do for its realization. Concentrating on the rotary-wing 
arm, we can clearly see that the nations do not discard their already build operational and 
training capabilities.
• From an operational point of view, their home defence interests far outweigh Smart 
Defence’s principles, even if their RW capabilities leg behind NATO interoperability 
minimum requirement standards. They know, that in the present asymmetric opera-
tional environment7 quick reaction and mobility has crucial importance.
• They know, that during any hostile activity, they will not have time to wait till interna-
tional forces arrive. There will be an immediate need to deploy the land force.
• From a training point of view—on a conceptual level—there is no significant differ-
ence. The nations know, that an army can be abolished by the cancellation of pilot 
training. Moreover, the patriotic, motivated soldier (devoted to his or her country’s 
defence), can only be socialized during a national training process.
Undoubtedly, pilot training can be bought from other allied member states, but in this case 
the flexibility disappears. In a case of urgent need, it can happen, that a given nation does not 
get proper number of training slots from its contracted counterpart. For these reasons, nations 
7 Asymmetric operational environment should be considered when the opposing forces have different 
organizational structures, armament and way of warfighting. During an asymmetric conflict, actions do not 
need to be taken against a unified-, or not even against a single guerrilla force. While drafting a military 
counter action, it must be directed against dozens or even hundreds of different active groups. [5]
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are more likely to maintain their domestic helicopter pilot training systems, and offer their 
vacant training slots on flat cost to other countries (to keep it sustainable).
It is a perfect example for the above written thoughts, how the Czech and Croatian parties 
maintain their own rotary wing and training capabilities operational under the umbrella of 
the European Defence Agency (hereinafter: EDA) by the Czech led Multinational Helicop-
ter Initiative’s (hereinafter: MHI) HIP Helicopter Task Force program. [6] Multinational 
pre-deployment training for nations operating “Mi” helicopters in Afghanistan carried out in 
two phases and locations, funded by EDA. The Czech Republic provides the emergency pro-
cedural and operational training for RW aircrews at HTP Ostrava on their Mi–171 simulators. 
Croatia (Croatian Defence Forces) provides practical flying training with their own Mi–17sh 
helicopters. I must underline the fact again, that both countries receive significant financial 
reimbursement from the EDA. Such sum of money that covers expenses of the simulation 
centre in Ostrava, and the cost of running the Croatian helicopter fleet. Apart from these, the 
money covers not only the Hungarian aircrews’ training, but the Czech’s and Croats’ as well.
But, if running the Smart Defence concept raises so many questions and if it works only 
on a principle level and actually seems unviable in practice, what can the solution be?
Practical Solutions for Operational Capability Enhancement  
of Rotary-Wing Forces
In the followings, I would like to outline the problems described above from a practical point 
of view. By writing this chapter, I intend to propose solutions to RW operational capability 
enhancement. To do that, I completed my research from several directions, on a global scale.
The capability itself obviously does not mean only having an adequate number of RW 
assets on the operational area. For an efficient task fulfilment, there must be equally trained 
(and also wisely thinking) aircrews, who are using the same tactics. The human resource is as 
important as the serviceability of the helicopters.
As for the first solution proposal, the cooperation improvement of NATO and EU 
­forces,­ the­ synchronization­ of­ their­ flying­ tactics. At present, 25 out of the 28 NATO 
member nations are European. The principles of deployment of the European forces are laid 
down by the EDA, which in many cases are not synchronized with NATO regulations. On the 
part of NATO, the combat RW aviation arm’s deployment principles are in the ATP–49(G) 
document. [7] The same purpose is served by the EDA HEP handbook of Standing Operat-
ing Procedures. [8] Obviously, this is not good, as it is. It cannot be allowed for any given 
EU associated aircrew to think differently in an operation led by NATO, and again in an 
operation led by the EU force. Effective deployment on a situation-based mindset change is 
unthinkable. But, which should be the preferred direction? Should it be the EU’s or NATO’s 
deployment principles to be put into the forefront? Is it possible to force a NATO dominant 
United States to accept EU developed flying tactics? As for my opinion, it is impossible, 
since the US military itself is stronger than the whole EU armed forces together.
On the other hand, the EU forces themselves presumably could not be able to counteract 
any of the Russian armed advance. In our present security-policy situation, for example the 
Baltic States would not be unconditionally happy with a pure EU force provided airspace 
defence over their region, since it could lead to a detriment of a well-functioning, security 
guarantee NATO cooperation. It is unacceptable for them (and even for the Polish as well) to 
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face the Russians without the power of the US military. These nations do not inadvertently 
emphasize, that NATO is the strongest safeguard of the European defence.
So, since there is no formal cooperation between NATO and EDA, it must be (as a first 
step) established. Following this, using a constructive communication method, these two 
organizations must jointly develop and standardize their deployment principles.
To­carry­out­common­trainings­and­exercises.­Considering the contemporary opera-
tional tempo, a nation concentrates on reaching the aircrews’ combat ready training level8 as 
soon as possible. Internationalism can rarely be incorporated into this tight-paced training, 
so, there is a low possibility for any multinational joint training. However, as a result of some 
necessities, there are some training areas in which nations must rely on each other. These 
can be due to a geographical characteristic of a given country or because of the lack of local 
expertise or training asset. It is the same with our country, where pilots must complete their 
mountainous training in Slovenia and a Mi–17 emergency procedural training in the Czech 
Republic. Table 1 below shows the abroad training locations on a nation level.
Table 1. Cross-training locations of NATO member states. [9]
Mountainous training Desert training Extreme cold training











Ideally, trainings must be followed by such exercises in which pilots can improve their flying 
skills into routines.
There are serious difficulties in respect with the international exercises’ execution. Each 
nation has its own flying procedures laid down in their regulations which are barely synchro-
nized with each other.
Planning an international exercise takes a long time, [10] since the planners must con-
sider all constraints, limitations and different regulations of the participating nations. Such 
8 The helicopter pilot must be considered “Combat Ready”, if he or she can carry out all of those flying and 
tactical manoeuvres which are on the one hand allowed by the given RW asset’s design, and on the other hand 
are dictated by his or her unit’s regulations.
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limitations may apply to weapon use, flight manoeuvres and procedures, flyable weather 
conditions, pilot rest time, maximum flying hours per day and night under different visual an 
instrument conditions. Since the elaboration of a Standing Operating Procedures (hereinafter: 
SOP) based on broad-ranging national rules, the fulfilment of the NATO-wide multinational 
exercises become questionable. As a tendency, after the initial “flare-up”, already in the 
planning period, member states are quitting the multinational exercises and are performing 
their own (national) exercises instead. It looks obvious, that until the synchronization of RW 
deployment principles of NATO and EU forces it is impossible to talk about internationalism. 
Likewise, there will not be any cooperation if the pilots’ operational proficiencies differ in 
these two organizations. Moreover, it is not enough to sort out the dissimilarities separately; 
in the end, the organizations must unify. It is a very important task, since apart from the US 
military, there is no other country in the Alliance who could cover the entire spectrum of 
operational tasks with its manpower and weaponry. For NATO/EU nations there is no other 
choice than to match their segmented capabilities and “burnish” them together during inter-
national exercises. If this happens, the helicopter forces’ interoperability-based operational 
capability will be greatly enhanced.
The question of RW­aircrew’s­operational­proficiencies’­standardization­is organically 
related to the previously written subject. More than four years ago NATO’s JAPCC—ana-
lysing the capabilities of NATO forces—drawn up in its study entitled Enhancing NATO’s 
Operational Helicopter Capabilities [9] that one of the biggest obstacle to an efficient opera-
tional deployment is a disharmony amongst coalition aircrews’ proficiencies. The work start-
ed to solve this problem by NATO Standardization Agency’s (hereinafter: NSA) Helicopter 
Inter Service Working Group (hereinafter: HISWG). The ultimate goal of the work is to 
develop a standardized, nation-wide accepted Allied Tactical Publication (hereinafter: ATP) 
document which clearly identifies the minimum qualification requirements of RW aircrews 
involved in allied operations. HISWG developed a draft study entitled ATP – 90 – Minimum 
Core Competence Levels and Proficiency of Skills for Helicopter Crew for NATO Operations 
upon the suggestions and guidelines of JAPCC’s Standardization of Qualification for NATO 
Helicopter Crews in Support of Land Operations. [2] Overviewing the content of this study, 
it can clearly be expressed that adoption and application of the directives for all NATO/EU 
countries:
1. will improve the interoperability of all aircrews that undertake allied operations, there-
by enhancing helicopter operations’ effectiveness;
2. will provide the possibility for competent human resource management for all on-
scene commanders.
However, the situation outlined above can be tinged with two things. One is the different 
content of the pilot qualifications9 obtained, and the other is the density of flights required 
9 Pilot qualification: A crewmember receives a qualification after passing an examination or completing an 
official course during which the individual demonstrates the knowledge, skill and aptitude required to safely 
and effectively complete the task within their approved national standards. For helicopter pilots, multiple 
qualifications can often be acquired within one specific course or training session. For example, during 
a specific mission qualification course, night vision goggles, low level flight, gunnery qualifications could be 
a part of the syllabus and could be acquired upon graduation of this course.
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to maintain pilot proficiencies.10 Probably the best way to clarify the differences on pilots’ 
qualifications is to use an example for it. So, a pilot’s qualification cannot be the same if 
an individual’s mountainous training is performed at 1,000 m or at 4,000 m. It is the same 
qualification on paper, but indeed, this is not so. There can be quite similar differences at 
formation-, instrument- or degraded visual environment flight qualifications. Likewise, 
missing an international standard, nations use their own regulation to maintain pilot 
proficiencies. Thus, a given proficiency can be maintained in one country with a 30 days-, 
and in another country with a 6 months’ flight repetitions. It is again obvious, that it does not 
mean the same level of proficiency if the helicopter pilot repeats brown-out flight every 30 
days or if he/she makes it every 180 days. Recognizing these anomalies, HISWG started the 
work on standardizing qualifications and proficiencies. Evidently, the extent of flight hours is 
limited by the economic opportunities of the individual nation which has a negative impact 
on the density of required flights to maintain proficiencies, yet a compromise solution must 
be found in this area as well.
Use­of­interlinked­tactical­simulators.­Nations have individually created their own sim-
ulator capability due to financial aspects in order to facilitate their aircrews’ flight technics 
and tactical training. The training itself can be carried out under the simulated active coun-
ter-activity of the enemy forces, under visual and instrumental meteorological conditions. 
Aircrews in the digital space—amongst others—can perform support tasks for land forces, 
practice of their on-board weaponry and tactical manoeuvring. Naturally, this cost-effective 
training method is nowadays quickly spreading across the countries, but they have been 
created autonomously. Nations are exercising their own tactical procedures on them. Further 
emphasizing the facts previously written at common trainings and exercises, if these auton-
omous simulators were linked, it would open the possibility for international level exercises, 
which could enhance the RW forces’ operational capabilities. I must underline to the margin 
of the exercise on network, the currently unsolved information protection problem which 
occurs when secured data and voice communication is transmitted via the Internet between 
the simulation centres.
Improvement­ of­ sharing­ operational­ lessons­ learnt­ and­ experiences. Today, only 
those nations can perform their RW tasks efficiently, who can quickly adopt themselves to the 
rapidly changing operational environment, who are able to evaluate the conflicts outcomes 
and lessons, who can transform their training to meet the newly arisen challenges and can 
implement those into their armed actions. It is easy for those nations, who are on the oper-
ational theatre and gaining and processing experiences on a daily basis. However, there are 
some others who are just planning to deploy their helicopter forces to the warzones. If they 
do not get information on the changes, they will not be capable to prepare for them either.
Not having proper information about the current challenges, these nations must face 
serious interoperability problems with the experienced ones that can only be eliminated by 
providing additional training for the aircrews on site. Since it cannot be the goal to train 
aircrews in a combat situation, competent operational lessons learnt and experiences shared 
must be created amongst the nations. If that happens, the whole helicopter branch could step 
ahead on the field of operational interoperability.
10 Pilot proficiency: A helicopter pilot is considered “proficient” when he or she, firstly, is deemed qualified per 
national guidelines, and secondly, is current and skilled. It is essential for commanders to know which specific 
mission assigned helicopter pilots are proficient in.
56 (16) 3 (2017)
T. BALI: Operational Capability Enhancement of NATO Rotary-Wing Forces
Closely connected to the experience share topic, I have to underline the importance of 
the use of pilot exchange programs. These exchange programs are especially useful for 
those nations who have inadequate operational knowledge, since information transfer can 
be facilitated at the base of the host nation for a long-term period, from a representative 
of a more experienced nation. These programs are equally useful among the more experi-
enced nations also, as they can even learn different tactical procedures and aircraft handling 
 methods. The usefulness of these programs are shown by the widespread involvement 
of NATO  nations. (Table 2)
Table 2. Pilot exchange programs at NATO member states. [9]









We can see from Table 2, that the pilot exchange program works; however, its volume does 
not reach the level required for a sufficient flow of information and experience. For example, 
the Central and Easter-European countries11 tend not to participate in it. They are precisely 
those countries which upon the deficiencies and constrains of their air assets and operational 
experiences are lagging far behind their Western counterparts. In order to create an equal 
level of knowledge for an efficient operation, an existing pilot exchange program needs to 
be extended.
The implementation of a mandatory, standardized pre-deployment evaluation 
­(TACEVAL). Despite the fact that RW forces have a decisive knowledge on the allied 
standards that apply to them, only a standardized evaluation system can ensure that they 
really have been implemented, or they are correctly applied. It is a special situation that the 
helicopters are not uniformly located in the armed forces. While in some countries helicop-
ters serve at the Air Force, others are at the Land forces. The document entitled ACO Forces 
Standards Volume I—General [11] published by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers of 
Europe (hereinafter: SHAPE) and Allied Command Operations (hereinafter: ACO) applies to 
all military branches and services, and must be applied at joint forces level.
SHAPE’s ACO FS Volume III—Air Forces [12] specifically addresses the Air Force. 
Here, there is a detailed and exact regulation of the capabilities of the RW forces involved 
in Allied operations. The problem stems from the fact, that although ACO FS Volume I state 
11 Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland.
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the joint forces level application requirement, it is only the Air Force’s helicopter arm who 
utilizes it at its capability forming, the Army Aviation is not. This consequently leads to ca-
pability differences among these arms’ RW forces. If the helicopter forces, regardless of their 
military affiliation, would have an equivalent understanding of ACO FS Volume III and they 
would also apply uniformly ACO Forces Standard Volume VI—SHAPE Tactical Evaluation 
Manual [13] (hereinafter: STEM) at the evaluation of their capabilities, the result would be 
the same high level of operational capability.
The implementation and interpretation of STEM should not be done individually by the 
nations, it must be applied to all NATO member states equally. If this happens, all those 
nations will also comply with the highest level of operational requirements who have not 
yet implemented the regulation written in NATO Standardization Agreements (hereinafter: 
STANAGs) and ATPs, as they will be forced to make extensive preparations to comply with 
the standards and they will be virtually levelled up.
Last, but not least, I have to emphasize the importance of the improvement of pilot 
English­language­proficiencies. The high English language proficiency is a key factor in the 
efficient mission completion. Without having communication, there is no interoperability, 
quick reaction capability slackens and decision-making cycle slows down.
Conclusion
The economic difficulties of the past period had a negative impact on the capabilities of the 
nations’ armed forces. The helicopter branch was also not avoided by the negative effects 
of the constraints. The number of serviceable helicopters decreased, as well as the extent 
of the flying hours. In spite of these limitations—in what regards the security necessities—
the level of operational ambition did not decrease. In addition to the fact that most NATO 
nations reduced the size of their armed forces, they refused to abandon their home-defence 
capability. This decision led to the declining tendency of national contributions to Allied 
operations. Obviously, this situation is untenable, since it weakens the overall capability 
of the Alliance which globally results serious security issues. It is unquestionable, that the 
level of operational capability of the NATO cannot be reduced, solutions need to be found to 
enhance it. In my present study, I dealt with the exploitation of the Smart Defence concept’s 
opportunities and to outline practical procedures for securing rotary-wing capabilities in 
a sustainable manner. It is important to do this, as it is essential to ensure Air Force and 
Army aviation RW operational capabilities, as there is no country with a competent, powerful 
force, if it is unable to use it, to ensure operational tempo, to protect its forces, and to provide 
logistical support for it.
References
[1]  NATO 2009 BI-Strategic Commands Priority Shortfall Areas. Brussels: NATO Allied 
Command Transformation, and Mons: Allied Command Operation, 2009.
[2]  Standardization of Qualification for NATO Helicopter Crews in Support of Land Operations. 
Kalkar: NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2015.
58 (16) 3 (2017)
T. BALI: Operational Capability Enhancement of NATO Rotary-Wing Forces
[3]  Chicago Summit (May 2012) Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 
2020. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm (Downloaded: 15.03.2017)
[4]  ETL A.: A NATO és az Okos védelem, az Okos védelem és Magyarország. 
biztonsagpolitika.hu (online) http://old.biztonsagpolitika.hu/?id=16&aid=1379&title=a-
nato-es-a-smart-defence-a-smart-defence-es-magyarorszag (Downloaded: 19.03.2017)
[5]  PORKOLÁB I.: Hibrid hadviselés: új hadviselési forma, vagy régi ismerős? Hadtudomány, 
XXV 3–4 (2015), 36–48.
[6]  BALI T.: A helikopter erők felajánlásai, ezekből fakadó kihívások. Repüléstudományi 
Közlemények, XXIII, 3 (2013). http://repulestudomany.hu/folyoirat/2011_3/Bali_Tamas_2.
pdf (Downloaded: 19.03.2017)
[7]  ATP – 49(G) Edition G Version 1 Use of Helicopter in Land Operations. Brussels: NATO 
Standardization Office, 2015.
[8]  EDA Helicopter Exercise Program Standing Operational Procedures. Brussels: EDA HEP, 
2016.
[9]  Enhancing NATO’s Operational Helicopter Capabilities. Kalkar: NATO Joint Air Power 
Competence Centre, 2012.
[10] Gyakorlattervezői útmutató. Budapest: HM HVK Hadműveleti Főcsoportfőnökség 
Kiképzési Csoportfőnöksége, 2000.
[11] SHAPE ACO Forces Standards Volume I—General. Brussels: SHAPE, 2008.
[12] SHAPE ACO Forces Standards Volume III—Air Forces. Brussels: SHAPE, 2008.
[13] SHAPE ACO Forces Standard Volume VI.—SHAPE Tactical Evaluation Manual. Brussels: 
SHAPE, 2008.
[13] SHAPE ACO Forces Standard Volume VI.—SHAPE Tactical Evaluation Manual. Brussels: 
SHAPE, 2008.
[14] MAGYAR Z., RÉVAI T., PADÁNYI J.: The Usability and Significance of Tests Using Live 
Subjects for Measuring the Thermal Insulation Ability of Military Clothing. In. FÖLDI L., 
PADÁNYI J. (eds.): Effects of Climate Change on Security and Application of Military 
Force. Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2014. 97–122.
Vol. 16, No. 3 (2017) 59–72.
59
The German Organization for Security  
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)  
Chairmanship in 20161
Éva REMEK2
Germany planned its 2016 Chairmanship of the OSCE to establish the following 
goals “to renew dialogue and to restore trust among participating states and the 
security of Europe”.3 [30] Germany supported actual work on the priorities of its 
Chairmanship, which involved e.g.—inter alia—strengthening OSCE capabilities 
across the conflict cycle,4 handling old and new challenges of the fundamental 
freedoms in the OSCE region, strengthening good governance, and other new 
types of challenges. The German Chairmanship continued the work of the earlier 
chairmanships of previous years. There are state “chairs” (Switzerland and Serbia 
held the OSCE Chairmanships in 2014 and 2015, they are the OSCE Troika)5 and 
they started a “new model to address new challenges”.6 Related to that it should be 
noted (for this work’s keywords), that Foreign Minister Steinmeier said: “Germany 
wanted to durably strengthen the OSCE and its tradition of an equal dialogue 
among all participating States. This was the only way to rebuild lost trust and 
restore security on the European continent in the long term. This was all the truer 
against the background of the conflict in Ukraine, in which the OSCE had proved 
its outstanding importance and indispensability.” [30]
This analysis aims to present the work done throughout 2016. This paper shows 
and demonstrates that during the German chairmanship of the Organization 
a meaningful dialogue was lead and co-operation was pursued in various fields 
of common interest (mainly their role in context of the European security and the 
Ukrainian crisis) throughout the dimensions of the OSCE. The OSCE approaches 
security along these three dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and 
environmental, and the human.
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Miklós Zrínyi Habilitation Program.
2 Ph.D., Associate Professor, National University of Public Service, Faculty of International and European 
Studies; e-mail: remek.eva@uni-nke.hu 
3 ZIF—Center for International Peace Operations: “Renewing Dialogue, Rebuilding Trust, Restoring Security”. [30]
4	 “I.e.	early	warning,	conflict	prevention,	crisis	management	and	post-conflict	rehabilitation.”	[30]	
5 The OSCE Troika was invented at the Helsinki Summit in 1992 to bring an element of continuity to the 
OSCE’s leadership. It is a format of cooperation between the present, previous and succeeding Chairmanships.
6 Germany made a declaration at the end of its presidency (Hamburg Declaration see later in the text) and the 
OSCE	Troika	invited	the	all	participating	States	commonly	to	work	“along	five	lines	of	action”.	I	believe	
its earlier goal has been achieved with this document. Hamburg Declaration. Source: http://osce.org/
cio/287946?download=true (Downloaded: 20.04.2017)
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This study is a part of my research work, so in the current text details also can 
be read with reference to the earlier and subsequent studies, which have already 
been or will have been written. This seems inevitable because, as I have pointed 
out above, my previous and next studies have referred/will refer to OSCE, crisis 
management and Ukrainian events, too.
Keywords: OSCE, German Chairmanship, crisis, security, dialogue, trust
Introduction
Germany took over the Chairmanship of the OSCE on 1 January 2016. This was the second 
time when Germany had guided the world’s largest regional (pan-European) security organ-
ization [31] since 1991. Foreign Minister Frank-Waltzer Steinmeier was the organization’s 
Chairperson-in-Office,	while	Gernot	Erler	was	the	Federal	Government’s	Special	Represent-
ative for Germany’s OSCE Chairmanship in 2016. [30]
Given the title of the analysis, obviously the question is raised: what did the OSCE Chair-
manship mean for Germany? “Taking on the OSCE Chairmanship was a major project,” 
said Frank-Walter Steinmeier,7 “involving over 300 events in Vienna, Berlin, Potsdam, the 
entire	OSCE	area,	and	last	but	not	least	the	grand	finale	in	Hamburg,	the	Ministerial	Council	
in December 2016”. [1] From a political point of view, the Minister said, Germany had sent 
a clear message in the light of the tasks that they “believe in effective multilateral organiza-
tions, especially now in these times of turbulence, upheaval in the international order and, all 
over the world, the resurgence of nationalism…” [1] and they are “willing to actively take on 
responsibility in such situations”. [1]
It is known that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is the most com-
prehensive regional security organization, comprising 57 participating states from Europe, 
Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic region.8
It	 should	 be	 mentioned	 that	 in	 1975	 thirty-five	 countries	 established	 a	 “cooperation	
forum”. Namely this was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
which was a real forum for dialogue and consultation from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This 
organization was founded with these goals: “to ensure peace, stability and democracy for 
more than a billion people”. [2: 24] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
was the predecessor institution of the OSCE, which concluded with the signing of the Helsin-
ki Final Act. During the Cold War, the organization served as an important multilateral forum 
for	 dialogue	 and	 negotiation	 between	 East	 and	West.	 The	 CSCE	was	 officially	 renamed	
OSCE on 1 January 1995.9 [4]
Today the situation is similar to the then time, i.e. the OSCE is continuing to provide 
its	participating	states	with	effective,	efficient	tools	and	deals	with	current	security	issues.	
Although the OSCE lacks NATO’s military capabilities and the European Union’s (EU) 
7	 Former	OSCE	Chairperson-in-Office,	Germany,	2016.	At	the	end	of	Germany’s	OSCE	Chairmanship	in	2016,	
Foreign Minister Steinmeier took a very personal look back over the year and the next quotes came from 
there.
8 The OSCE is the only security-policy organization in which all European countries and Russia, the USA, 
Canada etc., and Mongolia are represented. Mongolia became the 57th participating State on 20 November, 
2012. [32] 
9 Budapest Summit marked the change from CSCE to OSCE in 1994. Among other things it is important that 
ministers formally “have adopted” the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security. [3: 3]
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 economic resources, yet no other security organization has a mandate to act in such a large ge-
ographical	area.	This	makes	OSCE	the	key	player	in	conflict	prevention	and	resolution,	crisis	
management and hence its uniqueness among internaional players. Quoting NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg: “…the efforts of Germany’s OSCE Chairmanship to focus on 
renewing dialogue and strengthening the OSCE’s instruments and discussion  forums…”, [5] 
the OSCE is a “key player in many areas of particular interest to the Alliance.” [5]
The Changing Face of European Security
“In early 2014, nobody even assumed that only a few months later European security would 
be	significantly	compromised.”	[2:	26]	It	is	not	possible	to	formulate	the	essence	better	than	




him. There was a growing and growing disaffection with the government. This situation 
eventually resulted in a demonstration, after violent and powerful anti-government demon-
strations, at the end it became military clash. It was the worst crisis not only for European 
security	but	also	for	global	security.	Germany	took	over	the	OSCE	Chairmanship	at	a	diffi-
cult moment in European security. The experts said10	that	“illusions	of	quick	fixes	to	the	deep	
strategic confrontation between Russia and the West should be avoided, but opportunities for 
practical	confidence-building	standards	need	to	be	kept”.	[17:	1]
This situation has seriously affected Europe. “The world will never be the same again”, said 
European Council President Herman van Rompuy after, when the Crimea was captured. [26]
It	was	under	these	circumstances	that	the	Chairperson-in-Office,	Swiss	Foreign	Minister	
and President of the Confederation11 launched the “Panel of Eminent Persons on European 
Security as a Common Project” (hereinafter called Panel) at the Ministerial Council in Basel 
in 2014. The idea was to make ready for use on the basis for full range security dialogue 
across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, focusing on consideration the Ukraine crisis 
and especially the importance of security in the OSCE area. [7]
The Panel’s main task was to work out how to rebuild trust and reconsolidate European 
security on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and on how to sup-
port the principles of OSCE. Therefore, the task is examining what kind of threats in the 
OSCE	area	and	researching	common	responses	to	confirm	again	cooperative	security.	It	is	
important to emphasize that the Summary of the Panel’s task outlines the particular role of 
the	OSCE	in	Euro‒Atlantic	and	Eurasian	security.	Its	role	is	unchanged,	namely	the	old-new	
task is preventing and resolving crises (that is also the case in Ukraine). The importance 
of this task can be measured in the long term. And fact it will have a strong effect on the 
German chairmanship work. Why? Because general guidance for the Panel’s work was 
given by the OSCE Troika, composed of the outgoing Swiss (2014), (the then 2015) Serbian 
and	 	incoming	 	German	Chairmanship	 (2016).	 The	 Panel	 is	 attempting	 to	 find	 input	 from	
the OSCE partici pating States, the OSCE Secretariat, other Institutions and Parliamentary 
10 Dr. Petri Hakkarainen is a Senior Diplomatic Advisor at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) and 
Dr. Christian Nünlist is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich.
11 Didier Burkhalter.
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Assembly, multilateral organizations concerned with European security issues, civil society 
and think tanks, etc.12 [10: 20] As we see nowadays, this idea was an extremely good one 
for two reasons. On the one hand none of the existing international organizations, groups 
or	institutional	agreements	have	been	able	to	find	a	peaceful	settlement	to	the	conflict	over	
eastern Ukraine, including the Crimea situation. It means that it focuses on arms contorol, 
reduction armaments, or just questions of trust in political relations. On the other hand, I 
think that it is time, when the OSCE is able to realize its own comparative preferences, values 
i.e. its inclusive nature and consensus-based decision making. As we know the OSCE has 
been the most relevant framework to manage the Ukraine crisis (at present there are three 
missions).13 [8: 23–27]
The aims of the organization’s management were “to continue to play a useful role, the 
body must adjust its methods and strengthen its toolbox”. [9] What does it mean? This is 
a new opportunity for OSCE reform. As I have already mentioned above, the Panel’s task was 
preparing proposals to resolve the Ukrainian crisis. In June 2015, this Panel delivered two 
documents: [10: 2] an Interim report on the Lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis.14 And 
the Final report on the broader issues of security in Europe and in the OSCE area was to be 
presented toward the end of 2015.15 [11] From these documents we can clearly read that the 
OSCE has become relevant again. “The reason for this is not because the West and Russia 
have overcome their differences, but because their relations declined to a point at which both 
sides needed to turn to the organization’s crisis management tools to contain the risks of 
a dangerous escalation.” [9: 13]
In	this	process	the	Troika	is	a	significant	player	(in	our	case	Serbian,	German	and	Austrian	
chairmanship), through this process the organization will continue to stabilize the situation.
It appears that, the OSCE’s role may even increase further. Of course, it depends on many 
factors (participating States’ interest, economic situation, effect of sanctions against Russia, 
etc.). However, as long as this acute challenge dominates the agenda, there will be little 
chance for serious efforts on the longer-term reform of the organization. According to the 
experts’ view the Panel’s “initial paper on the lessons learned from OSCE crisis management 
in Ukraine was useful”. [9: 14]
Furthermore, it is important to realise that given the current polarization among member 
states, the Panel is “unlikely to achieve agreed conclusions on the future perspectives of the 
organization”. [9: 14] At best, it will present an interesting variety of options and diverse 
viewpoints. “Germany’s assumption of the OSCE chair in January 2016 was potentially more 
12	 It	is	mportant	to	quote	the	words	of	Fred	Tanner.	(He	is	Ambassador,	a	Senior	Adviser	in	the	Office	of	the	
OSCE Secretary General. He is the OSCE Secretariat Project Manager of the Panel of Eminent Persons on 
European Security as a Common Project): “The Panel and individual members also make use of opportunities 
to engage with high-level representatives of participating States (for example inside events at multilateral 
conferences and other international events). The Panel is assisted by a support unit that provides operational 
and logistical assistance in convening meetings as well as substantive support in drafting the reports. 
The OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions is contributing research and position papers. 
The	Panel	is	financed	through	voluntary	contributions.”	[7]
13 All OSCE operations are described by the next aspects: basic decision, tasks, deployment, duration, 
composition,	fianancial	implications.
14 This document focused mainly on operational issues.
15 “As soon as the Minsk commitments are in place on the ground, the Panel recommends that the OSCE 
Chairmanship, supported by the OSCE Troika, and in communication with the Ukraine Contact Group, launch 
a diplomatic process to rebuild the foundation of European security.” [11: 13]
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promising. For one, it brought the political level of crisis management on Ukraine, in which 
Berlin has been a leading actor, closer to the operational dimension handled by the OSCE. 
This could allow the OSCE to have a stronger political role and at the same time strengthen 
the effectiveness of the organization’s operational action.” [9: 14]
Thus, the German Chairmanship in 2016 was very operative, because Germany would be 
suitable to give a fresh power and dynamism to the work of the organization. As a leading EU 
member state with “strong relations with Washington and Moscow, Berlin has a better chance 
than	any	other	capital	to	break	through	the	existing	stalemate	and	help	the	OSCE	find	a	new	
sense of direction and purpose”. [9: 14]
We consider this organization as a comprehensive and inclusive forum, as a platform for 
real	dialogue	between	the	two	confrontational	sides,	but	its	capacity	to	influence	the	quality	
of their relations in the different task is limited. But the really important decisions are made 
within national framework or highlighted in the organizations (e.g. UN, NATO, the EU, 
Council of Europe, etc.). I would like to quote Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann about the EU and 
Russia that “they need also to identify common geopolitical interests in order to engage in 
a strategic dialogue. They could address three pivotal thematics at global, pan-European and 
regional levels: the continental axis, the missing link of European security and the common 
neighbourhood”. [12]
We must acknowledge that the geopolitical environment is changing. After Brexit and 
its consequences, the EU should focus more on the real events. For example, although the 
 European Union targets strategic autonomy, “strategic autonomy must be achieved over 
time”, [13: 16] but strategic autonomy does not mean that one does not need partners, par-
ticularly	NATO.	The	specifics	of	each	crisis	at	hand	will	make	clear	 the	appropriate	actor	
(the EU, the UN, NATO, country, ad hoc coalition, etc.) to take the lead in crisis manage-
ment.	[13:	16–17]	This	is	well	and	authentically	illustrated	in	the	figure	below.	(Figure	1)	
This	conception	is	built	on	the	international	organizations	in	which	the	OSCE	definitely	gets	
a role. Behold a not-well-known opinion, but the question (some kind of lack of European 
security) is worthy of further consideration. (Figure 1)
Fragmentation of the European and Eurasian Security Order
It can be treated as a fact that the challenges in front of the world are numerous and complex, 
that	 is	why	it	 is	difficult	 to	resolve	them.	The	situation	in	the	OSCE	area	is	characterized	




third group will be presented.)
The second group: fragmentation within the integration structures
The EU is a most special entity, modern integration structure in the OSCE area (all EU member 
states are at the same time participating States of the OSCE). “Its development is key for the 
whole of Europe, and the EU–Russia relationship is a major pillar of the European  security 
64 (16) 3 (2017)
É. REMEK: The German Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe…
system.”16  [20]  “NATO  is  also  facing  significant  challenges  in  relation  to  the  conflict  for 
example in Syria, where different member states are going on different and even conflicting 
strategies.”17 [20] Moreover, the current situation is difficult, therefore it is difficult to resolve 
burden sharing proportionally among stakeholders. An interesting example is the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) that has not yet become a driver of economic cooperation among 
its member states (the Ukraine crisis has caused political problems among members),18 but 
their national interests’ realization depends on the relationship between Russia and the West. 
The situation is similar to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, too. The solution has 
been found by these countries through their multidirectional foreign and security policies.19
Third Group: conflict in Russian–Western relations
According to the experts’ opinion Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis was worrying 
in the West, especially among Russia’s neighbours. That is to say after the Cold War, the 
Moscow’s policy purpose was the review of the European security architecture. This was 
a revisionist idea. At least this has moved Russia’s neighbours, which have already become 
members of the EU and NATO, “to seek credible reassurances from the Alliance and to 
move towards a deterrence posture vis-a-vis Russia”. [20: 14] The expert writings really 
indicate perceptible, some times a “Cold War behavior”, and it is determined that “this kind 
of essentialist approach is a really alarming sign”.20 [20]
How does all this relate to the German OSCE Chairmanship? So, this crisis or conflict is 
now more dangerous, with “no clear rules of the road”.21 [33] The German foreign minister, 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, an advocate of dialogue made the same (see before) point: “It’s 
a  fallacy  to  think  that  this  is  like  the Cold War. The current  times are different and more 
dangerous.” [33]
The Missing Link of the European Security
Another reading of the fragmentation problem examines the issue of European security as 
a whole. What do these “Olympic circles” mean? The interesting approach draws attention to 
the lack of “European security link”. (Figure 1)
16 More details of the EU’s internal disagreements, the deep socioeconomic North–South, Brexit and etc. are 
in [20: 11–13].
17 Ibid.
18 More details see in [20:12].
19 It means that they strive for enlargement their relations with NATO, the EU, the OSCE to balance their 
relationship with Russia.
20 By working group [20:14].
21 Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6 said. [33] 
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Risk of continental fracture
EEU: Eurasian Economic Union 
OTSC: Organisation du Traité de sécurité collective, namely Collective Security  
Treaty Organization (CSTO) SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Figure 1. “Olympic circles” of Euro-Atlantic,  
European and Eurasian security to fix the missing  
link of European security. [12]
According to the experts again,22 it would be therefore interesting to imagine new treaties 
and institutions, resembling the “olympic circles”23 which would allow maintaining stability 
on the whole Eurasian continent. There is a common interest. However the missing Euro-
pean security can be restored on an equal and rule-based economic cooperation with the 
EU–Russia.	[12]	We	must	understand	that	the	OSCE	is	important,	but	specific	institutional	
arrangements might be necessary.
22	 Pierre-Emmanule	THOMANN	is	Scientific	Advisor	in	geopolitics	and	geostrategy	at	the	European	Institute	
for International Relations (IERI), Brussels.
23 “Olympic circle”: A new “security space” from Lisbon to Vladivostok would be the inner circle of the security 
space from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In	this	configuration,	we	would	find	the	EU	as	a	pivot/political	centre	
and Russia as a neighbouring pivot/political centre at the crossroad of overlapping security spaces from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok (NATO and OSCE, USA–EU–Russia), Lisbon to Vladivostok (EU–Russia), St. 
Petersburg to Peking (OCS) and Minsk–Duchanbe (OTSC). [12]
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The expert’s opinion says that there is a missing link in the European security archi-
tecture	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 fixed	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 a	 further	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 European	
continent between Euro–Atlantic and Euro–Asian alliances. We also have to assume that an 
enlargement of Euro–Atlantic institutions (NATO–EU–OSCE) to the whole of the Eurasian 
continent	 is	 impossible.	Why?	Thomann	 argues	 that	firstly,	 further	 enlargement	 is	 not	 on	
the EU’s and NATO’s agenda. Secondly, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are unable to handle 
the	geopolitical	diversity	of	the	Eurasian	continent.	“The	solution	to	fixing	the	missing	link	
in the European security architecture is based on the “geographical tightening” principle in 
the context of NATO’s and EU’s overstretched capacities. Geographical proximity would be 
a central criterion to build regional alliances in order to foster stability and prevent further 
Eurasian fragmentation.” [12]
The only question is how would it be possible to balance among the different states, the 
alliances and the political and security institutions in the area of the continental fracture? 
The answer is evident, that is the balancing can be solved using the OCSE dialogue and 
co-operation methods.24
The Five Priority Areas
“The German Chairmanship in 2016 was an interesting diplomatic experiment for the 
OSCE”, [14] because a real political “heavyweight” was taking over the Chairmanship. 
“Germany is the most powerful OSCE participating state ever at the helm of the organization 
in its 20-year history.” [14]
Under the motto “Renewing Dialogue, Rebuilding Trust, Restoring Security”, the 
German	Osce	Chairmanship	2016	planned	five	priorities.	The	most	important	priority	was	
the	Ukrainian	situation,	namely	focused	on	crisis	and	conflict	management	 in	and	around	
Ukraine. Furthermore, “Germany will also continue the OSCE’s long standing work on 
finding	 lasting	 solutions	 to	 the	 so-called	protracted	 conflicts	 in	 the	OSCE	area,	 including	
Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus.” [15] Secondly, they have to 
strengthen	the	OSCE’s	capabilities	at	all	 levels	 the	conflict	cycle,	but	 this	 idea	affects	 the	
increase of the budget, too. Thirdly, the OSCE has a major task in the area of the arms control 
and the renewal of the Vienna Document25	on	Confidence	and	Security-Building	Measures. 
This proposal is promoted by such seminar works as High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar 
which Berlin focused on (it has also been realized). Fourthly, the issue of the human dimen-
sion was highlighted. Germany payed special attention to this area, because it is related to 
current crises and security problems such as tolerance and non-discrimination, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the media, and minority rights, etc. “The human dimension is an 
area of considerable disagreement among OSCE participating States with Russia and some 
of its proxies accusing the West of double standards and distorting the balance between the 
three security dimensions of the OSCE.” [15] Finally, the economic (and environmental) 
dimension was on the meeting table. This would be a good opportunity to make better and 
more effective this dimension when there are no progresses in the other two (politico-mili-
tary, human) dimensions. The Presidency focused on two issues inside this dimension: good 
governance and connectivities (dialogue between the public and the private sector). This 
24 Between organizations like NATO, EU, OSCE, OCS, OTSC, etc. which should lead to more stability. [12]
25 More details on the Vienna Document. [34]
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dimension really received great attention during the German presidency, so much so that e.g 
“Good Governance was the main theme in 2016 year’s Economic and Environmental Fo-
rum, […] good governance was a key topic at the Economic and Environmental Dimension 
Implementation Meeting…”26 [16: 9]
After these the expert’s question is straightforward and legitimate: “Germany a neutral 
and honest broker?”27 [15] Germany’s priorities were generally welcomed and supported 
by most of the OSCE participating States. The real question is how did Berlin manage the 
renewed confrontation between Russia and the West? It seems that a common understanding 
was	missing	 (the	European	 security	 system	 is	 fractured,	 see	 above)	 therefore	 the	 finding	
an acceptable solution was waiting for the German Presidency.28 In addition, the Final Re-
port29 [35] is proof that “the role the OSCE could play today in the form of a common forum 
for	mediation	and	conflict	prevention	is	more	important	than	ever,	as	military	tension	and	the	
likelihood	of	accidents	and	conflict	escalation	is	increasing”.	[20:	8]
According to Stephanie Liechteinstein30 “with regard to the Ukraine crisis, Germany will 
be expected to act as honest and neutral broker and to help build consensus.” But neutral by 
all sides? In her view Germany is “the leading power within the EU and a strong member 
of NATO”. All the two previous Chairs, Switzerland and Serbia were neither EU nor NATO 
members. Switzerland was “well-placed to mediate between Russia, the West and Ukraine”, 
still it is neutral. Hence, Germany may be “viewed as lacking neutrality, especially when it 
comes to mediating between the parties” to the Ukraine crisis. Namely, Germany has sup-
ported sanctions against Russia within the EU and is a member of NATO. “Thus, for Berlin, 
its	engagement	with	Moscow	has	so	far	been	dominated	and	influenced	by	the	former’s	role	
in those two Western institutions.”31 [15]
The OSCE Chairmanship was a great opportunity for Berlin in connection with Moscow. 
First of all Germany was in the same organization in which Russia was an equal partner. 
Moreover, it was an organization where decisions were taken by consensus. “Germany can 
thus deal with Moscow in a more balanced way, not overshadowed by EU sanctions or mil-
itary rhetoric. This may open new possibilities to ease tensions, which today can neither be 
managed through the EU nor through NATO.” [15] Secondly, the changes within the EU 
and NATO have affected the Euroatlantic region. Germany was/is a powerful state within 
the two organizations. It was especially important that it could keep the opportunity of its 
OSCE Chairmanship in order to maintain a balance between parties (the EU, NATO and 
Russia).32 [17: 2]
“The	priority	 status	of	 the	Ukrainian	conflict	 and	 talks	with	Moscow	has	been	 shown	
by the appointment of Gernot Erler (SPD) as Special Federal Representative in the OSCE. 
Gernot Erler was a close associate of Minister Steinmeier between 2005 and 2009. He has 
served as Secretary of State in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in charge of Germany’s Eastern 
26 All details on the Report [16: 9–10]
27 Stephanie Liechtenstein’s question. 
28 It should be mentioned the Final Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons (details see above) could be useful 
in this context. For this to happen it is all-important that the dialogue on European security issues should 
continue permanently within the OSCE.
29 As recommended by the OSCE Network of Think Tank and Academic Institutions. [35]
30 This paraghrap is based on her complete study [15].
31 It is important to mention that German Chancellor Angela Merkel has always had a privileged relationship 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
32	 More	details	of	the	difficulties	in	paragraph:	Defusing Conflicts Outside the Vienna Agenda. [17: 2]
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policy and, since January 2014, as Federal Coordinator for Russia, Central Asia and Eastern 
Partnership.” [28: 2–3] The negotiating framework was “a perfect distraction from the mul-
tilateral diplomacy of NATO member states towards Russia, which is critical due to the 
suspended cooperation between the NATO Council and Russia”. [28: 3]
Although	the	Ukrainian	conflict	remained	the	most	important	task,	the	German		presidency	
continued to give political support to other observation missions, and cooperation with 55 
experts. [17: 3] They pad particular attention to Transdniestria, South Caucasus and Nagorno 
Karabakh. The Berlin presidency considered important the member states’ contribution to 
the OSCE budget, itself being the second largest contributor. The OSCE budget was €141.1 
million in 2016. [28: 3]
How	could	 the	German	presidency	 accomplish	 tasks	 of	 the	five	priorities	 area?	What	
methods and tools were used? We could keep asking questions endlessly, but there are also 
answers.
It was not easy, but Germany was able to make good use of its own potential. “Whether 
the	format	includes	ministers,	senior	officials	from	capitals,	or	ambassadors	in	Vienna,	infor-
mal high-level meetings should be encouraged as much and as often as possible to continue 
a	confidential	dialogue	aiming	at	bridging	the	gap.”	[17:	3]	Furthermore,	Germany	could	also	
use its OSCE Chairmanship to make easy Track One and Half33 or Track Two Diplomacy34 
“in	carefully	chosen	fields,	harnessing	the	capacity	of	think-tanks	and	research	institutions	
for a common cause”. [17: 3] So, the “keeping lines of communication” were open, the 
Chairmanship focused on small, concrete steps to begin improving the confrontational at-
mosphere and to create mutual trust. Five areas35 seem particularly well-suited to create these 
“cooperative islands”. [17: 2]
The	 following	 quotation	 is	 useful	 for	 a	 summary	 “The	Ukraine	 conflict	 has	 therefore	
contributed to a ‘German moment’ without (as yet) transforming it into a European mo-
ment”. [22: 112] German Presidency played pronounced role in crisis management in 
Ukraine and in the realization of negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian parties. 
E.g. Steinmeier Foreign Minister presented the OSCE Observer Mission in 2014 and together 
with the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship made efforts to set up a special observation mission. 
Furthermore, Germany was closely concerned “in the shuttle diplomacy of the Swiss OSCE 
chairship for the establishment of a trilateral contact group at the beginning of June 2014 under 
Swiss	Ambassador	Heidi	Tagliavini,	which	led	to	the	conclusion	of	the	first	Minsk	agreement	
on September 5, 2014 between Moscow, Kiev and pro-Russian separatists.” [22: 125–126] 
This preference for the OSCE is also related to the OSCE tools (dialogue, cooperation, pres-
ence diplomacy), when the Swiss OSCE chairship was, which immediately offered OSCE 
support for crisis management. So in the end “as a result, the OSCE gained importance as an 
institution	for	crisis	management	and	emerged	from	the	conflict	reinforced,	while	the	EU	has	
been weakened.” [22: 126]
It seems to me this example demonstrates that the OSCE can be a relevant partner for the 




35 For details of areas see in [17: 3].
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Conclusion
Jean Monnet was right, who was often called the founding father of the European Union, when 
he said: “Without men nothing is possible, without institutions nothing is permanent.” [6] 
Later Jaakko Iloniemi [6] also pointed out the same thing about the OSCE. Quoting him in 
his own words “political and legal institutions that are strong enough to weather storms and 
upheavals are the best guarantee we have for an orderly and successful management of in-
ternational	relations”.	[20:	9]	It	can	be	stated	that	the	OSCE	can	fulfil	its	roles	and	mandates.
The German Foreign Minister himself thus appreciated the annual work: “Without a doubt, 
the path there is a very, very long one. But let me borrow a quote from Willy Brandt: Small 
steps, he said, are better than no steps. Willy Brandt was himself a trailblazer for the CSCE. 
He would advise to take the small steps now, while the large steps are still far off.”36 [36] And 
the German Foreign Minister said as OSCE Chairmanship in his closing remarks, left the 
participating States with a question: “A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, we 
find	ourselves	at	something	like	a	crossroads.	We	are	faced	with	the	fundamental	question:	
do we want to continue pursuing this vision of cooperative and comprehensive security or 
not?”37 [21: 4]
A remarkable statement by the foreign ministers of Germany, Italy and Austria to 
strengthen the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has been read 
on the pages of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “Just in stormy times, we need a strong 
OSCE”, said with one voice Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Paolo Gentiloni38 and Sebastian Kurz. 
The	three	ministers	identified	some	common	areas	for	action,	such	as	“the	creation	of	new	
platforms for dialogue and for a lasting solution of the crisis in Europe, a new beginning of 
monitoring conventional arms, a common approach to global challenges. The ministers speak 
of “too restless times in Europe” that “have questioned the architectural pillars of European 
peace” and they again mentioned the Ukrainian crisis. [23]
To sum up the German OSCE’s method (cooperation, dialogue, presence diplomacy, 
trust) which at the same time is an effective instrument not only in the Ukrainian crisis, but 
it also would be a good example for crisis management elsewhere. And as Swiss Foreign 
Minister Didier Burkhalter once said: “The OSCE has become the eyes and the ears of the 
international community in Ukraine.” [29: 2]
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Prerequisites of Virtual Teamwork in Security 
Operations Centers: Knowledge, Skills, Abilities 
and Other Characteristics1
Balázs Péter HÁMORNIK,2 Csaba KRASZNAY3
Cybersecurity is an emerging field of national security where usually the technical 
aspects of defense take first place. Cyberdefense is heavily relaying on teamwork 
where members of Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) or Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) or Security Operations Center (SOC) 
teams are often geographically dispersed. In cybersecurity teamwork, computer 
supported collaboration is crucial as the team functions virtually in many ways. 
In this paper we present the results of interviews that were conducted with SOC 
exerts and we summarize the reviewed relevant literature. We have reviewed 
knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs) that make a team of 
cybersecurity experts capable to perform as virtual teams. These results revealed 
that to treat the cybersecurity team as a socio-technical system and supporting to 
cope with challenges of virtual teams helps them to be more effective and enhances 
employee retention. This perspective may contribute to cyberdefense of both 
industry and military.
Keywords: human factors, Security Operations Center, teamwork, KSAOs, virtual 
teams
Introduction
As cybersecurity is getting one of the most important national security issues worldwide, 
nations began improving their ability to tackle this challenge successfully by setting up spe-
cialized forces for cyberdefence. One of the best-known setup for such groups is a Computer 
Emergency Response Team or a Computer Security Incident Response Team. A CERT or 
a CSIRT can support one organization or a set of organizations with the same interest. The 
basis of their success is the continuous flow and interpretation of security related information. 
This can be done in a Security Operations Center (SOC) that is the key element of modern 
incident management.
There are several CERTs or CSIRTs in Hungary, some of them support private companies, 
some of them were established by non-profit organizations, some of them came into being 
through the effects of a law. CERT-Hungary is responsible for the incident management of 
all governmental and municipal bodies, meanwhile Mil-CERT deals with the cyber incidents 
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project 
PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the 
Ludovika Cybersecurity Workshop.
2 Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Ergonomics 
and Psychology; e-mail: hamornik@erg.bme.hu
3 Ph.D., Assistant Professor, National University of Public Service, Institute of E-government; e-mail: krasznay.
csaba@uni-nke.hu
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of Hungarian Defense Forces. Although cooperation is essential between such groups, they 
have to be built up as an operational internal team first. [1] Unfortunately, one of the major 
problems in information security is that there is a million-man strong manpower shortage 
in this profession worldwide. In military, this might be solved by simply reassigning some 
troops, but old traditions may not work in a modern age with knowledge workers. Therefore, 
it is worthwhile studying people related questions of cyber defense and highlighting the 
findings to support Hungary’s national security efforts in the cyberspace.
Knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs) could be identified that 
make employees capable of working effectively in SOC teams. This includes both general and 
virtual teamwork approaches. This step should rely on the results of research on work-related 
stress in other high-risk industries, such as aviation or nuclear power-plant (NPP) where em-
ployee selection focuses on tolerance against monotony or on vigilance. [2] The application 
of the expected results from this latter step would contribute to better employee selection, 
retention, and development in SOCs even in the military, which in turn could help alleviate 
the serious lack of experts that, as mentioned previously, SOCs are facing nowadays.
Security Operations Centers (SOCs)
Security Operations Centers are defined as both a team and an organization unit, often operating 
in shifts around the clock. SOCs are also a facility dedicated to preventing, detecting, assessing 
and responding to cybersecurity threats and incidents, as well as to fulfilling and assessing reg-
ulatory compliance. This implies many aspects that invite closer examination: the team (in the 
first place), the organizational unit, and the external expectations that compliance requirements 
bring. It is important to emphasize that SOCs cover multiple security activities that require 
different skill sets when it comes to effective teamwork. A fully functional SOC running 24/7 
requires a team of minimum eight to 10 people just to maintain two people per shift, working 
three days on, three days off, four days on and four days off in opposing, 12-hour shifts. [3] This 
requires effective teamwork and competent leadership of such teams. To maintain continuous 
high quality through the changes in shifts and people, a deep, shared understanding should be 
developed and kept up-to-date. In addition, the recruitment, selection, and retention of employ-
ees is crucial in SOCs: shift work, time pressure, monotony, and high risk all make demands on 
staff, as they induce stress and fatigue, and are a challenge to work-life balance.
The main activities that an SOC covers are monitoring functions, detection, triage of 
alerts, resolution of incidents (by taking actions or escalations), handling of issues (aligned 
with the internal or external processes required, e.g. ticketing system or reporting), threat 
hunting and threat intelligence (TI).
The last 15 years of the SOC landscape reveal four incremental generations of SOCs 
developed as responses to increasingly sophisticated attacks. [3] [4] [5] The generations 
distinguish different sets of tools used and ways of working, as well as more and more 
 requirements to comply with. This evolution is visible throughout the research literature from 
the years 2000s. [4] SOC generations are as follows:
1. First-generation SOC: Security operations are not delivered by the establishment of 
a formal SOC, but in many cases by some IT operations individual or a team who 
focuses on a blend of tasks. They cover device and network monitoring, as well as 
antivirus operation. They rarely work proactively, and the security incident response is 
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not appreciated highly in the enterprise. This initial generation of SOCs does not usu-
ally use a centralized system such as a Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) tool. [3]
2. Second-generation SOC: At this stage, SOCs focus on security threat management and 
event management, which creates the need for SIEM tools. SIEMs aggregate log in-
formation from various sources to form events. Events are then correlated to discover 
the possible relationships between them to help identify a security incident. Incidents 
are reported and visualized as dashboard alerts to SIEM operators. At this level, SOC 
activities are integrated with company ticketing systems. The main activity while oper-
ating such second generation SOC systems is correlation rule setting and refinement to 
enable the SIEM tool to capture known or recently discovered threats. This is always 
a reactive way of working. [3]
3. Third-generation SOC: At this level of evolution, incident response tasks are 
 formalized. Other security services, such as vulnerability management are linked to 
SOC operations. This shows a shift toward a more proactive strategy. [3]
4. Fourth-generation SOC: The latest generation is described by the manner SOCs treat 
data. They can analyze large amounts of data recorded over long periods of time to 
discover threats and visualize them. This volume of data could also mean big data 
analytics. The data is enriched using multiple external sources (e.g. geo IP, DNS, IP 
and Domain reputation service, threat intelligence feeds). Another key differentiator at 
this level is the automation of remediation measures (as opposed to manual rule setting 
processes). [3]
Regarding the models of SOCs, based on our knowledge of the market, five distinct models 
exist:
1. A virtual SOC, mostly found in small enterprises does not have a dedicated facility 
and consists of part-time members working in a reactive manner. The virtual SOC may 
be applied when most of the SOC operations are outsourced and the in-house security 
team is limited to this model.
2. A multifunction SOC/Network Operation Center (NOC) has a dedicated facility, how-
ever, it shares tasks and people with the NOC. It provides 24/7 operations and it is 
frequent in the case of low-risk large enterprises or small/mid-size companies aiming 
to save costs.
3. A distributed/co-managed SOC consists of dedicated and partly dedicated team mem-
bers, typically in 5/8 operation times, co-managed with a Managed Security Service 
Provider (MSSP). It is most frequent in small/mid-sized enterprises.
4. A dedicated SOC has its own facility and team fully employed in-house, operating 
24/7, covering all functions required. It is the best practice choice for large enterprises 
and companies facing high risks.
5. A command SOC is a coordinating, higher-level SOC that provides threat intelligence, 
threat awareness, and additional services to multiple local SOCs in very large enter-
prises. Command SOCs are rarely involved in day-to-day operations. Security opera-
tions can be outsourced to expert service providers (MSSPs) who run the SOC at their 
facility, using their own team. In this case, the MSSP’s SOC team is shared among 
multiple clients.
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An SOC facility’s physical characteristics are inspired by the arrangements found in 
a network operating room. [3] The aim of the physical setting is to facilitate monitoring, 
the shared understanding of events, and the collaboration of experts. The analysts at the 
individual workstations with multiple displays are facing toward a large central screen, 
which shows a dashboard where alerts may appear and where network status is monitored in 
tables, logs, and charts. The analysts’ displays show the same types of information in details. 
The individual workstations are grouped by roles of team members. Level 1 analysts, who 
investigate alerts at the first step, usually sit closest to the central display. Then level 2 and 
level 3 come at increasing distances from the center. The adjunct functions of the SOC e.g. 
TI, forensics, malware analysis may sit separately or even in different facilities. The SOC 
manager as a team leader is positioned to overlook the whole team in the room to be able to 
orchestrate their work.
Figure 1. SOC floor plan. [Edited by the authors.]
As mentioned previously, the SOC is also defined as a team which has a leader and specialized 
employees. [3] SOCs are usually led by the SOC manager, who is responsible for the overall 
leadership. The majority of tasks in the team rely on analysts whose responsibilities can 
include security event monitoring, incident report investigation, incident handling, threat 
intelligence, vulnerability intelligence and reporting. They are organized in escalation levels 
(1–2–3) or tiers from juniors to seniors. The most advanced experts are doing forensics and 
malware analysis, which may be somewhat separated from the escalation levels. There are 
engineering roles (SOC engineers) too, who are responsible for the testing, staging, and 
deploying of new technology platforms or major releases/updates to those platforms. This 
also includes the setting and the refinement of correlation and detection rules. Operations 
roles also exist, focusing on the maintenance and operation of the SOC platforms. Beside 
these core roles, other support functions can also be represented in the SOC team: project 
managers, compliance and audit support experts, process/procedure developers, training 
specialists, communications specialists, etc.
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SOC is a Field of Teamwork
Teams are groups of people working together toward reaching a common goal. They work 
in an interdependent way: every team member’s performance contributes to the overall 
performance and they rely on each other. [6] Their activity is coordinated by a leader who 
orchestrates the processes and procedures they follow. These are especially valid in the case 
of high-risk industries—such as aviation, nuclear power-plants (NPPs) and information 
 security—where an error can lead to fatalities, accidents, or data losses.
Teams are more than the sum of their members: interdependency and collaboration among 
members produce higher performance than can be reached by the individuals making up the 
team. This originates from the way knowledge is used and combined in a team. Mental rep-
resentations that contain information that are applied in the team are named in multiple ways 
in the literature of psychology. A focused field of applied cognitive and social psychology 
studies team cognition in multiple industries. Team mental models [7] [8] contain the shared 
knowledge that a team has. This means the up-to-date representation of the internal and 
external reality, the knowledge that has to be applied during work. It contains the problems 
and tasks to be solved, the tools to be used, individual knowledge and its distribution (who 
knows what), the processes to follow on a team or individual level (roles in the team), and 
the future state that is the aim of the team’s activities. The team’s mental model functions 
as a common interpretative frame for the team, which enables them to react effectively to 
challenges. [8] The team mental model contains decision- and behavioral patterns that can be 
applied across the team and which enable them to behave coherently.
Figure 2. Team mental model: What is shared and distributed? [Edited by the authors.]
According to Banks and Millward [9] the procedural knowledge that dictates how to perform 
a task (a procedure [3]) usually does not have to be owned by every team member. It is not 
fully efficient to have the knowledge of procedures represented redundantly: a team should 
not be a group of one-man-armies as it is emphasized in case of SOCs. [3] The declarative 
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knowledge containing what to do has to be owned by every team member indeed. It enables 
the team to keep their focus on their aims, and act in a coordinated way toward the same goal.
The key to using team mental models effectively, as a team-level cognitive process, is 
communication. Explicit communication enables teams to build and update team mental 
models. [10] [11] [12] During periods of high pressure, there is often no room to commu-
nicate, to explain the background of actions or the context. Thus, communication before 
actions is crucial to a fully functional team mental model. During an emergency situation, 
teams perform with a limited communication capacity, coordinating their actions implicitly. 
This means that they presume that everyone knows what to do and how to perform their 
roles. The team mental model held in the minds of individuals enables the team to perform 
effectively. As we have previously reviewed information security teamwork in SOCs, this is 
one of the fields of teamwork in high risk where team mental models, communication, and 
coordination takes a crucial role in success.
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)
Information security and security operations centers places where teams are using technolo-
gy to collaboratively complete their tasks, reach their goals. This makes the research field of 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) highly relevant. According to Carstensen 
and Schmidt CSCW addresses: “how collaborative activities and their coordination can be 
supported by means of computer systems.” Relying on the definition of Carstensen and 
Schmidt “computer-based support for cooperative work can be provided by offering better 
communication facilities, providing improved monitoring and awareness possibilities to the 
actors, and by aiming at reducing the complexity of the coordination activities to be conduct-
ed by the involved actors”. [13: 620] CSCW focuses on the study of tools and techniques of 
groupware, as well as their psychological, social, and organizational effects. [14] In order to 
use our concepts distinctively, we have to define what we mean by collaboration and cooper-
ation. Collaboration is when people work together toward a single shared goal. Cooperation 
is slightly different: while cooperating, people perform together but also work on their own 
goals (goals that fit the common aim’s direction).
The “CSCW matrix” (Figure 3) considers the work context along two dimensions: space 
features of collaboration (co-location or geographically distributed) and time features of col-
laboration (synchronous or asynchronous working). The resulting four cells cover most of 
the possible ways a team can collaborate or cooperate. [15]
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Figure 3. The CSCW Matrix. [16]
Previously we have defined SOC teamwork as where team mental models expected to be 
observed and identified expound the characteristics of it in the CSCW perspective. [17] 
In this study we are focusing on a mixture of synchronous and asynchronous tasks heavily 
relying on remote interactions, communication, and coordination.
Virtual Teams
Security Operations Centers are assumed to be a field of teamwork where technology plays 
a crucial role while more and more frequently geographical distributed experts are requested 
to collaborate using communication channels provided by information technology. These char-
acteristics of teams fit what literature defines as virtual team. Traditionally virtual teams are 
defined as: “a group of people who interact through interdependent tasks, guided by common 
purpose. Unlike conventional teams a virtual team works across space, time, and organiza-
tional boundaries with links strengthened by webs of communication technologies.” [18: 6] 
This definition fits the CSCW matrix cited above and integrates into the research paradigms of 
work and organizational psychology. Virtual teams are in the current focus of organizational 
psychology, since approximately 79% of knowledge workers work in dispersed teams so it be-
came a standard form of working. [19] In the following section, we are examining collaborative 
aspect of security teamwork where virtual teamwork may appear.
Virtual Collaboration in SOCs
Information security work both in individual and team levels started emerging as a research 
topic in CSCW from the early 2000s. Hence the emphasis of supporting the effectiveness in 
this field remained on the technology side. The technology provides more and better data, 
indicators, anomalies, less false positive alerts which security experts are getting faced with. 
Focusing on the human factors Goodall, Lutters, Komlodi [20] [21] studied the analysts using 
intrusion detection system (IDS). In that time SOCs were not widespread and the activities 
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of IDS Analysts could be considered to be the ancestors of SOC Analysts. IDSs are pattern 
based alerting tools aiming to prevent attacks against the organizations computer network. 
Analysts handle alerts that are false positives in a very high percentage: however, they have 
to maintain their vigilance to look for alerts indicating real compromises. Considering the 
IDS analysts’ work as a socio-technical system [20] three points can be highlighted: (1) 
understand the work-behavior of analysts, what effects both (2) the way to design technology 
that fits their tasks, and (3) the staffing of such teams. IDS Analysts work consists of monitor-
ing, analysis, and response. These tasks are mostly identical to SOC analyst tasks. Especially 
since these have similarities in collaborative means: analysts do not work in isolation: they 
are interactive with other experts responsible for other domains in the security team (security 
manager) or in the organizations or even outside the company when looking for or sharing 
threat intelligence information (TI)—email feeds in 2004, TI platforms nowadays.
1. Monitoring: IDS analysts handle high quantity of alerts, considering most of them as 
false positives. This high load of alerts causes the monitoring and reacting activities 
to be performed under time pressure. This is a time consuming but not cognitively 
challenging task.
2. Analysis: When an alert is not considered false positive analysis is required to make the 
further decision on what reaction to take. This is a highly unpredictable yet non-rou-
tine task. Both the frequency and duration of an analysis can take minutes, hours, or 
even a day. Analysts use heuristics for promoting decisions as fast as possible: they 
look for known patterns of events, use their previous and mostly implicit experiences, 
and their knowledge on the signature set (considering some signatures or rules more 
reliable than others). For the decision, the experience, the context and the knowledge 
of the own network are essential. With a steep learning curve for this it is hard to 
share knowledge what is acquired on the job that relies on experiences (e.g. eyeballing 
long lists of logs). Seniors mostly teach juniors on the job even though both of them 
have high workload. As the organization size grows, the required network knowledge 
emerges and job roles are more distinct (system administrators, security administra-
tors, analysts in multiple tiers with SOC or without SOC) what causes heavier reliance 
on collaboration. Over the time multiple solutions appeared to collect and correlate 
data in order to reduce the number of events, reduce false positive alerts, enhance 
collaboration between team members in remote locations. Nowadays SIEMs are the 
main software functioning in the heart of SOCs providing surface of many individual 
and collaborative activities.
3. Response: IDS analysts make intervention, feedback and reporting when responding 
to incidents. The intervention takes place in coordination with others both in face-to-
face and virtual collaboration. The feedback in case of IDS and in modern SOCs using 
SIEMs means refining the signatures or rules and generating share threat intelligence 
information from the incident. The response phase is closed by reporting and the reme-
diation of damages (e.g. restoring from backups).
Reviewing Goodall, Lutters, Komlodi [20] [21] and current SOC literature [3] the similarities 
show that over time it can be stated that the “security work is collaborative both within the 
organizations and across the internet”. [21: 345] The authors made an important proposition 
to commit organizational changes besides subsequent technological efforts being made. They 
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identified the lack of time to analyze alerts and information overload as key issues in case of 
IDS analysts. Goodall, Lutters, Komlodi [20] advised the separation of monitoring (junior 
level) and analysis (senior level) job roles and introducing information visualization tools, 
to furthermore provide support for collaboration. These advices are parallel with the current 
trends in improving SOC efficiency.
The support of face-to-face and virtual collaboration was obviously missing from this 
field back in 2004, and it is still requiring major improvements nowadays. Information se-
curity teamwork is a CSCW field of collaborative problem solving under high workload, 
time pressure, and high risk what makes team cognition (e.g. team mental models) a key 
perspective to understand und provide support. Since then the issues related to staffing and 
transferring expertise still remained unsolved. It is now crucial to understand what knowl-
edge, skills, abilities and other characteristics contribute to successful information security 
work and how to support the acquisition of these.
Since 2004 SOC are widespread that is a dedicated team working in collaboration among 
its members and with other teams, in a structured way. The tasks are both structured within 
the team and the team space (the SOC room, see Figure 1) is designed towards promoting 
a common understanding of the security situation. However, the virtual collaboration of 
remote team members appears as a growing challenge.
Challenges of Teamwork in SOCs
Goodall, Lutters, Komlodi [20] described a workplace where time pressure, monotony of 
time consuming but not cognitively demanding tasks, and information overload as major 
challenges in case of analysts; these remained major issues today also.
SOCs nowadays face challenges from both internal and external issues. A global shortage 
of skills and employees constrains the building of SOC teams. From the point of view of 
external challenges, intensive and ever more complex cyber-attacks constantly push SOCs 
toward applying new technology, and toward a change from a reactive to a proactive way 
of working, one that is based on threat intelligence and hunting activities. [22] From the 
perspective of internal challenges, once an SOC has been built, the task cannot be considered 
done. Indeed, the operation and the further development of processes, people, and technology 
remain crucial all along. From the people’s side, collaboration within the SOC team and 
with other teams are specifically emphasized in recent market analyses. [23] The employee 
retention is a crucial internal issue compared to all others.
The emerging special segment of SOCs and security teams working together in virtu-
al or mixed ways such as virtual SOCs (model 1), co-managed SOCs (model 3), MSSPs 
(model 5), or dedicated SOCs (model 4) that are monitoring companies of multiple remote 
locations are all facing challenges of SOCs in general and mentioned above. In order to iden-
tify the key causes of challenges in computer supported collaboration using mixed or entirely 
virtual channels within and between the teams we are focusing on KSAOs that make people 
capable to perform in a highly efficient way. The SOC models mentioned above are highly 
relying on virtual teamwork so the possible human factors of success can be studied. Schultze 
and Krumm [19] highlighted three main challenges appearing in virtual teams such as we 
think SOC teams are: (1) technology usage, (2) cultural differences, and (3)  geographical 
 dispersion.
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Aims
In the previous research phase, we have been focusing on applying teamwork and computer 
supported collaborative work (CSCW) research to SOCs. [17] As a further step in this paper 
we are focusing on the prerequisites of a successful teamwork in this environment. We are 
approaching the question from the challenges of human factors, and virtual teamwork.
Security Operations Centers can be considered as fields of virtual or augmented teamwork. 
In our study we are aiming to identify the prerequisites of successful SOC teamwork limited 
to the aspects of virtual teamwork. Information security as all other fields heavily relies on 
dispersed teams collaborating through computer supported channels both in synchronous and 
asynchronous ways. The knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs) are 
supposed to play an important role in being effective as a virtual team working in a SOC. Are 
there KSAOs that promote people in SOC to perform better, stay motivated, work better as 
a team? We are aiming to identify the challenges and possible KSAOs relating to them using 
field interviews and literature research.
Methods
We have conducted 15 semi-structured field interviews with industry experts who are op-
erating an SOC or performing tasks related to SOCs. The interviews were focused on the 
following topics: processes for investigating incidents, roles in the team, collaboration, tools 
used, levels in SOCs, time frames and escalations, what information is presented and availa-
ble for the experts, the physical organization of the workplaces, the largest challenges among 
the daily tasks, etc. Also we included questions in case of managers that cover the employee 
recruitment, career planning, and learning opportunities in their SOC teams.
The experts interviewed come from the Western-, and Central & Eastern Europe region, 
North America, and North Africa. They operate SOCs or security organizational units in the IT, 
finance, governmental, research, and IT security industries. There can be found both in-house 
SOC operators and managed security service providers (MSSPs) among the interviewees. 
These interviews were combined with two field visits to currently operating SOC departments: 
one was an in-house SOC of an IT company, the other was a large managed SOC of an MSSP 
serving clients in Western Europe. This set of interviews and visits were completed with litera-
ture review, the analysis of sector-specific market researches (e.g. Gartner, Forrester), and two 
interviews with independent market experts. We handle all the sensitive company information 
anonymously and present them only as aggregated results here.
Results
We have found that SOCs show large differences in maturity levels and SOC models.
On the one hand, there are SOCs owned by enterprises only for compliance reasons, and 
these are not operated at their full potential. On the other hand, there are highly structured 
in-house and managed SOCs that focus on proactive security monitoring. The industry trend 
is to focus on threat intelligence and become more proactive [22] in order to keep up with the 
rising number of attacks.
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We have found that SOC activities are separated from the overall security or operations 
departments in most cases. Depending on maturity, this means more specified roles, positions, 
and locations. Similarly, to what have been observed by Goodall, Lutters, Komlodi, [20] [21] 
the smaller the organization, the more roles a security expert shares in it including system 
administration, forensics, security administrations, etc. Summarizing the processes that 
these SOCs (or SOC-like teams) follow, it is important to emphasize that all of them have 
dedicated escalation levels with defined time frames to handle an event or incident. This 
is one main source of time pressure across the teams. The main activity besides event and 
incident handling is the setting and refining of rules. The core tool used in SOCs is a SIEM 
that uses rule-based alerting. These rules are reactively made based on previous and recent 
incidents. The rule set builds up a large knowledge base of security incidents that the SOC 
can detect and handle. Nevertheless, this rule set requires continuous updating as attacks tend 
to evolve and change over time. This is the most time-consuming and effortful activity in 
SOC teams. Besides SIEM other specialized tools are also used in SOCs. These tools for e.g. 
IDS, net flow, malware analysis, endpoint protection, firewalls, threat intelligence sources 
are also providing information in an incident response situation when all data available have 
to be analyzed. The multiple tools used cause workload by dividing attention of the users 
especially when the user experience of these are heterogeneous. Following the trends that 
Gartner [23] revealed, therefore, TI and proactive ways of working (e.g. use of machine 
learning) are gaining popularity to reduce the hassles caused by manual rule setting.
The interviews shed light on challenges that specifically related to computer supported 
cooperation of remotely located people or teams. Experts working in MSSPs mentioned that 
delay in working hours (because of different locations and time zones) causes interruptions 
in incident responses and gathering of context information. Cultural related challenges are 
appearing in language skill differences among distributed team members what makes dif-
ferent preferences in communication channels (email, phone, ticket, etc.). The knowledge 
of the network monitored and protected is not accurate or up-to-date enough in case of large 
organizations or managed SOC services providers: the system administrators or clients are 
neglecting providing this information to the (remote) SOC team. This lack of knowledge 
of the own network hinders fast understanding of event context thus the ability to respond 
effectively.
These findings ensure that our sample of SOC experts are representing the industry well 
and their experiences are a valuable foundation of identifying challenges.
Regarding human factors, it is important to note that monotony is a strong source of 
stress for analysts: the monitoring task is repetitive and most of the time no significant inci-
dent happens, hence vigilance has to be maintained. Most of the events examined are false 
positives. When something happens the time-pressure is high because the incident handling 
time windows are limited and sometimes regulated by SLAs. This causes high workload. 
This is, among others, a cause that contributes to low retention and a lack of employees in 
the sector. Shift working in 24/7 is the other factor that contributes to heavy workload and 
stress. Contrarily to other high-risk fields like aviation or utilities, in IT security people are 
more prone to change jobs (and leave stressful SOCs) to other IT jobs where their skills are 
applicable. This all together contributes to a lack of skilled security employees in the industry 
on every level.
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The physical work settings, in every case, aim to support the visibility of information: 
large screens, multiple displays per workstations, and specialized light conditions. The tools 
analysts use are largely customized based on company requirements, for example, integrated 
with or even built around the ticketing system.
The roles in SOC teams are highly structured, hence the lack of skilled employees may 
eventually contribute to more flexibility (e.g. through job rotation) in order to support em-
ployee retention. This is an effort observed multiple times in our discussions with experts 
that SOC management makes in order to cope with human factors challenges. The policies, 
processes, and even procedures are highly defined to fit company regulation or compliance 
requirements.
In the SOCs studied, collaboration and cooperation are observable on multiple levels and 
mediated by several channels. First of all, local team members communicate within the team 
verbally or using email, chat for synchronous cooperation, and the ticketing system for asyn-
chronous cooperation. The security teams observed in global companies have connections or 
sub-teams in various locations in the world. There is intensive communication with these re-
mote team members using computer-mediated channels, phone calls, and rarely face-to-face 
meetings. These later examples are fitting the definition of virtual teams described above. 
Finally, there is cooperation and communication with employees of the company who are not 
involved in security functions. They are the “ordinary” people who can be both targets of an 
attack or represent an insider threat. Information exchange with employees mainly happens 
using email and phone calls. Reaching company employees is especially complicated in the 
case of a managed security service when the SOC is operated by an external company in 
a time zone different from the one where the customer to be protected is. These later issues 
mentioned by the experts interviewed are related to mixed or virtual team collaboration. 
All together these features of teamwork either a mixed setting where technology augments 
the face-to-face interaction or virtual teamwork where the team members are distributed in 
geolocations, working times, organizational units. This includes both in-house and managed 
SOC teams on a spectrum of fully virtual team who rarely meet face-to-face to a team that 
augment their collaboration by using communication technology.
A schematic way of incident handling in an SOC is described by Muniz and his col-
leagues [3] is summarized in Figure 4. This process is supported by our findings based on our 
interviews and visits.
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Figure 4. The schematic steps of incident handling in an SOC is described by Muniz et al.  
[Edited by the authors.]
Besides this chain of actions performed when something out of the ordinary happens, the 
daily routine of the SOC team consists of prescribed monitoring tasks, threat hunting for 
suspicious events in data, and rule refinements—these are often monotonous tasks.
Discussion
The findings summarized above prove that the information security activities performed in 
Security Operations Centers rely heavily on team collaboration, cooperation and on how in-
formation is shared and used in teams. These teams use multiple computer-mediated channels 
for working together and for collecting, displaying, storing information, and taking actions. 
Examples of these channels are the ticketing system, chat applications, phone calls and wikis.
There are multiple levels of remote or virtual collaboration observed in SOC teams sorted 
using the cells of the CSCW matrix. [16]
1. In the case of face-to-face interactions, discussions and meetings take place in the 
same time and space in the SOC. The large displays of events or alerts happening in 
real time are visible from all parts of the SOC room and they provide information in 
a collocated synchronous way.
2. The same large displays, dashboards, and project management tools (e.g. Jira, Slack) 
supporting continuous work can be used in an asynchronous way too, while analysts 
are changing shifts or new experts are involved in the incident response.
3. Remote interactions happen through messaging or chat tools (sometimes integrated in 
project management applications). The same dashboards and SIEM data are visible in 
multiple remotely collaborating locations of a SOC. The real-time monitoring of priv-
ileged users also fits into this cell of the matrix, that is, when an activity is remotely 
observed as it happens.
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4. Teamwork that is asynchronous in both time and space is related to communication 
and coordination tools such as the project management or ticketing tools, emails, wikis 
(e.g. Confluence) and calendars. Threat intelligence and forensics data collection and 
sharing also fit into this cell.
The issues learned from interviews and field visits are matching the challenges highlighted 
by the research of virtual teams. Not only technology but individual and organizational 
factors take important roles in solving challenges that SOCs are facing nowadays. KSAOs 
are crucial in this set as these are the input elements of a high performing virtual team what 
SOCs are likely to be.
The SOCs in case of three plus one models can be considered as fields of virtual team-
work. Virtual SOCs (model 1), co-managed SOCs (model 3), MSSPs (model 5), and dedicat-
ed SOCs (model 4) when monitoring companies of multiple remote locations are all facing 
challenges virtual teams. These are challenges of technology usage, cultural differences, 
geographic dispersion (CITE Schultze). These challenges have impact on communication, 
coordination, cohesion, trust, performance, innovation or even on functioning. [19] These 
impacts cover almost every field of teamwork. The results based on the interviews verify 
these challenges appearing in case of SOC teams. Also the high reliance on technology in 
case of virtual teams in SOCs make the earlier observations of Goodall, Lutters, Komlo-
di [20] of IDS analysts from the perspective of CSCW applicable. Even though these have 
moved to the forefront of discussion in the literature, the high workload and the personnel 
issues remained a problematic area in the security domain. Changes in technology has to 
be matched with changes in the organization in order to facilitate a successful cooperative 
work. [20] Implementing novel tools will not solve the challenges in SOCs: organizational 
improvements e.g. redesigning job roles or career paths are also required to be successful.
Specifically referring to challenges and related to virtual teams, that SOCs are considered 
to be similar in certain cases, Schulzte and Krumm [19] provides a detailed review of litera-
ture. The authors match the challenges with relevant KSAOs which provides a framework of 
future research and field applications of virtual teams e.g. to SOCs.
Challenges in Virtual Teams
The main challenges appearing in virtual teams are (1) technology usage, (2) cultural differ-
ences, and (3) geographical dispersion. [19] In details the challenges consist of the following:
1. Technology usage: the technology used to connect team members often suppress social 
cues, nonverbal communication which reduces attractiveness, understanding, relation-
ship and trust-building in virtual collaboration. [19] In case of SOCs the technology 
used to reach out other experts or clients often mentioned to be a source of problems 
and biases: they are hard to reach or the mutual understanding is missing. Especially 
in case of asynchronous communication (e-mail, ticketing system, wiki, etc.) the ra-
tio of relational messages in the communication often causes feelings of uncertainty, 
larger demand for coordination and problem solving. It strengthens this challenge that 
intensive and ever more complex cyber-attacks constantly push SOCs toward applying 
new technology.
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2. Cultural differences: it means differences in values, communicative behavior and 
language skills. Poor language skills cause anxiety which causes less communica-
tion. [19] This may lead to lack of information that is required to be shared across the 
SOC’s dispersed team.
3. Geographical dispersion: meaning also configurational, spatial and temporal dis-
persion. It includes problems of low visibility, reduced awareness of isolated team 
members leading to increased coordination requirements. Team members dispersed in 
multiple time zones may suffer low accessibility of information (e.g. who knows the 
answer is out of his working hours) and reduced coordination which reduces perfor-
mance. [19] In case of managed SOCs the service provider suffers problems reaching 
clients out of their working hours and SOC employees working in night shifts to cover 
the client’s time zone are prone to larger workload and stress.
The interviews revealed issues in all three challenges which underline that SOCs share the 
problems of virtual teams as they are functioning alike in many cases. The knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs) that considered as drivers of virtual team success 
are grouped into six clusters [19]:
• Media KSAOs: knowledge about the medium, knowing how and when to use what, 
and adapt to channel restrictions
• Communication KSAOs: enables people to communicate effectively within dispersed 
teams, share knowledge, interpret messages appropriately
• Trust-related KSAOs: the skill to develop interpersonal trust (e.g. responsiveness, 
 dependability, active and frequent participation)
• Intercultural KSAOs: both knowledge and skills that help to interact with people from 
different (organizational-, functional-, national-) cultures
• Self-management KSAOs: the skill to manage oneself effectively (e.g. self-, time-, 
project- management)
• Conflict management KSAOs: the skill to constructively solve conflicts
Schultze and Krumm [19] reviewed the relevant facets of challenges and KSAOs (including 
motivation, experience, and personality). In case of virtual collaboration in SOCs we consider 
a selection of this broad review to be summarized here as a practical conclusion providing 
answers for issues emerged in the interviews.
Knowledge about the Challenge of Technology Usage [19]
The inadequate team communication or collaboration media choice harms teamwork. Con-
trarily knowledge about media channels is promoting teamwork. Consciously using media 
with low synchronicity helps transmitting information (conveyance). Using media with high 
synchronicity promotes mutual understanding in teams (convergence). The complimentary 
usage of communication technology also supports virtual teamwork. The more modalities are 
involved in the teamwork (modality augmentation) the less errors and information overhead 
will happen. These may apply to the selection of tools and communication channels to use in 
SOCs collaborating in mixed or virtual ways.
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Skills about the Challenge of Technology Usage [19]
Certain communication skills support virtual teamwork through usage of technology which 
are applicable to SOCs. These are expressiveness, coordination (e.g. timing of emails), 
 attentiveness, composure (e.g. how confident one is). These are important for communication 
within the team or between teams or with clients’ communication.
Knowledge about Cultural Differences Related Challenges [19]
Cultural knowledge is a plus in any case of collaboration. Knowing how cultures perceive 
channels of communication technology differently reduce misunderstandings and even con-
flicts. It is a valid case of an organizational culture described in one of our interviews where 
email is the accepted channel of work orders so this is used for a trigger of forensics tasks to 
do. No other channels apply for this role and the knowledge about this helps to work with that 
team better. Similarly, email is effective in reducing language problems, miscommunications 
because it is asynchronous, causes less anxiety in members with lower language skills. The 
cultural knowledge can be shared in training programs which may have a positive effect on 
SOC teams’ performance.
Skills about Cultural Differences Related Challenges [19]
Cross cultural communication skills acquired by team members promote teamwork in virtual 
collaboration. Adopting communication with partners (e.g. communicate clearly, reducing 
slang words) occur 80.3% in verbal and 60.7% in written communication. Verbal commu-
nication is a stronger trigger to adapt language level. This application of culture related 
skills lead to higher trust in the distributed team and higher performance. This facet is fitting 
the case of global SOCs (of large organizations) and global MSSPs providing service for 
culturally different clients. These skills should be assessed and developed in order to make 
a successful SOC team.
Knowledge about Geographical Dispersion Related Challenges [19]
The knowledge that distance hinders synchronous interactions helps to apply compensatory 
solutions. Regular face-to-face meetings and site visits have a positive effect on virtual teams. 
The same effect was observed in case of video conferences where non-verbal communication 
channels are more available. It has a positive effect that the team members know that asyn-
chronous communication is good for conveying information across time zones. In general, it 
promotes team performance when the members know the effects of certain communication 
channels because it helps to choose adequately. These can be included in training programs 
for SOC personnel.
Skills about Geographical Dispersion Related Challenges [19]
High skills in time- and self-management supports virtually collaborating teams to plan, 
strategize, schedule and reduce communication delays (e.g. keeping shifted working hours 
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of others in mind). Communication skills applied adequately by providing contextual infor-
mation promotes shared identity of the team and trust. The same effect is related to frequent 
and spontaneous communication. Such skills may be the characteristics to look for in SOC 
employee selection or to develop in training.
Motivation
Motivation plays an important proximal role in virtual team performance. Motivation 
towards technology usage may appear perceived usefulness of tools or even in computer 
anxiety which are determining factors in technology usage. [19] Organizations having SOCs 
or using managed security services have high compliance regulations (e.g. financial sector) 
where early adoption to new tools and technology is rare. Thus, motivation towards the us-
age of virtual teamwork related technology may appear constrained. Motivations related to 
cultural differences in virtual teams appear as a fear of communication in foreign languages 
or high cultural intelligence as a better case. [19] These motivations can either be perceived 
or shaped by SOC management. Motivational issues are related to geographical dispersion 
of the teams for example the feeling of anonymity, low social control, low visibility of own/
other team can end up in social loafing which reduces performance. [19] Contrarily trust, 
coordination, goal setting, self-efficiency promoting motivation of team members dispersed 
in various locations. Geographic locations per se have an effect on motivation which has to 
be considered in case of virtually collaborating SOC teams or using managed services.
Experiences
Experiences of team members with virtual team work have a positive effect on coping with 
all three challenges. [19] Experiences with technology shapes the media channels’ percep-
tion. Intercultural experiences are precursors of culturally intelligent acting. Dispersed work 
experiences support self-efficacy which promotes performance. This is applicable to SOCs 
when searching for employees: experiences with virtual teamwork and its challenges predict 
better performance.
Personality
Personality characteristics are the less studied area in this field. On a high level, the openness 
factor of the personality has a positive effect on adaptation to new technology and learning 
about other cultures. [19] Personality factors may be measured in selection, so looking for 
high openness in SOC applicants’ tests could promote to hiring the right people.
Conclusion
It is important to take into account the fact that not all people are equally capable of working 
together in teams using computer supported collaboration e.g. virtual collaboration tools. 
Krumm and colleagues’ [24] [25] broad research revealed different sets of knowledge, skills, 
abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs) that affect virtual teamwork.
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SOCs are extensively relying on virtual teamwork especially in case of virtual SOCs 
(model 1), co-managed SOCs (model 3), MSSPs (model 5), and dedicated SOCs (model 4) 
when monitoring companies of multiple remote locations. The challenges related to virtual 
teams were observed in the interviews conducted in this research phase. Focusing on this 
special and emerging subset of SOC, the virtual team performance related KSAOs proved to 
be applicable.
These KSAOs can be learned, trained, or looked for in case of selection. These promote 
SOC team performance and reduce the turnover in SOC personnel. These can be considered 
as prerequisites of effective virtual teamwork in SOCs. Exactly what KSAOs may be relevant 
that depends on the working conditions of the teams: the virtual team performs at the highest 
level when the members have the knowledge, skills, and motivation relevant to the setting.
In a broader perspective: the work of information security teams using computer sup-
ported means of collaboration (e.g. virtual or mixed teams) cannot only be supported by new 
technology but human factors have to be taken into consideration. Changes of technology 
should be accompanied by organizational changes or support. It requires a perceptive man-
agement that perceives the SOCs and all information security activities as socio-technical 
systems. [20] Goodall et al as an example of that suggested refining roles and positions, 
designing an effective information visualization tool to enhance IDS analysts work and 
promote employee retention, and satisfaction despite high workload. Following the authors 
perspective of CSCW and adding virtual teamwork with the KSAOs predicting high perfor-
mance we consider that SOC teams have to be studied, supported, and managed in a complex 
way. This should include technology to provide data, technology to enable collaborative work 
of dispersed members and knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics to promote 
a high performance in this setting.
As a practical conclusion identified challenges appearing in SOCs related to virtual team-
work and KSAOs enabling performance to focus on. These KSAOs may help coping with 
the challenges: finding the right people, develop the people, retain talents, provide leadership 
guidance in SOCs. This completes the fast-evolving technology in information security in-
dustry by adding human factor and interpreting SOC work as a socio-technical system.
This conclusion can be also useful within the military. We should not forget that more and 
more cadets start serving from Generation Z with deep skills in IT and an option to leave ser-
vice and start a new career in the private sector. Meanwhile, the threat agents in cyberspace 
will not be reduced. Officers and politicians responsible for national cyber defense have to 
keep in mind this generation change and should establish this cultural and environmental 
change. Cyberspace is the fifth domain of warfare where new strategies and tactics appear 
on the attacker side day by day, therefore we have to rethink the defense capabilities as well.
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Major Chemical Accidents in the 21st Century Europe 
and its Lessons Learned in Higher Education1
József DOBOR2
This article provides an example of how to use case studies in the case of disaster 
management education subjects. The development of the subject’s program 
and content are a continuous activity, actually a consequence of the changing 
world. Companies carrying out chemical processes while maintaining their 
competitiveness, cannot be considered constant in parallel with the constantly 
evolving technical conditions. Therefore, industrial processes, chemical processes, 
accident prevention, recovery techniques, presentations in the lectures need to be 
updated.
New methods can be used for computing devices, applications, or their results. In the 
case of hazard analysis, the software and the presentation of their computational 
results are, in my experience, effective in the line of teaching methods. Namely, 
depicting and propagating the propagation of a gaseous material with a dangerous 
property, the direction and speed of the wind (and other physical chemical 
parameters) is an effective frontal technique for the students.
The chemical processes are based on numerous chemical processes, which are 
able to operate under constant control of the control parameters. There is a strong 
professional justification for describing these processes, which is the subject of 
the Dangerous Technology section of the subject in the field of industrial security.
Keywords: hazardous chemicals, case study, chemical industry, chemical accident, 
higher education, disaster management
Introduction
Mankind was helped by numerous accidental discoveries and inventions to achieve today’s 
development level. Here are a few seldom heard special discoveries:
Thanks to the development of Sir Humphry Davy in 1815, by replacing the lamp used 
for lighting in mines with a safety alternative, much fewer accidents occurred in coal mines. 
Methane was an undesirable by-product in many coal mines, resulting in frequent firedamp 
explosions. Davy’s lamp saved many lives and proved to be a huge opportunity for mining. [1]
In 1839, Charles Goodyear invented a process that made it possible to use rubber 
extracted from the rubber tree on an industrial scale, thus making rubber one of today’s 
most useful materials. The vulcanization process was accidentally invented. This process is 
a chemical process which increases the strength and durability of rubber tires. The tire retains 
1 The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority 
project PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance” in the Miklós Zrínyi Habilitation Program.
2 Ph.D., Assistant Professor, National University of Public Service, Institute of Disaster Management; e-mail: 
dobor.jozsef@uni-nke.hu
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its  elasticity in a much wider range of temperature, therefore vulcanised rubber can be used 
for more purposes. [1]
In 1846 nitroglycerin was produced by an Italian scientist, Ascanio Sobero, the first to 
do so according to the publications. Nitro-glycerine is a very explosive liquid, so it was very 
risky to use.
In 1866, Alfred Nobel, a Swedish inventor, mixed silicon dioxide with liquid nitro-glyc-
erine, thus obtaining an extremely explosive paste and patented the process in 1867. Nobel’s 
aim was to place dynamite on the market and use it for larger construction work, such as 
building roads and tunnels. Unfortunately, however, dynamite has been used by the military 
as a weapon in numerous battles. [1]
The contradictory story of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) is also worth re-
counting to the readers. DDT was first produced in 1874 by the German chemist Othmar 
Zeidler. Its usefulness was proved by Swiss biochemist Paul Hermann Muller in 1939, 
discovering its effectiveness as a general insecticide. Muller received a Nobel Prize in 1948. 
The introduction of DDT reduced the occurrence of malaria, typhoid, yellow fever and bu-
bonic plague which had killed millions of people. However, it was found that DDT is not 
selective, its effects are not limited to insects and it is very dangerous to the human body, 
because it is able to cause many changes in the body. Decays very slowly and accumulates in 
different living organisms.
The first artificially created element was technetium (Tc), created in 1937 by Emilio Segre 
and Carlo Perrier. Alloys containing technetium oxide reduce corrosion. [1]
Justification for the Choice of the Subject
To maintain today’s standard of living, it is inevitable to have contact with dangerous 
substances on a daily basis. Production, transportation, use and storage are all activities in-
volving continuous risk factors throughout the world. Work accidents, malfunctions, damage 
incidents, transport accidents in the country; the release of dangerous materials whether they 
are gaseous, liquid or solid are practically everyday occurrences. It is important for disaster 
management specialists to have a professional routine in activities involving chemicals, so 
that they can provide effective professional advice to students they are in charge of, the 
would be future professionals. Naturally, primary interveners and professionals from author-
ities may also encounter this problem.
A Brief Introduction to Present Europe’s Chemical Industry
The chemical industry supports virtually all segments of the economy and is closely en-
twined with its customers downstream. Rubber and plastics, pulp and paper, and the auto-
motive industry are all huge users. Closely two-thirds of EU chemicals are supplied to EU 
manufacturers or construction. The EU chemical industry distributes technology throughout 
the region’s economy. The EU chemical industry’s share of world markets has declined in 
the past two decades. Trading chemicals all over the place prompts competition, provides 
an incentive to develop different markets through innovation, inspires production efficiency 
and helps develop the quality of human life.
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Characteristics of the EU28 chemical industry structure:3 [2] [3]
• number of companies: 28,221;
• turnover: 520.2 billion €;
• direct employees: 1,155,000.
The chemical industry demands energy and competes globally. Anything that increases energy 
costs in Europe in relation to our participants has a major impact on competitiveness. EU 
legislation adds several costs for the European chemical industry, hampering its worldwide 
competitiveness. [2] [3]
Among others REACH prices will likely decrease after 2018; on the other hand comply-
ing with biocidal product and plant protection regulations will become costlier. The aim is to 
guarantee regulation by achieving its objectives in the most well-organized way, and correct 
any shortcomings without negotiating health, safety and environmental protection. Europe’s 
chemical industry needs a regulatory framework that is fit for the purpose, consistent, cost- 
effective and which does not negatively impact its competitiveness vs other regions.
Over the last two decades, the European chemical industry, together with pharmaceuticals 
has made a huge effort to minimise the environmental impact of its production. The Euro-
pean chemical industry is still a world leader, and a highly inventive sector. Germany and 
France are the two largest chemicals producers in Europe, followed by Italy and the United 
Kingdom. [2] [3]
Characteristics of Hungary’s Chemical Industry Structure
The chemical industry plays a significant role in Hungary’s economy. The chemical and 
pharmaceutical businesses have a long history in Hungary, as they do investigation, im-
provement and novelty that are mainly essential now to the competitiveness and sustainable 
development of the country’s chemical companies. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Manufacturers operate laboratories and research centres. The Chemical Research Centre 
of the Hungarian National Academy and the technical universities of Budapest, Veszprém, 
Debrecen and Miskolc participate in both basic and applied research projects in cooperation 
with companies and/or under EU programmes and projects.
Characteristics of Hungary’s chemical industry structure:4 [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
• turnover: > 16 billion €;
• direct employees: 80,305.
Strengths of the Hungarian chemical industry:
• a robust petrochemical base,
• rule economies of scale, up-to-date technologies and sound environment practices,
• powerful presence on the stock exchange,
• volume improved by investment to meet demands from electronics and agriculture.
3 Based on data of the year 2015.
4 Based on data of the year 2015.
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Development targets of the Hungarian chemical industry (weaknesses):
• depends heavily on imported raw materials and energy,
• high and volatile energy prices weaken competitiveness.
The chemical enterprises are trying hard to maintain and develop close relations with 
vocational training schools, dedicated high-schools and technical universities to attract 
young, well-trained and highly educated people to replace the aging employees. This aims 
to avoid skill shortages and losing professionals to other developed economies. Chemical 
industry structure in Hungary (2015), source: Hungarian Chemical Industry Association as 










Graph 1. Chemical industry structure in Hungary (2015),  
source: Hungarian Chemical Industry Association.  
(Compilation of data by the author based on source [4–8].)
The business is a giant employer, with more than 80,000 workers, including 14,000 in 
chemicals and 17,000 pharmaceuticals. With gross wages above the national average, the 
chemical segment is a valued employer. Full time employment in the Hungarian chemi-
cal industry (2008–2015) source: Hungarian Chemical Industry Association as shown in 
Graph 2. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
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Graph 2. Full time employment in the Hungarian chemical industry (2008–2015) 
source: Hungarian Chemical Industry Association.
(Compilation of data by the author based on source [4–8].)
In the following part of my paper some characteristic major chemical accidents will be 
 discussed and lessons learned and accepted in higher education will be summarized.
 Toxic Leakage in a Frozen Food Storehouse in France
On the premises of a company operating hundreds of frozen food storehouses located in the 
village of Nemours, near the A6 motorway in Seine-et-Marne, France, packaging, distribu-
tion and storage of food products take place. The company employed 236 employees in 2005 
and consisted of two buildings separated by a passageway. The logistics warehouse contains 
a laboratory and a refrigerated storage room with the refrigerator containing ammonia. This 
technology line is capable of storing up to 2 tonnes of ammonia. [9]
As regards the pressure vessel containing ammonia, it is important to note that it was 
only equipped with fi lling and fl uid drainage valves, but it did not have various pressure 
accessories, such as pressure gauges or safety valves.
Between 20th and 26th April 2005, safety improvements were planned for the refrigeration 
equipment used by the company to replace the condenser and other accessories (including, 
for example, the valves) of the cooling system circulating ammonia under pressure. Prior to 
the development work, part of the ammonia had to be removed from the system. As noted in 
subsequent studies, during this process, it escaped the attention of the maintenance workers 
that 500 kg of the 2 tonnes of liquid ammonia in the cooling circuit remained in the evaporator. 
1500 kg of ammonia was transferred into four 450 kg tanks rented by a subcontractor special-
izing in the maintenance of refrigeration equipment, which were placed outside the storehouse 
and stored under guard. On April 23, 2005, one 450 kg ammonia tank began to leak.
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The toxic cloud affected a total of 100 people on the plant site, including 21 warehouse 
workers and people who were parking 200 meters from the tank at the rest area on the A6 
motorway.
Following this incident, the authorities required the operators to prepare and fully comply 
with a so-called internal emergency plan.
During the response, significant protection resources were used with substantial efforts 
and professional supervision. About 100 firefighters, 40 vehicles, and 2 helicopters were 
needed to manage the incident.
Local ambulance units reported approximately 50 people injured, 28 of them were ex-
amined and five injured were hospitalized for a severe asthma attack. Due to the internal 
emergency plan, a 150-meter radius security perimeter was set up by local professionals.
At the site of the incident, the primary interveners diluted the ammonia gas leaking from 
the ruptured tank with the help of a water curtain, thus preventing the ammonia cloud from 
spreading to the nearby rest area. [9]
The waste water generated during the intervention was collected in a 300-m3 basin and 
after a laboratory inspection, it was released into the communal drainage system.
The major problem identified as the reason of the accident was the rupture of the pressure 
vessel, caused by the overpressure in the tank, which can be traced back to overfilling during 
the transfer. Vessels used for the transfer were originally designed to store liquefied gases and 
liquids with a filling rate of 85–100%. As a further problem, post-accident analyses revealed 
that the tanks in which the ammonia was transferred were not suitable for filling above 430 
kg, which was very close to the container’s storage capacity.
A further complication that also contributed to the damage incident was that the transfer 
method applied was not suitable for the tank model used by the operator and the company did 
not have documents or instruction manuals which could have explained the markings used 
on the tank. [9]
After the investigation of the accident, the following measures were required from the 
company by the competent French authority: [9]
• preparation of a training material for the employees, which included the events that 
had happened before, simulations, presentation of consequences and analysis of the 
event;
• the company was to take measures that are capable of preventing or minimizing leak-
age of a similar dangerous material;
• clarifying, continuous updating and practicing the internal emergency plan;
• the instructions of the tank filling processes need to be revised;
• installation of devices for the measurement of the concentration of ammonia and their 
mobile use if the dangerous material is transferred in an open space;
• defining the responsibility of the actors involved in the event in legal proceedings.
Measures taken by the dangerous establishment following the accident: [9]
1. replacement of some of the equipment in the technological line with more suitable 
ones that fit the parameters more accurately, e.g. tubular heat exchangers were replaced 
with plate heat exchangers;
2. the maximum amount of ammonia present at the site was reduced to 600 kg;
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3. building well-designed loading stations which greatly facilitates the process and in 
the event of a possible ammonia leak, the toxic gas clouds automatically flow to the 
chimney due to a ventilation system, thereby reducing the harmful effects on workers.
As regards the equipment used by the operators, concerns were raised about the use of simple, 
multi-function tanks that did not have safety valves, pressure and overcharge accessories, 
avoiding incomplete ammonia removal.
Road Accident of a Tanker Truck Transporting Ammonia
On 19th September 2006, on the outskirts of Balatonberény, Somogy County, a tanker truck 
with UN marking 1005 crashed into a ditch and leaked dangerous material. The police officer 
arriving at the scene of the incident found that the accident was caused by a truck driver 
unlawfully overtaking the truck transporting ammonia. [10]
The disaster management units observed the following points during the reconnaissance:
• the ambulance arriving at the scene began treating the injured;
• the accessories protecting the valves at the top of the trailer of the lorry were damaged 
in the accident and ammonia leaked through the damaged valves.
Measures taken during the response: [10]
• the road section affected by the accident was closed by police officers in a radius of 
60 metres;
• disaster management specialists equipped with type “A” personal protection (gas-tight 
protective suit) closed the deformed valves on the top of the damaged tank and tempo-
rarily stopped ammonia leakage with an emergency patch;
• the dangerous material was transferred from the damaged tank into a suitable container 
vehicle;
• the local unit of Disaster Management, the Emergency Reconnaissance Team (the pre-
decessor of the Disaster Management Mobile Laboratory) carried out reconnaissance 
and took measurements (inside the danger zone) which revealed the presence of the 
dangerous substance in the immediate vicinity of the damaged tank;
• the presence of ammonia was not detected after closing the valves.
Ammonia Leakage in a Facility in Nagykanizsa, Hungary
On 3rd January 2003, the service staff of a facility in Nagykanizsa performed the scheduled 
replacement of one of the pumps responsible for cooling the plant. According to the mainte-
nance workers’ narrative, prior to performing the operation, they were planning to separate 
the sections of the pipelines as prescribed in the operational instructions. Meanwhile, in order 
to remove the small amount of gaseous ammonia remaining in the pump, they opened the air 
valves and the gas was released (into the hall) at full pressure through an opening of approxi-
mately 16 mm diameter. The maintenance workers immediately alerted the employees in the 
factory who then left the danger zone and gathered in a safe place. [11]
Following the incident, the relevant units of disaster management were immediately 
alerted and squads from the Nagykanizsa Fire Department arrived at the scene, who reported 
100 (16) 3 (2017)
J. DOBOR: Major Chemical Accidents in the 21st Century Europe…
the incident to the Zala County Disaster Management Directorate, the Nagykanizsa Civil 
Protection Branch Office and the Nagykanizsa Police Department. Soon the Emergency 
Reconnaissance Team was also alerted and the West-Transdanubian Inspectorate for Envi-
ronmental Protection was informed about the events in addition to other establishments in the 
vicinity of the establishment. [11]
Primary interveners dressed in fully protective clothing, equipped with breathing appa-
ratus disconnected the power in the plant. Then during the reconnaissance, it was revealed 
that the air in the room containing the pump became saturated with ammonia and thus it was 
leaking through the doors into the plant.
For the sake of the operations, they designated the intervention zones according to hazard. 
The primary zone was a circle of 10-meter radius around the leakage and it was the one with 
the strictest personal protection requirements (full respiratory and chemical protection equip-
ment) were put in place to protect the primary interveners. The second zone was a circle of 
50-meter radius, in which the incident commander required interveners to wear firefighting 
protective clothing together with the accompanying respiratory protection equipment. [11]
Subsequently, under the professional guidance of the specialists of the plant arriving on 
site in the meantime, valves were closed in the pump room and with further operations, 
ammonia leakage was completely stopped. The ammonia accumulated in the pump rooms of 
the facility was removed with vaporised water. During the described operations, the chemical 
reconnaissance units continuously monitored the concentration of ammonia in the air (with 
the help of detection tubes and measuring instruments).
Subsequently, the plant gradually channelled the ammonia contaminated water into the 
communal wastewater system, bearing in mind the sustainable capacity of the residential 
network. In the coming days, all the facilities in the factory were ventilated and inspected.
Reconnaissance findings and the accident analysis later revealed that approximately 
300 litres (about 200 kg) was leaked out of 3 tonnes of ammonia and due to the effective 
intervention, there was no injury or permanent damage to the environment. Based on the 
continuous reconnaissance, it was stated that the concentration of ammonia did not reach the 
life-threatening value, but its level was repeatedly found in the range of “harmful to health”. 
The loss of working hours resulted in a significant economic damage in the operation of the 
plant. [11]
Accident of a Fuel Tank in Hungary
On 25th March 2010, at the Csepel Base Depot of MOL5 Group, an explosion occurred during 
the cleaning of a tank of 5,000 cubic metre, originally used for storing petrol; the hydrocar-
bon compound residues caught fire in the empty uncleaned tank. As a result, the top of the 
tank collapsed and the subcontractor worker performing maintenance inside the tank lost 
his life. The dead body of the man burned beyond recognition. It could only be pulled out 
through a crack at the bottom of the tank formed as a result of the explosion. At the site, the 
cleaning work was carried out by a subcontractor company which claimed to have provided 
the workers with appropriate personal protective equipment, namely respiratory protection 
(breathing apparatus), protective clothing and the necessary external professional supervisors 
5 Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt. – Hungarian Oil and Gas Plc.
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were also present. The rather robust tank of 5,000 cubic meters cracked open as a result of 
the physical consequences of the explosion and the roof structure of the tank collapsed. It is 
assumed that the industrial incident occurred when the hydrocarbon residues were removed 
and an explosive mixture of petrol vapour and water was formed and an adverse event result-
ed in a spark. The cleaning worker probably had taken a non-explosion proof hand-held radio 
with himself, while other case studies claim that his clothing was not entirely suitable and 
became charged with static electricity due to friction. The author of this article, as a member 
of the primary mission unit on the day indicated was on the site and conducted a chemical 
investigation. [12] [13]
Explosions in a Pharmaceutical Plant: Linz, Austria
The case happened in Linz, Austria, in an industrial park where thirty chemical companies 
are located. The plant involved in the event produces chemical and intermediate products 
for the pharmaceutical industry, the highest tier according to Seveso. In the unit affected, 
glyoxylic acid was produced, using ozone, oxygen, methanol dimethyl maleate with the help 
of a catalyst in several steps. The chemical process was performed with ozone at –20 °C and 
1.7 bar. After a lengthy experiment, a technological process was developed and the product 
became more valuable for the company. [14]
On 13th August 2003, after 10 o’clock in the morning, the technological unit exploded as 
a result of a harmful side process. The material released during the event, which was largely 
methanol, caused fire. According to the witnesses, a special phenomenon occurred, called 
“fireball”, with a diameter of at least 80 m, causing considerable damage to the structure. 
Several units arrived on the spot, both the company’s own industrial firefighters and local 
firefighters as well, and thanks to the effective primary intervention, the fire did not spread 
to other facilities. [14]
Many of the workers on the site suffered burns, broken bones and bruises that were made 
even more serious by the broken glasses. According to the available literature, twenty people 
had to be treated. The unit was completely destroyed in the explosion. This accounted for 
about one quarter of the total area of the facility, so the damage was enormous.
A further fact is that closed offices were also destroyed or suffered significant damage due 
to the explosion. In the entire industrial park, chemical activities were shut down until the 
event was settled. Fortunately, environmental damage was not detected beyond the bounda-
ries of the facility. Specialists attributed this to the fact that a significant part of the chemical 
material was burned in the explosion process.
The analysis revealed that one of the columns had an irregular chemical leak, probably 
methanol and peroxide. It resulted in a spontaneous combustion and decomposition which 
then spread to the first and then to the second column. This is referred to as the so-called 
domino effect which means that the dangerous effect spreads further to other chemical pro-
cesses. [14]
Based on the information available, it is interesting to note that, after the event, the 
pharmaceutical company did not change its procedures and introduced only minimal tech-
nological improvements. Among others, the columns used in the ozonolysis process were 
installed in the refrigeration units, in a separate, closed and guarded building unit. Naturally, 
the ozonator units of the facility were equipped with ozone sensors.
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The reactors were equipped with pressure relief valves to withstand explosions in case 
of overpressure and additional safety measures were introduced, for example regular control 
parameter measurements (temperature, pressure) were scheduled.
Despite the increased security level of the technology, two more explosions occurred on 
the same site one year after the complete restart. These events resulted in a significantly lower 
material damage. The analysis of the damage incident showed that the new security measure 
was carried out properly from a professional point of view. These measures made it possible 
to avoid injuries but are not yet sufficient to prevent the occurrence of a second accident in 
the future. [14]
The company relied on more than 50 experts and spent about 400,000 Euros on expertise 
and analysis. Consequently, the technology underwent a significant change, the reaction is 
carried out with air and inert gas in the future instead of ozone.
A Chemical Incident During the Cleaning of  
a Tanker Truck in Budapest, Hungary
On 8th July 2014, in a truck washer in the 13th district of Budapest, a trailer truck with tank 
lined up for cleaning the inside of its tank. Previously, a flammable hydrocarbon, pentane, 
was carried inside. Prior to the cleaning, the material previously transported was identified 
with the help of the consignment note and the visual elements displayed on the tank such as 
dangerous goods labels and orange warning plates with numbers. The tank cleaning started 
in line with the instructions manual, although it was not detailed enough. The truck parked in 
that part of the truck washer where chemicals are cleaned. The driver of the vehicle unlocked 
the dome covers but they were not opened. The attendant opened all the four dome covers 
of the tank and attached the cleaning device to three of them. The attendant grounded the 
tank with the cleaning heads, since there was no separate grounding point on the tank. The 
discharge valves on the right side of the tank were turned open and the cleaning device 
was started. Pressurisation began in the system until normal working pressure was reached, 
which was maintained during the whole cleaning process. Once normal working pressure 
was reached, the attendant launched the washing process. The washing process involved high 
pressure water of approximately 80 °C. The washing water going through the tank flowed 
into the drainage system built at the bottom of the washing area. At the end of the cleaning 
process, the attendant stopped the washing and switched on the ventilation system of the 
washing area. After the ventilation system was switched on, the attendant left the area and an 
explosion occurred. No personal injury occurred during the damage incident; however, the 
material damage caused was significant. In addition to the vehicle and the cleaning device, 
the roof structure of the facility got damaged as well as the wall structure separating the 
washing areas and another vehicle. The damage did not render the vehicle immobile. The 
truck and its trailer managed to leave the spot without outside help. The case analysis identi-
fied pentane residues as the cause of the explosion. Most probably, air-pentane mixture was 
formed, in which a static spark triggered an explosion. [15] [16]
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Explosion and Fire in an Oil Storage Depot—Hertfordshire, 
 England
On 11th December 2005, at around 6 a.m., several consecutive explosions occurred at the 
Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, located in Hertfordshire, England. Following these explosions, 
there was a huge fire that burned for several days and caused enormous damage to the sur-
roundings of the facility in South-England. The blasts in the storage depot in Buncefield started 
with the detonation of hydrocarbon-air mixture coming out of an overfilled tank. Overfilling 
was due to the failure of the signalling system measuring the tank parameters. However, the 
strength of the explosion could not be explained with this circumstance. [17] [18] [19] [20]
Despite the extraordinary damage, the number of serious injuries was relatively low. 
To be more precise, 43 people suffered minor injuries and there were no fatalities. The 
nearby commercial and residential properties suffered minimal damage. It was a major 
disaster management task that approximately 2,000 people had to be evacuated on short 
notice from the damaged commercial and residential buildings. Residents in the properties 
in the vicinity of the industrial park that had not suffered damage were warned to stay in-
doors. [17] [18] [19] [20]
On12th December 2005, the fire escalated at around lunch time. At this time, 26 fire en-
gines, 180 firefighters and 20 support vehicles took part in the rescue.
The primary interveners acted in accordance with the instructions for the management 
of chemical incidents, while partner organisations, such as the Environment Agency worked 
in close co-operation with each other. Experts from the Environment Agency provided pro-
fessional advice to interveners in order to minimize contamination, paying close attention 
to nearby surface- and groundwater (and water bases). At the beginning of the incident, 
the Health Protection Agency experts were ready to participate in the analysis of the situa-
tion. [17] [18] [19] [20]
The Buncefield incident has clearly pointed out the need for a suitable, well-functioning 
(properly updated) emergency management plan, an ideal solution for a potential chemical 
accident in order to provide a proper professional basis for primary interveners. In addition, 
a publicly available document is easily accessible for the interested population. Furthermore, 
the event also highlighted the problem of commercial and residential areas being in the 
vicinity of a dangerous establishment, for which there are plenty of examples around the 
world. Moreover, it also serves as a typical example for the physical, chemical and biological 
impacts of a damage incident.The plant’s land use plan ignored and failed to simulate, cal-
culate and analyse the potential for the formation of gaseous hydrocarbons. The main lesson 
to be drawn is that greater attention should be paid to the risks affecting the population in 
emergency planning. [17] [18] [19] [20]
An effective emergency planning addresses the following issues: various communication 
channels between the primary interveners, the specific tasks and the probable consequences 
of the event. The plan must include concrete actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, 
specifying precisely the responsibilities of the plant employees in the document.
Over the past 12 years, the case has been covered in countless studies to provide valuable 
lessons to the readers. Since the case is extremely well-documented (including a lot of photos 
and videos), it has a relatively large publicity and reputation, hence the popularity of this 
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topic. The professional reason why this topic is addressed to students in the disaster manage-
ment specialization is that a typical series of events and its consequences can be modelled 
through this case: in a carbohydrate depot, filling a tank of several thousand cubic metres led 
to a serious industrial disaster caused by a series of human errors. When analysing the case, 
it was found that on the whole, the response of primary interveners was efficient and highly 
professional.
Educational Methods and Their Development Opportunities  
in Education in Disaster Management
The causes of industrial and chemical hazards and their disasters are failures, unanticipated 
side effects of technical systems. However, this is a misleading over-simplification and many 
other factors are involved. The calculus of industrial hazard is a blend of industrial structures, 
people and environments that contain atmospheric, ecological, psychological and social 
components.
The object of the disaster management’s main specialisation is to update the knowledge 
and skills of the college students on multi-dimensional aspects of chemical catastrophe risk 
management and emergency incident-response, effective planning, integration and organiza-
tion. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25]
The objectives of the disaster management specialization planned for the present is to 
enable the students to assess and deliver their respective aspects and roles in relation to chem-
ical disasters management and delineate strategies for risks mitigation and implementation of 
effective response in case of emergencies.
The educational aims of the subject program (elective course-unit, joint training, cred-
it-based education) purpose to allow the students: [21] [22] [23] [24] [25]
• identify the scenario and challenges associated with chemical disaster risks and con-
sequences;
• explain described observations about chemical disaster risks, mitigation methods and 
response mechanism;
• define preparedness for chemical emergencies and response of various services in 
chemical disasters;
• integrate environmental planning with disaster management in siting of Industries and 
Industrial estates;
• understand hazard and risk in materials, processes, others;
• understand how to avoid, how to treat events and how to minimize the number of vic-
tims, the economical and environment damages.
Educational methods shall be chosen for teaching a particular aspect of chemical disaster, 
from a range of the following:
• presentation (slides) and discussion,
• group work / project/ dialogue-exercise,
• film, simulation show followed by question-answer, discussion,
• lecture followed by query-answers,
• demonstration/hands on exposure (computer based).
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At the end of this educational unit, the participants will be able to : [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] 
• define and separate between chemical and industrial hazards,
• label their causes and impacts,
• comment the global, national and regional scenario.
To conclude, case studies of chemical disasters give the opportunity to:
• define the on-site hazards and risks of accidents that can lead to disaster within prem-
ises and outside,
• state the industrial siting aspects of off-site emergencies in case of a chemical disaster,
• analyse the vulnerability of the off-site population, property and environment to the 
risk of a chemical disaster,
• calculate the risk perception level, mitigation and preparedness including response 
measures, planning, coordination and command system on-site and off-site for han-
dling emergencies.
A nation’s legislative and institutional systems provide the basis for plans and administration 
in all areas of disaster risk reduction and emergency response. Then strong engagement exits 
between environmental degradation and disaster risks, environmental legislations and their 
implementation is a central criterion for disaster risk management. Conversely, the role of 
legal provisions on environment and natural resources can play significant role in addressing 
hazards and reducing vulnerability of natural disasters, and in handling after a disaster relief 
and recovery challenges, are seldom recognized. [21] [22] [23] [24] [25]
Conclusion
In the recent past, there has been a large number of industrial accidents in Hungary and 
European countries as well as in distant countries, some of which occurred during activities 
involving dangerous substances. For our daily activities, it is inevitable to come into contact 
with large quantities of dangerous chemicals. The life cycle of chemicals is so closely related 
to our everyday lives that it can be definitely stated that each and every person performs some 
kind of activity involving chemicals on a daily basis.
Using detergents, heating or cooking with gas-fired appliances, fuelling a car, a car engine 
running inside a garage, a poorly functioning combustion equipment, improperly installed 
and operated ventilation equipment, spraying in a kitchen garden or in a huge agricultural 
area are all just a few examples that can happen in a household in our everyday lives. The ac-
tivities mentioned above are carried out on a thousand or even on hundreds of thousand-fold 
scale in industry, agriculture, and of course with many different chemicals in the lead.
Statistics reveal that for most of the damage incidents people are to blame, mostly because 
of the following reasons: non-observance of operation rules, inattention and professional 
incompetence can all lead to accidents with serious consequences. It is of utmost importance 
for students studying in any of the three specialties of the disaster management course to 
master the basics and application of physics and chemistry. During their studies, students 
take part in both theoretical and practical training, through which they get into contact with 
the subfield of natural sciences connected to industry. After obtaining a degree, they should 
possess professional skills in incidents involving dangerous substances that allow them to 
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make high quality decisions. For a disaster management specialist, in addition to legislation, 
the knowledge and the sensible, conscious use of natural sciences is crucial for decision- 
making.
Chemicals and related activities can create increased emergencies and pose a risk of 
malfunctioning or accident. The main purpose of my paper was to present the importance 
of education through case studies. Ultimately, disaster management students are familiarised 
with various dangers that may occur during industrial activities, their occurrence characteris-
tics and the methods of identifying the hazards.
In a dangerous establishment with an advanced safety management system, the main 
guidelines relevant to the employees are discussed at least on a monthly basis in the form of 
further training and professional discussions.
Conclusions from the case studies are compatible with the curriculum of the disaster man-
agement course, and in addition, there are numerous other professional points for continuous 
improvement of the course syllabuses.
Closing remarks
In Hungary, natural sciences education is world-renowned, with over 120 years of tradition. 
Thanks to the high-quality, internationally acknowledged national higher education in nat-
ural sciences, there are many innovative processes in the domestic chemical industry. The 
undesirable effects of an industrial accident can be significantly influenced by the fact that 
disaster management higher education equips those in charge of managing interventions and 
training interveners with technical-natural sciences qualifications. A lecturer with empirical 
experience can familiarise students with technical and natural subjects with considerable 
efficiency. The teaching of natural sciences is not complete with the teaching of only theo-
retical knowledge. The desired outcome is that a prospective expert is able to make effective 
decisions. Our rapidly changing world is also reflected in the chemical processes.
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Decisive Change or Determined Continuity? 
The Trump Administration’s Foreign and Security 
Policy Viewed from Central and Eastern Europe
Gábor CSIZMAZIA1
The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States may be viewed 
as a watershed in American foreign policy. The Trump team entered the White 
House with several controversial views on America’s relation with the outside 
world, thus raising the question of whether the Trump Presidency will introduce 
decisive changes or will it follow the tradition of continuity in U.S. foreign policy. 
Due to some of his provocative remarks on NATO or Russia, President Trump’s 
actual performance is particularly important for Central and Eastern Europeans 
who have their own respective views on transatlantic relations. The Trump 
Administration’s principle of “America First” has indeed re-evaluated America’s 
responsibilities in the world but has not brought fundamental changes so far. In 
fact, Central and Eastern Europe may experience U.S. foreign policy continuity in 
a narrower or wider context alike.
Keywords: Trump Administration, transatlantic relations, Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia
Introduction
The outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election is regarded as a unique political devel-
opment for several reasons. The campaign highlighted tensions in U.S. domestic politics: 
in addition to the divisions of American society on certain issues (such as migration or 
Obamacare), the race between Hillary R. Clinton and Donald J. Trump represented a con-
frontation between the “establishment” and the “outsiders”. The latter’s triumph indicated 
a sharp change in both the rhetoric and the agenda of the White House. The Trump campaign 
emphasized the aim of “making America great again” which meant the revision of U.S. in-
vestment and burden in its international political, economic and security affairs. Simply put, 
Donald J. Trump challenged the pillars of the international order that had been established 
and maintained by the United States,2 therefore, the election process was followed with even 
greater attention by Washington’s transatlantic partners. This was particularly true for Central 
and Eastern Europe where the major security pressures from the East and the South are most 
direct. Donald J. Trump’s views during the campaign on Russia, migration or the American 
1 Assistant Lecturer, National University of Public Service; email: csizmazia.gabor@uni-nke.hu
2 The political, economic and security pillars of the international order are the support of democracy, free trade 
and cooperation through international organizations. According to the liberal theory of international relations, 
these factors reinforce each-other and underpin international peace. Consequently, some of Donald J. Trump’s 
critical remarks—e.g. praising the leadership qualities of Vladimir V. Putin, rejecting North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and waving the idea of introducing additional tax on certain imports, or 
questioning the United States’ obligation to defend all NATO allies—have been regarded in the West as 
challenges against the founding principles of this order.
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security umbrella over European NATO allies were outspoken and were giving cause for 
either concern or relieve in the countries within the region—depending on the specific issue 
in hand. Nevertheless, while several of the new president’s remarks have implied a decisive 
change in U.S. foreign and security policy, there is—as always—a great chance of some 
continuity. The aim of this article is to review this dilemma by displaying the major high-
lights of the Trump Administration’s foreign and security policy and their implications on the 
transatlantic relationship from a Central and Eastern European perspective.
The Trump Administration’s Heritage in Central and Eastern 
Europe
In order to have a clear view on the main possibilities for the Trump Administration’s position 
toward Central and Eastern Europe, its predecessors’ respective views should be observed 
in the wider context, namely the main strategic thought of previous U.S. administrations. 
Accordingly, the following paragraphs will focus on the background and the rationale of 
Washington’s policy concerning the region after the Cold War.
Central and Eastern Europe on the Previous Administrations’ Agenda
By the time William J. Clinton entered the White House, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact left NATO in search for a role in the post-bipolar world. Moreover, 
the disappearance of these powers created a security vacuum [1: 81] in Central and Eastern 
Europe with the risk of re-emerging hostilities among nations within the region. The Clinton 
Administration started to slowly but surely fill this vacuum with NATO which was intended 
to remain the backbone of transatlantic security. [2] Thus the first post-Cold War NATO en-
largement took place in 1999 with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic becoming new 
members of the Alliance. Following the 2001 September 11 terror attacks, the presidency of 
George W. Bush was inseparable from the global war on terror. The fight against evil [3: 12] 
taking the form of terrorists and tyrants intending to acquire weapons of mass destruction 
was in the spotlight of America’s foreign and security policy. Washington’s focus shifted 
toward the Middle East, specifically to countries identified as “rogue states”. This change 
also affected NATO expansion: the second round of enlargement in 2004 included seven 
new members from Central and Eastern Europe, [3: 17–18] as Washington needed allies who 
could complement U.S. efforts in the “global war on terror”. Arguably,3 Eastern European 
countries seeking membership in NATO were viewed as possible providers of niche capa-
bilities. Yet perhaps more importantly, the accession of these nations had a political4 aspect 
as well. This was felt during Europe’s division over the support for the Iraqi war in 2003 
3	 While	the	overall	military	capabilities	of	the	new	members	were	relatively	insignificant,	their	contribution	in	
the	form	of	niche	capabilities	and	overflight	rights	were	deemed	useful	in	Washington.	[4:	59]
4 According to another view, the Bush Administration was more interested in the political power rather than 
in the capabilities the new members would bring to the alliance. This perspective was based on experiences 
such as the operations in Kosovo where the military performance of European allies lagged behind the U.S. 
efforts.	[5:	100–101]
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with Central and Eastern European allies being more eager to stand behind Washington.5 
This led to an American practice of utilizing NATO as a toolbox which caused tension in the 
transatlantic relationship and was ultimately counterproductive.
Barack H. Obama promised a fresh start in transatlantic relations. For Central and Eastern 
European nations, the new American approach was perceived as a less pleasant develop-
ment. The Obama Administration showed signs of losing interest in the region and was more 
focused on withdrawing from the Middle East and conducting a “pivot” toward the Asia 
Pacific.6 In addition, Washington’s emphasis was set on global issues such as climate change 
and nuclear non-proliferation.7 This led to the “reset” with Russia which was primarily 
aimed at cooperation on shared security challenges, including international terrorism and 
the spreading of weapons of mass destruction. The latter issue provided the highlight of the 
“reset”, the 2010 New START. While the Obama Administration continued enlarging NATO, 
and opposed the idea of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, allies in the region 
were wary of the realist pragmatism of Washington. They were afraid that while taking the 
Euro–Atlantic orientation of the countries within the region for granted, Washington might 
make a deal with Moscow over their heads. The White House did rush to reassure these allies 
in October 2009, however, it also made it clear that America expects more from Europe and 
that the region is not exempt from this.8 This was a reconfirmation that due to its global agen-
da, the Obama Administration was focusing less on Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s 
interference in Ukraine was a watershed, as it led to an increased NATO presence on the 
Eastern flanks of the Alliance with the United States being the first NATO member to make 
military reassurance measures in the Baltics, Poland and Romania via the European Reas-
surance Initiative. This could be regarded as a sharp turn in Washington’s policy, although 
the nature of U.S. military presence in the region has remained the same.9 The relationship 
of the United States with Russia on the other hand has further deteriorated.
5 From the Bush Administration’s perspective, former communist countries in Europe were adamant allies, 
as they held freedom and western values in high regard, precisely due to their historical experience of 
repression.	[3:	20]
6 The Obama Administration’s decision sent an unpleasant message to European allies thus the term “pivot” 
was	softened	to	“rebalance”	albeit	the	policy	remained	the	same.	One	of	the	first	announcements	of	the	
“pivot”	was	Secretary	of	State	Hillary	R.	Clinton’s	article	“America’s	Pacific	Century”	in	the	2011	November	
issue of Foreign Policy, however, President Obama’s remarks in Australia the same month were also 
outspoken:	“I	have	directed	my	national	security	team	to	make	our	presence	and	mission	in	the	Asia	Pacific	
a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the 
expense	of	the	Asia	Pacific.”	[6]	
7 President Obama’s security policy priorities included the efforts for a world without nuclear weapons, 
announced	in	his	remarks	in	Prague	and	Berlin	on	the	5th of April 2009 and the 19th of June 2013 respectively.




deployment of land, air and sea forces (instead of permanent large deployments) via trainings and exercises, 
positioning of equipment and improvements in infrastructure. This is in line with the 2012 U.S. Defense 
Strategic Guidance which in general called for developing “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint 
approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory 
capabilities”.	[8:	3]	
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The Russia Factor
Washington’s relationship with Moscow is an important component in clarifying the U.S. 
stance toward Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the latter is often viewed in the context 
of the former. Through its geographical size and position, military capabilities and political 
clout, Russia is a player the United States does not ignore in global affairs. Accordingly, 
American administrations in the last couple of decades have laid special emphasis on Russia, 
so much so that this emphasis often enjoyed priority over the focus on Central and Eastern 
Europe, meaning the idea of “Russia First” in U.S. foreign policy. [9: 59] Facing the cri-
tique that NATO’s enlargement could alienate the already wary Moscow from the West, the 
Clinton Administration called for the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act which was meant 
to clarify the post-Cold War relationship between the alliance and its former adversary.10 
George W. Bush acknowledged Russia as a great power11 and recognized the importance 
of the strategic bilateral relationship in the sphere of arms reduction, and especially in the 
light of the threat by rogue actors in the international system.12 Yet the concerns regarding 
democracy and human rights in Russia, the American position on Kosovo’s independence 
and missile defence represented serious clashing points in U.S.–Russia relations.13 The Bush 
Administration also pushed for the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance. This 
not only divided European NATO members but angered Russia14 whose five-day war with 
Georgia in 2008 indicated the lowest point in U.S.–Russia relations since the Cold War at the 
time. For Central and Eastern European nations, the events only reconfirmed their views that 
Russia continues to claim its former sphere of influence—backing it up with force—and that 
therefore the transatlantic bond should be enhanced.
President Obama’s election in 2008 promised change in many areas, including the rela-
tionship with Russia albeit in a modest way. Throughout the campaign Barack H. Obama 
was increasingly condemning the Russian aggression against Georgia, and was clearly 
supporting U.S. missile defence in Central Europe.15 On the other hand, he seemed more 
open to cooperation with Russia on certain issues such as arms control or the fight against 
terrorism. Overall, the Democrat nominee enjoyed more confidence in Russia with the 
possibility of a fresh start. The latter came in the form of the “reset” which was the Obama 
Administration’s attempt to reaching out to President Medvedev’s Russia. Announced by 
10 President Boris N. Yeltsin’s remarks of the agreement showed the limits of Russian enthusiasm: “We believe 
that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize 
the	negative	consequences	for	Russia,	we	decided	to	sign	an	agreement	with	NATO.”	[10]	
11 “In the breadth of its land, the talent and courage of its people, the wealth of its resources, and the reach of its 
weapons,	Russia	is	a	great	power,	and	must	always	be	treated	as	such.”	[11:	29]	
12 “Instead of confronting each other, we confront the legacy of a dead ideological rivalry—thousands of nuclear 
weapons, which, in the case of Russia, may not be secure. And together we also face an emerging threat—
from rogue nations, nuclear theft and accidental launch. All this requires nothing short of a new strategic 
relationship	to	protect	the	peace	of	the	world.”	[11:	29–30]	
13 The Bush Administration’s plans for enhancing America’s—and NATO’s—ballistic missile defence system 
included the deployment of a radar facility and ten interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland respectively. 
While the idea was viewed controversial even in the host countries, they eventually signed up for the plan 
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Vice President Joseph R. Biden16 at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2009, 
the ‘reset’ was aimed at bringing forward the aforementioned areas of cooperation with 
Russia but without appeasement from Washington in other issues such as acknowledging 
a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.17 Still, the “reset” has received mixed 
views in Central and Eastern Europe.18 President Obama’s 2009 September decision to 
alter his predecessor’s missile defence plans in Poland and the Czech Republic was not 
unexpected, nevertheless, it did not help the situation.19 The “reset” did have its achieve-
ments during President Obama’s first term including the New START Treaty and Russia’s 
WTO accession. Furthermore, the 2012 U.S. presidential elections showed that President 
Obama is less wary of Russia than his Republican opponent.20 Yet by the same year the 
“reset” became exhausted: Vladimir V. Putin blamed Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton 
for inciting protests after the Russian legislative elections in December 2011, and—a year 
later—Secretary Clinton openly opposed the Russian integration project in Eastern Europe 
and Asia.21 Legislative branches of the two governments did not embrace each other either: 
in response to the Senate’s approval of the Magnitsky Act (introducing sanctions in finance 
and travel against Russian officials who had contributed to the death of Russian whis-
tle-blower Sergei Magnitsky), the Duma approved the Dima Yakovlev Law (banning U.S. 
citizens from adopting Russian children). [16] This geopolitical opposition culminated in 
Eastern Europe through the events in Ukraine, leaving U.S.–Russia bilateral relations in 
the cold for the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.
The Trump Administration and Central and Eastern Europe
In order to highlight the outlooks of transatlantic relations under the Trump presidency from 
a Central and Eastern European perspective, it is essential to outline the principles of the 
Trump	administration’s	foreign	policy.	With	the	exception	of	Russian	attempts	to	influence	






18 “We welcome the “reset” of the American–Russian relations. As the countries living closest to Russia, 
obviously nobody has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in Russia and better relations 
between	Moscow	and	the	West	than	we	do.	But	there	is	also	nervousness	in	our	capitals.	We	want	to	ensure	
that	too	narrow	an	understanding	of	Western	interests	does	not	lead	to	the	wrong	concessions	to	Russia.”	[14]	
19 While the Obama Administration was adamant that the decision was not meant to appease Russia, the way 
it was announced was questionable. Firstly, whereas President Obama declared his decision in a television 
announcement in the United States, the Government of Poland was informed via a phone call in the middle of 
the night. Secondly, the sensitive announcement came on the 17th of September—the day on which the Soviet 
Union began the invasion of Poland in 1939 (in accordance with its secret pact with Germany). Lastly, while 
neither the change in U.S. missile plans nor the attempt to mend NATO–Russia relations was a surprise, the 
latter	was	announced	just	one	day	later	through	the	first	major	public	speech	by	Secretary	General	Anders	F.	
Rasmussen titled “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning”.
20 One of the highlights of the 2012 U.S. presidential election campaign was when Republican presidential 
nominee	Willard	Mitt	Romney	called	Russia	America’s	“geopolitical	foe”,	a	position	which	President	Obama	
deemed outdated, saying that “the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back” in the third 
presidential debate on the 22nd October 2012.
21	 Secretary	Clinton	deemed	the	Russian	plans	for	a	Eurasian	Union	as	attempts	to	“re-Sovietise	the	region.”	[15]
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 qualitatively new major challenges to the Trump presidency. President Trump on the other 
hand introduced a drastically new approach to the already existing issues and toward the 
outside world.
President Trump’s View of America and the World
Although the 2016 presidential election campaign was loud of scandals and personalities 
on both sides, it did highlight several pressing foreign and security policy issues of today’s 
America which the Trump Administration has set on its agenda. The primary items on this 
list of challenges include illegal immigration, international terrorism and the negative ef-
fects of American leadership in the world (i.e. the costs of international security) and of 
economic	globalization	(i.e.	the	loss	of	American	jobs	and	an	increasing	U.S.	trade	deficit).	
The	Trump	team’s	position	and	rhetoric	on	 these	 issues	have	two	defining	characteristics:	
on the one hand, all of them directly affect the American public in their everyday lives and 
were addressed in the campaign accordingly. On the other hand, all of these problems were 
linked with the Obama Administration (and previous governments) by the Trump campaign. 
As a result, Donald J. Trump promised a decisive departure from President Obama’s foreign 
policy which he described as a random one without vision, purpose and thought-through 
strategy, and one leading to the lack of respect towards Washington from friends and foes 
alike.	[17]	The	first	and	foremost	important	change	President	Trump	intends	to	introduce	is	
the dismissal of an active liberal approach on a global level.
In practical terms, this means two things. Firstly, defying “the false song of globalism”, 
President Trump believes that “the nation-state remains the true foundation of happiness and 
harmony”. [17] This seemingly set Washington once again at the juncture of internationalism 
and isolationism which is a re-occurring dilemma in American foreign policy debates. How-
ever, President Trump is not an isolationist but rather a nationalist who intends not to end 
but to alter America’s economic and security relationship with others—be it allies, partners 
or potential adversaries—to its own advantage.22 The “America First” approach ultimately 
raises the question of the United States’ role in the world. In Washington, American leader-
ship has been a widely accepted component of the international order. On paper, the Trump 
Administration is no different in this regard with President Trump emphasizing America’s 
capability to lead.23 Yet due to its aforementioned nationalist perspective, the Trump Admin-
istration’s aptitude for global leadership has received doubts. A recent example for this was 
when President Trump decided to withdraw the United States from the 2016 Paris Agreement 
on the joint efforts to combat climate change—a decision which caused widespread disap-
pointment among members of the international community. Still, international trade deals 
find themselves even more in the crossfire of the Trump Administration. President Trump has 
promised to revisit America’s hitherto international arrangements in trade and economy. In 
practical terms, this means a new take on free trade agreements and reshape or even nullify 
those that are disadvantageous for the United States. President Trump’s main targets in this 
22 “We will respect historical institutions, but we will respect the foreign rights of all nations, and they also have 
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regard were the 1994 NAFTA between the United States, Canada and Mexico, and the 2016 
(signed) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the United States and 11 other nations bor-
dering the Pacific Ocean. While NAFTA can expect renegotiations, American participation 
in TPP was actually abandoned on President Trump’s first day in office.
Secondly, the Trump Administration denounced the “global projects” of its predecessors, 
and specifically urged for “getting out of the nation-building business”, particularly in the 
Middle East. [18] In other words, the Trump Administration is not in favour of democracy 
promotion abroad, in fact, it regards such attempts as sources of destabilization in the Middle 
East which enabled the rise of additional extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS).24 Instead, President Trump focuses on international terrorism under radical 
Islam with one of his first decisions being to task the Administration “to develop a compre-
hensive plan to defeat ISIS”. [19] The war against terrorism is among the top security policy 
priorities for the Trump Administration who has continued to rally allies for the U.S.-founded 
Global Coalition to Counter ISIS. So much so that one of President Trump’s main goals and 
achievements at his first NATO summit was the Alliance’s formal inclusion into this coalition. 
In a certain sense, this development offers nothing substantially new, as all NATO members 
were already members of the coalition. However, it does reveal President Trump’s view of 
NATO. During the campaign, he called the Alliance “obsolete” for having an anachronistic 
mission instead of fighting international terrorism. President Trump’s first change of heart 
came in April 2017 when he indicated that NATO as an organization does agree with him on 
fighting against terrorism.25 In reality, the Alliance has already been contributing to the war 
on terror, although several member states were wary that NATO’s formal inclusion into the 
Global Coalition to Counter ISIS would serve with more problems rather than solutions. So 
far, the end result of President Trump’s first NATO summit in this regard was a decisive yet 
limited support from European allies.26
Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship and Russia
European cautiousness is a by-product of the Trump Administration’s foreign and security 
policy. In President Trump’s eyes, the aforementioned U.S. efforts aimed at more fair deals 
cannot exclude the area of defence. Specifically, America’s allies need to display more re-
sponsibility for their respective security by increasing their defence spending and thereby 
decreasing their reliance on American support. Next to NATO’s role in the fight against ter-
rorism, this was President Trump’s main message at the Brussels summit in May 2017. [22] 
America’s demand for a more equal transatlantic burden-sharing in security is not new at all. 
24 “We went from mistakes in Iraq to Egypt to Libya, to President Obama’s line in the sand in Syria. Each of 
these actions have helped to throw the region into chaos, and gave ISIS the space it needs to grow and prosper. 
It all began with the dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries that had no 
experience or interest in becoming a Western democracy. We tore up what institutions they had and then 




I said it was obsolete; it’s no longer obsolete. It’s my hope that NATO will take on an increased role in 
supporting	our	Iraqi	partners	in	their	battle	against	ISIS.”	[20]	
26 In addition to the political message of its support, NATO would enhance its efforts in surveillance, anti-terror 
intelligence,	and	in	training	but	would	not	participate	in	combat	operations.	[21]
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Before President Trump, former U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates set the frank 
reminder about this several decades-old reality.27 The novelty of Donald J. Trump’s position 
was that he openly questioned the U.S. obligation to follow NATO’s Article 5, making it 
dependent on the defence spending performance of the attacked ally in question. [24] Ac-
cordingly, the Trump Administration’s commitment to collective defence was an awaited 
statement in Brussels. While President Trump remained silent on this at the NATO summit, 
he ultimately re-confirmed U.S. commitment to collective defence, and in fact argued that the 
constant reminders of members’ responsibility to pay 2% of their respective GDP on defence 
was for the greater good of having an overall stronger Alliance.28
Whereas President Trump’s statements on certain issues such as climate change has raised 
doubts about his government’s ability of international leadership in Western Europe (specifi-
cally in France and Germany), U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe are more interested 
in the Trump Administration’s reliability, especially in security and defence. From a Central 
and Eastern European perspective, U.S. commitment to Article 5 is the cornerstone of transat-
lantic relations. Thus, the President’s earlier remarks on NATO and collective defence should 
have provided ground for worries in these countries. Yet there is an important principle in this 
regard: words and actions need to be distinguished. After Mr Trump’s campaign statement 
on tying American defence of allies to their respective financial contribution to that defence, 
Hillary R. Clinton emphasized that “words matter when you run for President, and they really 
matter when you are President [and] it is essential that America’s word be good” [26] thereby 
stressing the possible negative consequences of such remarks. However, even in the wake of 
NATO’s Brussels meeting where the reassuring words on collective defence were missing, 
the Alliance’s eastern flank did not give an echo of concern. This was due to the fact that 
American commitment to NATO’s Article 5 is openly supported by both Secretary of Defence 
(Ret. Gen.) James N. Mattis and Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson but more importantly, 
regardless of any statements, the United States continued to send troops to Eastern European 
member states.29 In fact, the Trump Administration’s defence budget request for fiscal year 
2018 included an increase of $1.4 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) thus 
planning with an ERI budget growth of nearly 41%. While this increase is not as massive 
as the Obama Administration’s increase30 for 2017, it does show the continuing American 
27 “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the 
American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are 
apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and 
capable partners in their own defense. Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume 
the	growing	security	burden	left	by	reductions	in	European	defense	budgets.”	[23]	
28 “I have been an advocate for strengthening our NATO Alliance through greater responsibility and burden-
sharing	among	member	nations.	[…]	I’m	committing	the	United	States	to	Article	5.	And	certainly	we	are	there	
to protect. And that’s one of the reasons that I want people to make sure we have a very, very strong force by 
paying	the	kind	of	money	necessary	to	have	that	force.”	[25]	
29	 For	example,	while	Slovak	Minister	of	Foreign	and	European	Affairs	Miroslav	Lajčák	said	that	although	he	
would have preferred to hear President Trump’s devotion to collective defence, “the commitment under Article 
5	is	so	obvious	there	was	no	need	to	mention	it”,	Polish	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	Witold	Waszczykowski	





G. CSIZMAZIA: Decisive Change or Determined Continuity?
(16) 3 (2017) 117
interest in enhancing allied military presence, readiness and capabilities on Europe’s Eastern 
Flank (including the defence capabilities of Ukraine).
The increased ERI budget means that U.S. military presence in Central and Eastern 
 Europe in the form of forward positioned forces and exercises is assured until 2020. How-
ever, it is noteworthy to mention that this continued financial support may not necessarily 
lead to an increase in U.S. troop numbers. [29] Due to this limitation in American numbers, 
the focus is set on the “speed of assembly” i.e. the time required for moving U.S. and allied 
forces from one place to another. Hitherto exercises served this purpose as well. Two exam-
ples of the earlier exercises continued under the Trump Administration are Saber Guardian 
and Saber Strike. The former represented the largest exercise held in Europe in 2017 with 
25,000 U.S. soldiers cooperating with 24 nations between 11–20 July in Hungary, Romania 
and Bulgaria [30] whereas the latter was held between 28 May and 24 June in Poland and 
the Baltics with 11,000 U.S. and allied troops. [31] One of the lessons of these exercises 
was that the allied troops’ peacetime border-crossings continue to face infrastructural and 
bureaucratic difficulties and that the latter could be eased by the establishment of a “military 
Schengen zone” within NATO. This American observation [32] was already made in 2015 by 
Commander of U.S. Army Europe Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, however, it has begun to circulate 
among European stakeholders as well. [33]
The other major form of American military presence in Central and Eastern Europe 
is via the U.S. missile defence sites in the Republic of Poland and Romania. The Obama 
 Administration’s plans for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is scheduled to 
be completed in 2018, however, due to the manifold factors31 possibly impacting its devel-
opment, the U.S. missile shield in Europe may be altered by the Trump Administration. That 
said, little is known of President Trump’s view on the subject so far. Before assuming office, 
Donald J. Trump promised to “fully eliminate the defense sequester” as well as to “develop 
a state of the art missile defense system” in response to the threats from Iran and North 
Korea. [35] The Kim regime’s missile tests have led President Trump to call for an increase 
in the budget for missile defence, although Congress has proven to be more eager in this 
regard: by mid-September 2017 both the House and the Senate have passed their respective 
versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, overbidding the 
President by allocating $8.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency within a nearly $700 
billion overall defence budget. [36] This is especially interesting when taken into account 
that the Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defence Review was not finished by the time of voting. 
The document is of high importance, as it serves the purpose of providing information on the 
possibilities for further improving U.S. missile defence capabilities, and therefore, offering 
implications for the fate of President Obama’s EPAA schedule which has not been addressed 
by President Trump yet. Missile defence also raises the issue of nuclear weapons: for Russia, 
NATO’s ballistic missile defence in Europe—as well as the intensified military presence 
in the region—has served as a reason to deploy nuclear-capable missiles closer to NATO 
31 The core concept of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is that U.S. missile defence plans in Europe can 
be	altered	at	any	stage	depending	on	the	change	in	security	climate,	available	technical	capabilities	or	financial	
framework. In practical terms, the EPAA’s further realization may be affected by the security relationship with 
Iran, the developments in American missile technology and the U.S. Government’s—legislative and executive 
branches’—position	on	providing	additional	funding	for	missile	defence.	In	addition,	fierce	Russian	objection	
against the plan and the possible consequences of this opposition set the Central European missile shield in the 
spotlight	of	international	security.	[34]
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members, thereby increasingly undermining such arms control regimes as the 1987 INF 
Treaty. Similarly, to the eventual development of missile defence, the changes in America’s 
nuclear posture—and its effects in Europe—under the Trump Administration depends on 
several factors: firstly, despite President Trump’s intention to make-up with Russia, he has 
denounced the Russian violation of the INF Treaty. While Central and Eastern European 
countries are highly interested in constraining nuclear weapons within their own region, they 
are also dependent on NATO’s nuclear umbrella. Subsequent to the crisis in Ukraine, Poland 
was reported to consider participating in NATO’s ‘nuclear sharing’ programme, although 
this was ultimately denied by the Polish Government. [37] Secondly, Donald J. Trump has 
called for the enhancement of the United States’ nuclear arsenal while also hinting that the 
2010 New START was a “just another bad deal” of the Obama Administration [38] which 
is an alarming note concerning future arms reduction agreements. Nevertheless, just like in 
the case of missile defence, the exact position of the U.S. Administration on the American 
nuclear capabilities will be revealed in the Pentagon’s—currently ongoing—Nuclear Posture 
Review.
Politically speaking, NATO allies in this region are particularly important for the Trump 
White House, as many of them can be set as examples for increasing national defence budg-
ets. It is no surprise that President Trump’s first trip to the region was to Poland which is one 
of the few Alliance members having their national defence expenditure reached 2% of GDP.32 
While his address to the people of Poland was primarily focused on defending Western civili-
zation from such major threats as radical Islam and international terrorism, President Trump 
also spoke about the threat posed by Russia.33 Apart from confirming U.S. devotion to NATO’s 
Article 5, the Trump Administration came closer to reaching an agreement with Poland on the 
purchasing of medium-range Patriot missiles for the latter’s air defence system, as well as to 
initiating U.S.–Polish efforts aimed at modernizing the Polish Armed Forces. Other Central 
and Eastern European nations are also looking ahead of modernizing their respective air and 
missile defences which could open the door for enhancing the security relationship with the 
U.S. [40] Yet these ties can reach into the sphere of economy as well. President Trump’s 
Warsaw visit included his participation at the Three Seas Initiative34 Summit of Central 
and Eastern European countries. President Trump expressed his support for providing U.S. 
assistance in these nations’ efforts for energy security by selling American liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) to them. [41] While this is a long-awaited development in Poland and the Baltics, 
its roots are actually found at the Trump Administration’s energy policy. One of Donald J. 
32 The geopolitical aspect is also worthy of mentioning: due to their respective geographical position and to 
their size in territory and population, Romania and Poland enjoy special attention from Washington within the 
region	and	pursue	strongly	Atlanticist	foreign	policies.	Accordingly,	President	Trump’s	first	bilateral	meeting	
with leaders from Central and Eastern Europe was held with President Klaus Iohannis of Romania and 




We urge Russia to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, and its support for hostile 
regimes—including	Syria	and	Iran—and	to	instead	join	the	community	of	responsible	nations	in	our	fight	
against	common	enemies	and	in	defense	of	civilization	itself.”	[39]
34 The Three Seas Initiative is an informal platform aimed at supporting regional economic, energetic, 
transportation	and	communication	projects	in	the	wider	region	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	specifically	
among countries in-between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea.
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Trump’s campaign promises was to revive the coal, oil and gas industry in America and to 
boost their exports. In the case of shale gas and LNG, this requires U.S. Energy Department 
permits for special facilities and shipment. [42] Accordingly, the Trump Administration went 
ahead by loosening legislation in this area, making it easier for U.S. companies to extract 
and export coal, oil and gas.35 Selling American gas would have a major effect in the security 
of Central and Eastern Europe. While the motivations of the Trump Administration in this 
regard are primarily related to creating U.S. jobs and improving balance of trade, the United 
States would inevitably compete with Russia who has been using the ‘energy card’ in keeping 
grip on countries (depending on Russian gas) within the region.36
Another important issue for Central and Eastern Europe is how the Trump Administration 
approaches its transatlantic partners. Specifically, would it regard and treat the European 
Union as a partner or would it try to bypass the EU and deal with member states one by 
one? Donald J. Trump’s nationalist remarks during the campaign37 [17] and his position on 
Brexit suggest that he is less enthusiastic about the EU, regarding it as an instrument for 
Germany.38 Furthermore, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policies on trade and immi-
gration received harsh criticism from President Trump. Regarding the first, the U.S. President 
raised the idea of imposing additional taxes on German products (primarily vehicles) and of 
rearranging commerce between the two countries. This however cannot be negotiated with 
the German Federal Government, as negotiating international trade deals are to be done with 
the European Commission. As for migration, President Trump’s views39 are closer to the 
position of several Central and Eastern European countries. That said, it is unlikely that the 
Bush Administration’s notion of “Old and New Europe” would repeat itself. Firstly, while 
the EU does have its internal debates and problems, Central and Eastern Europeans are not 
interested in further dividing the Union, as it provides them with better bargaining positions 
in international relations. Secondly, while the crisis in Ukraine served as a wakeup call in 
itself for Europeans to increase their national defence budgets, President Trump’s view of 
America’s relationship with the world underlined the notion in Central and Eastern European 
35 This move is also related to the denouncing of the Obama Administration’s energy and climate change policy 
with President Trump saying that “for the past eight years, the Federal Government imposed massive job-
killing	barriers	to	American	energy	development.	Since	my	first	day	in	office,	I	have	been	moving	at	record	
pace to cancel these regulations and to eliminate the barriers to domestic energy production, like never 
before.”	[43]
36 This, however, is a hypothetical situation. While several Central and Eastern European governments share the 
Trump Administration’s enthusiasm on the issue, the actual contracts of LNG purchase are to be signed by 
specific	companies	who	will	only	do	so	if	it	is	financially	lucrative.	Gas	prices	have	decreased	in	the	last	years	
and Russian gas is already considered relatively cheap due to the proximity of production and the means of 
transportation (pipes instead of special LNG terminals). Thus, receiving American gas in Central and Eastern 
Europe will be about the actual price these nations are willing to pay for reducing energy dependency on 
Russia.	[44]
37 “The nation-state remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am sceptical of international 
unions	that	tie	us	up	and	bring	America	down	and	will	never	enter.”	[17]	
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countries that—in addition to the preservation of the transatlantic link—the geopolitical 
realities make additional integration efforts in security and defence vitally necessary.40
One of these realities is Russia41 which continued to be in the spotlight of American 
foreign policy debates, although in a new context. The notion of great power rivalry has 
remained in place largely due to Russian attempts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
elections. During the campaign, the Trump team represented a more open approach to Ameri-
can–Russian relations, incorporating the traditional idea of fighting against ISIS and terrorism 
hand in hand. While Donald J. Trump praised the leadership qualities of Vladimir V. Putin, 
he also utilized this idea in his argument that this was a source of exploitation of America. 
In other words, despite not being a hardliner on Russia throughout the campaign, Mr Trump 
indicated that approaching the Russians requires statesmanship with authority (demanding 
respect) and that some issues—such as cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation—need to 
be revisited from Washington, since the Obama Administration had reached bad deals with 
Russia including the 2010 New START Treaty.42 The case of Ukraine is similar. Initially, 
Donald J. Trump called out against the violation of the country’s territorial integrity, yet his 
criticism was largely aimed at the Obama Administration for being weak on the issue. [49] 
Other members of President Trump’s team, including Secretary Tillerson and Ambassador to 
the United Nations Nikki R. Haley, indicated that while the Trump Administration is seeking 
better relations with Russia, it continues to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine for which 
U.S. sanctions will remain in place. [50] Similarly, American–Russian relations have not 
improved in the case of Syria so far either. Keen on distancing himself from his predecessor 
regarding the “red line” of chemical weapons, President Trump ordered a military strike 
against Syrian armed forces on the 7th of April 2017 which the Russian Government unsur-
prisingly denounced.43
While the Trump Administration claims to represent a stronger stance under the motto of 
‘America First’, it is also under pressure from Congress where bipartisan efforts are made to 
increase sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. Hardliners on dealing with 
Russia have gained momentum within the legislative branch of the American Government 
following Russia’s attempts of meddling with the U.S. presidential elections, and the possi-
40 “The global geopolitical environment is changing fast. Instability in the European Neighborhood, new 
dynamism on the global level and internal developments in the EU represent challenges the Union needs to 
address	in	the	spirit	of	shared	interest	and	responsibility.	[…]	We	should	strive	for	deepening	our	cooperation	
in defence and achieving European strategic autonomy. The European defence capabilities have to be 
developed, while preserving the role of NATO in providing collective defence in Europe. Equally, in order to 
tackle common geopolitical and security challenges, the Union should strive to strengthen the transatlantic 
relations	and	to	continue	close	cooperation	with	the	United	Kingdom.	We	should	reaffirm	the	EU’s	position	
as a major global trading partner, advocate an open, rules-based trading system and continue establishing new 
partnerships	based	on	principles	of	reciprocity	and	mutual	benefit.”	[46]
41 Similarly to his predecessor, President Trump also received an open letter from Central and Eastern European 
public	figures	who	warned	him	about	President	Putin’s	intentions	to	loosen	the	transatlantic	bond.	[47]





43 U.S. Ambassador to the UN Haley called Russia and Iran responsible for the utilization of chemical weapons 
in Syria. As for the overall U.S. involvement, like its predecessor, the Trump Administration seems to avoid 
more direct confrontations in Syria, especially with the Russian forces whom their American counterparts had 
alerted	about	the	strike	in	advance.	[51]
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bility of linkage between the Trump campaign and the Russian Government.44 Accordingly, 
the Trump Administration has also widened earlier sanctions against individuals through the 
Treasury Department in parallel with President Trump’s meeting with Ukrainian President 
Petro O. Poroshenko. [53] That said, some in Congress believe that President Trump would 
be too soft on Russia. Therefore, following the proposal of Democrat and Republican leaders 
in the Senate, the legislative branch has passed a bill that not only introduced new sanctions 
against Russian actors involved in the support for the Assad government in Syria or in the 
hacking of U.S. elections but also called for a Congressional review in case the President 
would intend to ease hitherto sanctions against Russia by himself. [54] Though calling for 
Russia’s accountability in the aforementioned hacking, Secretary of State Tillerson had asked 
Congress not to handcuff the Trump Administration in fine-tuning sanctions. [55] President 
Trump has signed the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” into law 
in early August 2017, however, he did emphasize his dislike in the document.45 Thus it can 
be said that President Trump may argue that his White House would engage with President 
Putin’s Kremlin as great powers do, however, the ways of such action do have their limits in 
the international arena and at home alike.
Conclusion
Donald J. Trump made sure throughout the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign that his 
views vastly differ from the hitherto practices of the establishment—especially Democrats—
in Washington D.C. Thus in theory, his foreign and security policy should display a noticeable 
deviation from that of President Obama. Indeed, America’s overall stance toward the outside 
world has been set into new light by the Trump White House. The principle of “America 
First” does not call an end to American leadership in the world but it does re-evaluate its costs 
and	benefits	from	a	nationalist	perspective,	and	thereby	introduces	a	new	approach	to	inter-
national actors, roles and frameworks alike. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration also 
showed a perpetuation of its predecessors’ policies either by repeating older or by continuing 
recent	ideas	and	practices	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.	The	President’s	priority	focus	on	the	fight	
against international terrorism is not new, nor is the issue unprecedented on NATO’s agenda. 
In addition, terrorism has once again served as the key driver behind the contemporary U.S. 
Administration’s	intention	to	find	common	ground	with	its	Russian	counterpart	which	has	
enjoyed preference by the White House despite other Russia-related issues being unresolved.
Furthermore, although President Trump’s critique aimed at European allies for their 
lagging defence expenditure has been harsh, it does not offer new in content compared to 
44	 President	Trump’s	first	meeting	with	President	Putin	at	the	G20	summit	on	July	2017	highlighted	this	issue	
perfectly. Regarding the unresolved issue of Russian interference in U.S. elections, Secretary Tillerson noted 
that the President “rightly focused on how do we move forward from what may be simply an intractable 






45 While agreeing with the idea of not tolerating the actions of North Korea, Iran and Russia in the respective 
matters,	President	Trump	noted	the	bill	is	“seriously	flawed”,	as	it	limits	his	space	of	manoeuvre	in	conducting	
America’s	foreign	policy	and	may	lead	to	causing	collateral	damage	for	U.S.	business	and	European	allies.	[56]
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collective defence, moreover, it has continued to back-up this commitment by resources in 
the form of U.S. troops deployed on the Eastern Flank and an increased ERI budget. These 
are crucial factors in the calculations of central and eastern European allies when assessing 
the reliability of the United States.
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Effects of Employee Satisfaction on Attrition  
of Military Officers at Hungarian Defence Forces  
(HDF) Military Hospital
Szilárd JASZTRAB1
In the results of this study, I examined the employee satisfaction survey given 
between 2011 and 2014, and I compared it with the research on emigration 
conducted at the Hungarian Medical Chamber and at the Hungarian Resident 
Association. We received between 412 and 801 answers annually. The importance 
of the topic is indicated by the fact that the media regularly deals with this issue 
and the shortage of doctors in the military severely compromises fighting ability. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predicts 
that by 2022 the European Union will have a shortage of 1 million physicians, 
which affects 14% of the total health activities. The situation is further worsened 
by the fact that the Hungarian civil sector (including pharmaceutical companies) 
presents a serious draining effect as well.
Keywords: employee’s satisfaction, attrition, disarmament of military doctors, 
Ministry of Defence, Military Hospital
Research
Non-representative survey-results—obtained in high schools—give a partial explanation 
why military service as a career option is not popular among young people before making 
career choices. Romantic notions are attributed to Hungarian soldiers in the military service. 
On the other hand, they are viewed negatively based on stereotypes made by the parents’ and 
grandparents’ generation. The view of society concerning soldiery, did not change after the 
regime change. The image of military life was not widely re-evaluated after the elimination 
of line infantry, draft and the professionalization of the profession. [5]
For what reasons does somebody opt for the military? There are several possibilities such 
as the idea of protecting the homeland, the possibilities of high-level professional learning, 
new challenges and career or a lack of other options. Nowadays, according to social public 
opinion the emotional part of the military has been pushed into the background. [6]
Professionals conducted career tests with students, who wanted to be doctors or soldiers. 
The study detected a relatively early determination. In the sample, 24% decided to become 
soldiers, and had made their decision. 41% of the students who started their studies decided 
in high school to become a doctor or soldier. The presumption of existential security can 
promote positive attitude enforcement towards military careers. Recent test results confirm 
the conclusion of the research: in the psychological and personal aspects of a military career 
existential security as a decisive factor is crucial. As for the social context, the family back-
ground is the decisive factor. The aspect of a commissioner livelihood is a very important 
1 Captain, Budapest, HDF Military Hospital; e-mail: jasztrabszilard@gmail.com
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motivating factor when choosing career and even later on. The “secure job” as a motivation, 
in many cases comes from the living condition of a person. [7]
In recent times, the prestige of the armed organizations and professions has gradually 
decreased. The decrease of prestige is supported by labour market analyses. These labour 
market analyses were carried out to establish the occupation policy of the army. The in-
ternational trend is that most members of the military stem from a poorer class of society. 
Primarily, they come from physical worker families. [8]
For those, who choose a military career, the livelihood, as motivation plays a prominent 
role. However, many medical students need to re-evaluate their former idea about their career 
when they face the anomalous state of the national health care during their residency period. 
The state of national health care can often lead to migration or changing of jobs among 
young doctors. Many young people decide on other jobs or migration, because of different 
reasons: aversion towards discipline in the military, regional disparities in the medical com-
munity, contradictions in parasolvency (a kind of mandatory gratuity unique to the sector), 
competition for patients at a doctor’s office and among private patients. In this situation, the 
military has a solution for the medical students. The Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) have 
a scholarship program created to stop students migrating abroad. The scholarship supports 
students who have qualifications which cannot be obtained in military institutions. The po-
sitions are filled with the help of the scholarship program. The scholarship program is based 
on statute 9/2013. (VIII.12.) HM and the 2012. CCV regulations. The scholarship scheme 
allows contractual employment for doctors and medical students. The program prescribes 
the execution of basic training and the adoption of the first offered rota. Contractual legal 
relationship is necessary for successful applicants. The successful applicants start to work as 
career starters for the HDF. They work as doctors and practice their profession. The eligibility 
conditions are the same for professionals and contract soldiers alike. [9]
Working abroad and migration are often interrelated phenomena. Many people who work 
abroad often decide to permanently emigrate. Migration takes place within the country and 
outside the country. According to literature data, emigration can have many reasons which 
coincide with various viewpoints: macro-micro, push-pull and cyclic-structural effects. The 
reasons need to be better examined, because it can be concluded that the workers return 
to the domestic labour supply when the cycle goes up. During periods of crisis, the unem-
ployment rate increases, which as a pushing effect increases the rate of migration, while the 
high rate of job finding is the puller effect. The cyclical reasons include the unemployment 
rate, differences in employment opportunities between the sending and receiving countries. 
For people who opt for migration, the employment opportunities are significant. Structural 
reasons include wage differentials, which are key factors in the decision to work abroad. The 
wage difference must be significant, since the person is able to cover the costs of relocation 
and integration. In addition, the international movement of labour allows the equalization 
of wages between nations. Similar languages being spoken in the sending and receiving 
countries can also increase the probability of migration. Studies show that this process works 
only to a certain degree, because it reaches a saturation level. The decrease of administra-
tive obstructions is another positive factor leading to working abroad. There are differences 
 between the sending and receiving countries in the social and education systems. The cultural 
environment of the country—the general political mood, exclusion, instability—are all able 
to enhance migration. [10]
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The domestic labour market, affected by regional—sectoral inequalities—also experi-
ences labour shortages and oversupply, as well as the departure of highly skilled workers, 
generating skill shortages (health care workers, IT specialists and engineers). As such, it 
must cope with more dissonances. The migration has positive and negative effects on the 
sending country. The study of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) examined the effects 
of the migration on the sending country from 4 + 1 aspects. Among them is the decreasing 
of the population. With a smaller population, there is a smaller number of unemployment 
as well. Negative effects include demographic trends and migration of young people. The 
sustainability of the pension and health care system are increasingly in danger. From the 
perspective of selective migration, if the less productive individuals go to work abroad, the 
domestic average productivity increases. Otherwise, if the more productive individuals go 
to work abroad, the average productivity decreases at home. There are more reasons in the 
background. If the emigration is increasing or is at a high level, the domestic labour market 
can offer more work opportunities and less effort is needed to hold a job or to obtain it. From 
the workers’ perspective, a decrease in their motivation is in direct proportion with their 
productivity. [12]
After the regime change, detailed timelines are available about employment trends, 
including data about emigration. For example, the number of foreign workers increased sig-
nificantly: from 2009 to 2013, at determined moments of time: October to December. Within 
all workers, the proportions of Hungarian foreign workers more than doubled. [13]
Some surveys show a clear picture of the age groups. Among the foreign workers, the 
young adults represent the largest group—predominantly the 18–35 years age group and 
the 18–50 years age group. [14] On the basis of educational attainment, a higher proportion 
of graduates choose to work abroad. Among the graduates, four times more choose to work 
abroad, than people with low educational attainment. In 2004, the proportion of money sent 
home by the foreign workers, jumped over 1.5%. Of course, this change happened within the 
domestic GDP. These changes draw politics attention to migration and working abroad. [14]
In case somebody with a profession that is in oversupply in our country goes abroad, 
the domestic situation may improve. The mismatch problems may show a negative trend, 
if somebody goes abroad with a profession, which is in high demand in our country. The 
remittances to Hungary can change positively the domestic volume and the modernization 
of education. The negative consequences of remittances can result in the deterioration of 
domestic productivity. [15]
The migration of healthcare professionals has become a global phenomenon, which 
deals more and more with health and migration policies. In a country the number of health 
professionals influences decisively the function of the national health system. It influences 
indirectly the health status of the population. The consequences of this phenomenon will 
make their effects felt in the coming decades. The lack of health professionals influences 
the ability of the health care. The economic performance and quality of life of a country’s 
population depends on the health care system. In case the system is not able to function 
properly, the right of access to health care gets injured. [17]
The migration of the physicians has four determining factors. First, the recognition of 
qualifications is automatic within the EU. Second, there are shortages in the healthcare sector. 
Powerful labour recruitment, which in many cases takes shape aggressively. Third, the human 
resource management, which in recent times has become a very important factor, because the 
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loss of specialists means accentuated burden to the functioning of the supply system. For 
example, the drastic reduction of the headcounts of family doctors and anaesthesiologists. 
The last one includes other positive effects, such as sharing of experience, exchange of infor-
mation, training opportunities. [16]
In 2014, the government announced a significant wage developments plan for the military. 
The aim of wage development is to retain the existing soldiers and recruit new candidates. 
The development plan is being implemented in several phases, over a 4-year period. The sal-
ary increase would be an average of 50%. The professionals think that, the life of the military 
has significantly improved, so fewer soldiers change work. In the HDF a major problem is 
to attract and retain the voluntary and the contractual soldiers. The results of the research, 
which investigated the reasons of significant career change, highlight the main reasons of the 
migration: material and financial reasons, treatment, human relations, disorganization, lack 
of vision, conditions for spending free time, placement and housing problems. [8]
Some of the military career leavers continue working in an area, where they can utilize 
their acquired knowledge and skills. In some cases, they switch to another military or security 
company for a better pay. This shows, that the work is usually for a fixed term, after which 
it is possible to return to the military. The draining effects of companies is not decisively 
relevant. [18]
Since military doctors have a special status, the question arises: do they give up their 
doctor’s vocation or their military vocation if they finish their career? Some of the doctors, 
who finished their military doctor’s career, continue practicing as doctors. In this case, we 
could say, that they give up their military vocation. Is the military a profession for them? 
Does military mean vocation for them? What is the correct answer, if they think that the 
military doctor’s career is a special exercise of the medical profession? [19]
The doctors, who leave the military and stay in the civil medical sector, have a better 
bargaining position on the negotiations, because they have special, transferable knowledge. 
In other words, they have more alternatives, more options to work in the future. For example, 
they have the possibility to be hired by the private sector, especially by foreign companies 
where they get a higher salary and during the work they use modern assets. Even the most 
developed NATO countries face difficulties to fill the short-staffed positions in the military 
with adequately trained doctors and to guarantee the existing doctors professional and mili-
tary further development regularly. In Hungary, the number of the professionals researched in 
this theme is limited, but it has numerous special sociological aspects. However, the problem 
of the military doctor’s discharge shows several problems, which are in the cross-section of 
the meeting of two professions. [20]
Regarding the contractual soldiers, for example they cannot get pension from the army. 
Therefore, they join the army for shorter periods. Generally, the entry into force of the stat-
ute—2011 CLXVII, conversion of pensions—adversely affected the different groups of the 
military. [8]
From the answers, it turned out that among the workers at the HDF Military Hospital the 
most problematic areas are the shortage of staff and exhaustion. The excessive bureaucracy, 
the lack of moral and material appreciation and the uncertain future perspectives were also 
highlighted. The other problem is the lack of motivation and professional development. The 
lack of financial and material conditions, the outdated equipment and long repair times were 
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also mentioned. The lack of information flow was also a relevant shortcoming. Interestingly, 
the lack of sports facilities and the insufficient parking facilities were also added to this list.
The organization’s leadership and the good relationship and collaboration with the closest 
colleagues were mentioned as a positive factor. The cafeteria system, the improving informa-
tion flow and the development of a quality management system (which means a possibility 
for development) were also highlighted as a positive aspect.
These results coincide with the online survey organized by the Hungarian Medical Cham-
ber in 2013. According to that survey, the biggest problem is also exhaustion resulting from 
the average 65 hours working week (hospital work +10 hours part time job +15 hours duty). 
This leads to burn out, stress, disrupted normal family life which is manifested in a greater 
number of health problems and chronic and malignant diseases. However, it should be noted 
that compared to the population, doctors typically smoke less and do more sports activities.
According to the Hungarian Medical Chamber’s survey, 75% of the respondents consider 
the situation of Hungarian health care system bad and forecast worsening. Many of them 
(25%) would not choose the medical profession again.
According to both surveys the physicians are dissatisfied with their earnings, the recogni-
tion of their work and their working conditions and their financial situation.
The same positive factor in the two surveys is that they are satisfied with their personal 
relationships. In the survey conducted by the Hungarian Medical Chamber, the doctors con-
sidered their own job performance and housing situations positive.
Both questionnaires asked about the intention of working abroad. At the HDF Military 
Hospital, this is rising year by year. In 2011 only 18% of respondents planned that in the 
meantime in 2015 this ratio went up to 22%. This coincides with the result of the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber’s survey, according to that the ratio is 17%. These forecasts a loss of 5,000 
doctors form the total of 30,000 physician members. [1]
Among university pupils, the medical students have the greatest willing of emigration. The 
Hungarian Association of Residents also sent a questionnaire to the doctors who were already 
working abroad. Two-thirds of doctors participating in the research had worked previously 
in the Hungarian health care system, but only 15% of them had already decided as students 
to work abroad. Only 2% of them are planning to come home within 2 years’ time. They 
claimed the biggest deterrent factors are low salaries, the more than 60 hours of work weekly, 
the impossibility of normal family life and the corruption due to the “gratuity system”. The 
increasing aggression and violence experienced by patients were also mentioned. [2] [3]
In the press, the number of articles on violence against medical personnel has increased: 
“Staff kicked, spat at, patient received 12 days in custody”, “Disgruntled patient used an axe 
against medical staff”, “Drunk patient beats nurse at hospital in Békéscsaba”, “He recov-
ered and threw the defibrillator out of the window”, and these headlines could be continued 
 endlessly. [4]
Professionals made studies in medical universities in Hungary. The results of the studies 
did not show differences in various aspects—family background, financial situation, origin, 
career circumstances—between the students who are going to be doctors and who are going 
to leave the doctor’s career. The results of the studies showed differences in some of the 
motivations of the career entrants. Those, who remained in the medical career felt more 
dedication. For them, it was very important to feel competent in this career. They were better 
motivated because medicine is a career, where they can help people. [11]
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The 75% of emigrated doctors would come back if the starting medical salaries increased 
to an acceptable level (to at least 300,000 HUF which is about 1,000 Euro), and the working 
conditions and the situation of on-call time improved. I note that the amount mentioned 
above is the salary of a captain in the Hungarian Army.
Most of the immigrant doctors did not experience integration problems. They considered 
the quality assurance system based on feedback and questionnaires, discussions, and the fact 
that many of the proposals usually come to fruition later a positive factor.
They find it important that they can operate and they can work independently, because the 
gratuity system is not the driver of the structure.
Besides the working hours, there is time to learn and to live well. For administrative tasks, 
typists are employed. They appreciate that their opinions are asked for and listened to and 
they are respected as team members. There are training courses arranged and provided for 
them. However, the doctors mentioned that they need to work hard abroad as well.
In my research among the negative factors, I found the same reasons mentioned above. I 
need to mention that in some fields some improvements have been made. For example, the 
parking system and the possibility of sports activities were improved.
At the HDF Military Hospital, the cooperation with close colleagues and the appreciation 
of the leaders of the hospital were considered good. They found that the quality assurance 
system also worked well at the Hospital and was leading towards improvements.
Summary
I compared the results of my research studies with the study carried out by the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber and the Association of Hungarian Residents. The results show that without 
money the problem cannot be solved. In addition, the reduction of duty and working hours is 
important in order to have enough time for normal family life. It is important to obtain some 
time for living as well. It should be stressed that for the young doctors it is important that they 
can reach their career goals and they can learn and do operations. It should be mentioned that 
the provision of sports facilities and adequate parking facilities are also important because 
of the annual military aptitude test. If there is no change in the willingness of going to work 
abroad in the future, there will be a serious problem in the civil health care system and it will 
compromise the combat ability of the Hungarian Army as well.
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Milestones in the Foundation and Role  
of the Most Significant  
International Organizations against Money 
Laundering in the European Union
Attila BUGYÁKI1
In this two-piece study, the author introduces the most important international 
organizations and institutions fighting against money laundering of our time, 
through the main chapters of the formation of the international institutional 
system. The first part is focused on the creation of the international institutional 
system fighting against money laundering.
By the 21st century the phenomenon of money laundering—with the need of the 
laundering of gradually increasing “dirty” money, mainly from drugs, weapons 
and human trafficking, prostitution and corruption—has become a world-
wide problem. With the increasing organization of international criminal  
groups—taking advantage of the free movement of money and financial services—
are using more and more refined techniques to get more profits with their illegal 
activities. Money laundering will not leave terrorism untouched—casting a shadow 
on our everyday life—as particular radical groups use every means necessary to 
lay their hands on money sources anonymously needed for their existence, as it 
supplies their destructive actions; and naturally procuring this money the best 
sources are the money laundered by criminals. Recognising the money laundering 
and the negative and destructive effects of new crimes on everyday economic, 
financial and political life based on laundering, the leading countries of the world 
started international legislation against money laundering and terrorism which 
laws and codes are strictly regulating the different financial and bank supervision 
of the nation states. Despite the onsetting difficulties and indecisiveness, it was 
clear for the European Union that only strong international collaboration—and 
the unified understanding of measures—is the only power to stop the spread of 
money laundering.2
Keywords: money laundering, fianancing of terrorism, international organizations
1 Ph.D. student, National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Military Sciences; e-mail: attila.
bugyaki@freemail.hu
2 Initially, not even the countries of the EU could come to an agreement concerning the directives to be  
made—never mind internationl collaboration—as the lobby activities of different professions (lawyers, 
notaries) prevented to be included with the announced ones, fearing it would harm their confidentiality 
obligations. [2: 31]
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Milestones in the Foundation of International Institutions against 
Money Laundering
Over the decades several radical opinions have formed about the role of international organi-
zations and institutions. According one opinion the international institutions are the precursors 
of the world government, which stand up with unified sanctions in conflicts, requisitioning 
their organized executor apparatus. [1: 25] This idea seems negated, as today the dominance 
of sovereign countries is felt significantly, preferring their own national economy through 
their protectionist attitude. Other—negative—opinions say that the activities of international 
groups are minimal, negligible and with the loss of threats, their own importance is lost as 
well. Another opinion says that the international organizations, as they are preventing the 
conflicts, they are, at the same time, fostering a strong collaboration between the parties. 
Surveying those above, we can state that due to the different strength and interests of the 
countries, all opinions have truth in them, thus we can say that the truth about the collabora-
tion of international institutions is a blend of opinions.
The main and determinative party of today’s international relations is the country. The 
foundation of an organic relationship among the countries has given rise to the need of 
the possibility for institutional activities over national borders. Thus the countries created 
international institutions via international agreements. These units are to be taken as the 
new elements of the international system, which help not only treating the conflicts but also 
the collaboration and interests among the countries and the occuring synergy effects can 
be utilised at the maximum. That is why communication and collaboration acquires a more 
and more important role in our globalising world, as through these institutions not only the 
national but also the regional and global influences can be reached as well.
The main purpose of the fight against money laundering is to prevent the legalisation of 
profits from different illegal crimes and returning that money into the legal/illegal economy, 
and collecting informations on the basic crimes and the criminals as well. For achieving 
this, the law enforcements—constantly collaborating with other countries and international 
institutions—analising, using, mobilising and monitoring every possibility given by the law 
that help prevent the installation or exchange of illegal profits, that is to say: prevent money 
laundering. As the legalisation of dirty money is mainly taking place on international lev-
el—through national borders, overarching continents—the fight against it is only possible 
on an international level. For a possible outcome not only organized collaboration but also 
requirements for internal laws of countries are needed as well, meeting the standards and 
making it technically and professionally possible for the law enforcements to execute their 
duties. [3: 79] Furthermore, it is necessary to constantly develop the effectiveness of the 
national legislation, law enforcement and jurisdiction.
The institutions of the EU against money laundering had the first milestone at the end 
of the 20th century which was later on followed by several international conventions and 
agreements.
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The Recommendation of the European Commission
The above properly confirm the need of regulations. The basis of this was the recommen-
dation of the Committee of Ministers of the European Commission about preventing “the 
transfer of funds of criminal origin from one country to another and the process” accepted 
on 27 June 1980. [4] The initial European community intention was caused by the basically 
changed, more organized and violent attitude of crime that could be more and more felt in 
the member countries. For legalising the illegally acquired money taken with increasingly 
new types of crimes, the criminals started using the everyday bank system more often, taking 
advantage of its initial unregulated system. The recommendation—besides the detective 
organizations—focused on financial and credit institutions which had to scan the clients and 
worked as a preventive filter as well during the cash flow.3
United Nations: Vienna Convention/Agreement
The Agreement—originally called United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that was commonly known as the Vienna 
Convention or Vienna Agreement—created under the aegis of the UN on 20 December 1988 
was signed by 67 countries of the world.4 [5] It took almost two years for it to become 
international law in August 1990—after placing the 20th ratificaion charter—and came into 
force on 11 November 1990. The purpose of the Convention (consisting of 34 chapters) was 
for the ratificational parties to stand against the crimes commited with drugs and psycho-
tropic substances and the income of these illegal profits in a more organized and effective 
way. [6: 547] To reach the goals, measures were used concerning the previously strictly 
used banking secrecy in as much that they were declassified, thus the parties were obliged 
to give information to each other—based on judicial or other authorizing enactments—and 
they could not decline to do this referring to banking secrecy. The Agreement in Article 3, 
5 and 7 focused on the fight against money laundering calling it a harmful thus indictable 
and punishable activity, and ordaining the fullfillment of overall legal aids according to this 
and the identification of devices used, monitoring the illegally acquired properties and the 
impounding, immobilisation and sequestration of such incomes. As for the collaboration, 
these activities are to be done co-operatively with other countries, mutually helping each 
other out.5
3 According to this the law obliged the bank system to: 1) Identification of clients for account opening, 
renting safes, and cash transactions over limit. 2) Use of safes is available for clients graded as reliable. 3) 
Impounding banknotes related to crimes according to serial number. 4) The professional training of banking 
staff. Furthermore, the national and international collaboration was specified among banks and authorities and 
a system that helps the monitoring and comparison of banknotes during depositions.
4 Hungary joined the Vienna Convention on 22nd August 1989, when signing the New York agreement.
5 For the mutual co-operation, the parties, in case of seizing illegal properties may share it and offer for the 
national and international organizations to be used for their work.
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel Statements
The Basel Statements, elaborated by the swiss Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 
December 1988 was regulating the practice of bank monitoring as well as the use of banking 
system for prevention of money laundering, which was signed by representatives of ten 
countries—United States of America, Belgium, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, 
Japan, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, Sweden—and has been ratified 
in several countries. [7] The Statements among others was looking for a solution—as the 
banks and banking systems are organic parts of the financial world, thus they cannot prevent 
being partners directly or indirectly in money laundering—for the banking system and the 
authorities as their supervising systems to have principles that can prevent the banks and 
financial systems to take part in money laundering, keeping them to be trusted. The principles 
focused on identifying the clients, meeting the requirements and keeping the laws, the collab-
oration with the authorities and finally joining the Principles Statement. To create the related 
roles and internationally accepted standards—paralel with the role of national supervising 
institutions—the conditions of communication and co-operations had to be created, making 
a client-scanning system which can filter the risky and/or illegal financial transactions. The 
so-created preventively functioning financial monitoring system was not obligatory but 
a guidance for parties taking part in international financial life. The above is illustrated by 
Part 6 of the Statements, which confirms the attitude norms, thus: „…whatever the legal 
position in different countries, the Committee considers that the first and most important 
safeguard against money laundering is the integrity of banks’ own managements and their 
vigilant determination to prevent their institutions becoming associated with criminals or 
being used as a channel for money laundering. The Statement is intended to reinforce those 
standards of conduct.” [7: 2]
European Commission: Strasbourg Convention
The Convention 141/1990 of the European Commission signed 8 November 1990 was about 
“Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime.” [8] Part of 
the direct preludes was an impact study created with the help of experts that was made to 
measure how well the actual international criminal collaborations and agreements in effect 
covered the regulations against the money laundering back then. [2: 36] The examination 
came to determine that the money laundering is an individual and far-reaching source of 
danger, so a new Agreement will be needed to be placed on totally new basis. According to 
this the Strasbourg Convention, as a theoretical guideline, is using the following principles:
• Vienna Agreement;
• the need of national regulations on money laundering;
• the undertaking of law aids relating money laundering;
• the authorities of countries financially interested in law aid;
• the question of law harmonization.
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The Agreement containing only recommendations and no obligatories emphasises the need of 
international collaboration and determined directives that can be efficiently used in international 
acts against money laundering. In case of illegal incomes, the Agreement highlighted the need 
of the parties to acknowledge and execute the other party’s requests based on decree related 
to confiscation of property, except it does not count as a crime in the other party’s laws, or the 
nation state does not give legal possibility. Given this, the money laundering was titled as crime 
and defined its illegal scope of activities that need special attention:
• conversion and transfer of possessions from crimes;
• dissembling and hiding original source of illegally acquired properties;
• stealing values of criminal sources;
• supporting and taking part in crimes specified in the Convention.
Directive I of the European Union
After realising the worsening effects of money laundering and organized crimes built 
around it, the European Union—using the Vienna Convention, Basel Statements, Strasbourg 
Convention and the 1980 Recommendation of the European Committee and their internal 
needs—joined the fight against money laundering and created the Council Directive 91/308/
EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
which was commonly known as the Directive I of the European Union. [9] Besides the above 
reasons, an emphasised role in the creation was that the previous international agreements 
were not in harmony with the needs and interests of the member countries and were not 
obligatory. For the EU members the obligatory Directive—besides harmonizing the law 
systems—determined the following goals:
• preventing the criminals taking part in money laundering to financially act against the 
market of the Union;
• the operation of free, internal market of the member countries needs to be harmonized 
with the measures against money laundering;
• in favor of increasing the effectiveness the European Union has to take active part in 
the fight against organized crime.
The Directive obligated the banks and financial institutions and other companies suitable for 
money laundering to identify their clients and over a particular limit (15 thousand ECU)6 the 
clients are deemed to certify their identities. The generated informations and any suspicious 
activity related to money laundering had to be transmitted to the Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU).7
United Nations: International Money Laundering Information 
Network
Ten years after the 1988 Vienna Convention the United Nations founded the International 
Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN) which took a main role in the fight 
6 The ECU was the currency of the European Community, and the later European Union between 1979 and 
1999, before the introduction of the Euro.
7 The main goal of FIU was to foster, ensure and develop the communication between the members.
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against money laundering, and together with the international institutions they elaborated 
a safe internet-based legislational and regulational information network (database, electronic 
library, calendar of events), thus giving access to up-to-date informations and effective help 
for the members. [10]
United Nations: The Global Program against Money Laundering
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published The Global Program 
against Money Laundering (GPML) in 1998 to prevent laundering money from crimes and 
financing terrorism. [11] The program gave professional help, training and means to actualise 
these, where the fight against crimes related to money laundering was still backward.
Joint Action of the Council: 98/699/JHA
The Council accepted on 3 December 1998 the Joint Action adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on money laundering, the identifica-
tion, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds from 
crime. This program contains: [12] [13]
• besides the termination of reservations, it gave legal possibility of seizing illegal pos-
sessions;
• the European Justice Network created a description to identify, trace, freeze, seize and 
confiscate illegal possession and means, which helped the informing and detection;
• the member countries during the procedures treated the requests of country members 
as that of an equal;
• collaboration was urged per the collaborational agreements;
• the member countries had to do every means necessary to prevent the cover-up of 
possession, unless it was forbidden in their internal laws;
• the member countries provided the authorities with the effective collaborative methods 
to identify, trace, freeze, seize and confiscate illegally acquired possessions and means.
European Commission Conclusions, Tampere
The European Commission’s session on 15–16 October 1999 in Tampere defined the con-
clusions which approved the principle of mutual recognition both in civil and in criminal 
cases based on the justice authorities’ verdicts and decrees, thus making the basis of the 
member countries’ justice collaboration, the concept of freedom, safety and legal region. [14] 
Chapter X of the conclusions was about the special measures against money laundering, 
especially since money laundering is the main driving force of organized crime, thus—taking 
the Strasbourg Agreement and FATF recommendations into account—it is necessary to take 
every legal step with the harmonization of laws and information-flow, that is focused on 
the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscating the illegal possessions. For the 
goals to be reached, it was necessary to extend the limit of the power of Interpol to several 
crimes related to money laundering, and in the interests of increased transparency, within the 
confines of collaboration and law aid agreements, the possibility needs to be ensured for third 
countries to be able to trace illegal money.
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Wolfsberg Group
The purpose of the Wolfsberg Group8—now consisting of 139 international banks, founded 
by the initiation of the greatest Swiss bank, UBS AG, on 30 October 2000—is to develop 
and show guidance preventing the international financial crimes and risks, especially on 
know-your-client (KYC), money laundering and terrorism. [15] The recommendations—also 
called Wolfsberg anti-money-laundering principles—filtering money laundering, elaborated 
by the organization working on non-government basis are not obligatory, but due to the 
vocation of the members, these recommendations are met as basic conditions. The group 
elaborated an anti-laundering questionnaire10 for the members, which was used as a scanner 
for the financial service companies. After the terror attacks in New York, the main focus of 
the group is financing the fight against terrorism.
United Nations: Palermo Agreement
Within the confines of the United Nations, on 14 December 2000, in Palermo (Italy) the 
United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime was elaborated. [16] It is 
a milestone, as it was the first harmonized UN-action against organized crime. According 
to the convention, the organization’s almost 200 members stand up harmonized against or-
ganized crime, corruption and money laundering. Besides the information-flow, for a wide 
justice collaboration, the followings were elaborated:
• law proceedings have been simplified, among others seizing possessions;
• the members are obliged to create their own Financial Information Units;
• the money laundering of illegally acquired possessions is expressed as crime;
• witness protection is accounted.
Council Decision: 2000/642/JHA
The European Union Council accepted on 17 October 2000 the concerning arrangements 
for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of 
exchanging information, 2000/642/JHA Decision, which regulated the direct and effective 
co-operation among the obligatorily founded Financial Information Units. [17]
Council Framework Decision: 2001/500/IB
The 2001/500/IB: Council Framework Decision signed on 26 June 2001 elaborated on money 
laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities 
and the proceeds of crime. [18] This framework decision was the further reflection of the 
8 The name of the group derives from the castle of Wolfsberg, where the foundation agreement was signed.
9 Besides the 11 founding banks (Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Société Générale, UBS Banks), later on 
the Standard Chartered Bank and the Bank of America joined as well.
10 The Wolfsberg Group’s anti-laundering quiestionnaire contained questions from general to risk management, 
know-your-client, transparency, transaction shadowing, and the professional qualification of the 
administrators.
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above mentioned 98/699/JHA Joint Action, which determined every conjunctive activity 
 related to covering, hiding, using illegal possessions as a crime. The illegally acquired pos-
session was determined as a legal-economical category, and in the future all illegally acquired 
possession exceeding one year of imprisonment was urged to be confiscated. The seizing 
and confiscating of illegal possessions directly or indirectly related to organized crime and 
assigned to third party could be realized much more effectively as the newly created concepts 
and regulations were put into practice.
Directive II of the European Union
The extended Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering—commonly known as Directive II of the European Union 
(Directive 2001/97/EC)—was signed on 4 December 2001 by the Union members. [19] The 
direct reason of creating the agreement was—besides the increasing number of crimes relat-
ed to organized crime and the defense of the mutual European currency, the Euro—clearly 
a reaction to the terrorist attack in the United States of America on 11 September 2001. The 
extended Directive II—which has automatically overwritten the previous—adapted from the 
40 + 911 recommendations of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), 
the Vienna Convention, realising the unregulated risks in the financial system, which could 
be used for financing terrorist attacks. Preventing the criminals to stay anonymous, client 
identification12 was obligatory in cases when a certain limit is reached. The new directive 
extended the material and personal extent of crimes related to money laundering. In the 
previous case, the use of providers’ activities for money laundering is taken as preventive 
purpose and defined which attitudes count as money laundering, obligating the members 
to keep the prohibition of money laundering defined in the directive. [21: 7–8] With the 
extension of personal extent besides the financial providers, the partly13 or fully involved 
obliged people are accountants, auditors, lawyers, notaries, estate agents and tax consultants: 
such enterpreneur types that can be involved with the legalisation of illegally acquired money 
during their activities. Relating the credible client identification obligation, no specific meth-
od was defined, but it prescribed in which cases it must be done.14 Since there was no specific 
definition for the case of simplified or strict client scanning, only some cases were defined, the 
member countries could decide on their own about the strictness of the matter. An important 
milestone was a new provision about the disclosure prohibition, which—besides not defining 
11 The FATF is an independent, government-related, specially authorised, particular and collaborative action 
group functioning under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), defining the 
strategy and main elements of the international fight against money laundering and financed terrorism. The 
workgroup has worked their recommendations in 40 points about the unified, internationally accepted basic 
system, which is not legally obligatory, but the countries accepting it are adjusting their national legislation to 
it, and it is essential for the international co-operation. FATF declared further 8 points in October 2001, and 
another in October 2004, totally 9 special points for the fight against financed terrorism, reacting to new types 
of dangers. [20]
12 The Directive stipulates that certain steps should be taken to find the real identity of the person in the 
backround in case it is doubtful that the client is not acting on its own behalf. However, the Directive does not 
determine who should be regarded as the real possessor.
13 In case the providers do not provide direct financial services, the Directive defines partial regulations, meaning 
that they are obliged to notify their activity in particular cases only (e.g. real estate purchase).
14 Scanning is obligatory at the first meeting of the provider and client, in case of every transactions exceeding 
15 thousand Euros, and in the smallest suspicion of money laundering.
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exclusions—prohibited the providers to inform their clients if there was any notifications or 
data-forwarding towards the authorities about them. [22: 137‒155]
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund: Model 
 Legislation
The United Nations Office on Drugs Crime and collaborating with the International Monetary 
Fund15 published in 200316 the Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism, in order to use international recommendations and practices to foster collaborating 
authorities’ to create international standards. [23]
Council of Europe: Warsaw Agreement
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism has been signed in Warsaw on 6 
May 2005. [24] The Agreement consisting of 7 chapters and 56 articles, besides increasing 
the international co-operation and its detailed legal regulations, focuses on increasing the 
efficiency, in which case all member country needs to create their own Financial Information 
Unit to “access directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and 
law enforcement information that it requires to property undertake its functions, including 
the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.” [24] The Agreement detailed the special 
cases of declining the co-operation and emphasized that if the purpose of the crime is related 
to financing of terrorism, the data-providing cannot be denied.
Council Framework Decision: 2005/212/IB
Council framework decision on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities 
and Property has been elaborated on 24 February 2005, generally disposes of confiscation 
of crime-related proceeds, as well as defines the possession surveillance and possession re-
covery. [25] As the previous, 2001/500/IB council framework decision’s expectations about 
illegally acquired possessions exceeding 1 year of imprisonment to be confiscated in practice 
of member countries’ collaborations, thus to increase efficiency, the authority of confiscating 
was exceeded to the range of the specific crime organizations17 and with inclusion of the fight 
against terrorism.
Directive III of the European Union
The Directive 2005/60/EK on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering and terrorist financing came into force on 26 October 2005 which is 
15 The Washington-based international organization interested in global financial collaboration, stability of 
exchange rate and economic growth was founded in 1945.
16 The initial basis of Model legislation was founded in 1999 by The United Nations Office on Drugs Crime.
17 The crimes are the following: counterfeiting related to the introduction of the Euro; money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime; human 
trafficking; aiding illegal immigration and transmigration and illegal residing; sexual exploitation of children, 
child pornography; drug trafficking.
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the Direction III of European Union against money laundering and financing terrorism. [26] 
The leaders of member countries realised that, besides the increasing and more organized 
crimes, they have to focus not only on the illegally acquired money flowing into the financial 
system, but on the legal incomes too, because those are capable to be used for financing ter-
rorism as well. The rethought Directive according to the above extended its effect besides the 
money laundering to fight against terrorism and preventing financing terrorism with taking 
the 40 + 9 recommendations of FATF, in which case “…the purpose is not only preventing 
providers’ activities for money laundering, but also preventing the support of terrorism via 
these activities or things that can be expressed with money.” [22: 139–140] The Council 
gave two years (until 15 December 2007) for countries to apply these Directive. Besides 
the prevention (prohibition) of money laundering and financing of terrorism, the extended 
regulation system defines those criminal attitudes and activities which have the possibility 
of directly or indirectly fostering money laundering and the financing of terrorism.18 A new 
element is the risk-based approach which, for the purposes of preventing money laundering, 
determines a unified obligation of legislation, client scanning and monitoring. At the same 
time, it declares that the scale of risk in the case of money laundering and financing of 
terrorism, is not always the same, it may differ in specific cases, thus the directive gave the 
opportunity for member countries to use stricter or lighter proceedings. As for the client 
scanning—redressing the lack of Directive II—we have much more definite criteria for iden-
tifying the clients and/or real possessors, and the measures for this activity, but the method of 
identification (e.g. the amount and types of data to record) is still up to member countries.19 
Furthermore—realising the dangers of international corruption—the identification and 
definition of political persona has been involved in the directive as well. The Directive de-
fined two categories in the aspect of risk-based client scanning. One is the simplified client 
identification which, in case of meeting specific requirements, gives alternate possibility 
for identifying low-risk clients and transactions, but in case of possible money laundering 
and financing terrorism, the identification is obligatory. The other is the obligation of client 
scanning in cases when the risk of money laundering and financing of terrorism is high, by 
its nature.20
An important milestone was—when specific requirements were met—the possibility of 
accepting of client scanning by other providers, aka third party, which was justified by the 
increased efficiency and faster investigation. As for the disposals of the disclosure prohi-
bition—in spite of Directive II—exceptions have been determined; according to these the 
prohibition does not concern the disclosure of such transferred information, whose address-
18 The Directive refers not only to financial but also to non-financial sectors, e.g. to lawyers, notaries, real estate 
agents, gambling companies, trustee and group providers and all enterpreneurs which have cash-flow of at 
least 15 thousand Euros.
19 “The measures of client scanning are the following: identifying the client and checking the ID; in specific 
cases identifying the real possessor and creation of risk-based measures for identifying the IDs; gaining 
information on the goals and attitude of the financial relation; constant monitoring of the financial relation, 
meaning the scanning of transactions during the relation.” [26: 23]
20 By their nature they mean greater risk, thus beside defining the concrete measures, the intensified client 
scanning is obligatory to be done in the following cases: if the client does not appear personally for 
identification; in the case of border-crossing relationships for correspondent banking with third country 
institutes; in the case of financial relationships with political personas residing in other member countries or in 
a third country. [26: 25‒26]
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ees are authorities and law enforcements providing the supervision.21 Besides the above, 
the directive urges every member country to create their own Financial Information Unit to 
increase the efficiency of notificational obligation; besides collecting, analizing and transmit-
ting information, these Units have the obligation of annual data providing. Furthermore, the 
directive declares the norms of collaborative professional training and sanctions, which sanc-
tions need to be sufficiently effective, proportionate and retentive in case of contravention.
Related to Directive III, the following three later decrees are to be mentioned: [2: 59–60]
• 1 August 2006: Commission Directive laying down implementing measures for 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the 
definition of “politically exposed person” and the technical criteria for simplified cus-
tomer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity 
conducted on an occasional or very limited basis; [27]
• 26 October 2005: Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community; [28]
• 15 November 2006: Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parlaiment and 
of the Council on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds. [29]
Directive IV of the European Union
The European Parliament and Council accepted22 Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC based on the recommendations of Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering (FATF) on 20 May 2015 in Strasbourg, which is Directive 
IV of the European Union against money laundering.23 The purpose of the new Directive, 
besides increasing the efficiency against money laundering, tax crime and financing terror-
ism is to strengthen and harmonize the EU’s anti-laundering regulations with international 
expectations. As its predecessors, the purpose of this Directive was to prevent using financial 
systems of the EU for money laundering, organized crime and financing terrorism, further-
more preventing illegally acquired possessions to constantly and uncontrollably flow into 
financial and economic sectors, as it may significantly weaken the stability, integrity and 
international judgement and development of EU member countries. In order to achieve these 
goals—besides raising criminal law to a unified EU level—it obliges member countries to 
stand stricly, purposefully and proportionally against crime in the aspect of both collaboration 
and execution as well. In the aspect of proportionality, it has been emphasized that in order 
21 Since it doesn’t result in disclosure, the disclosure of informations about the following providers are 
exceptions: institutes that are members of the same financial conglomerate; specific non-financial providers, if 
their activities are connected to the same legal person, or the activities are done in the same unit; in the case of 
financial and non-financial providers, if the client and affair is the same; if the specific non-financial provider 
tries to dissuade a client from illegal activity.
22 A decree has been accepted as well, at the same time with the Directive, related to monitoring financial 
transactions, with the purpose of making simple and effective the monitoring of financial transactions in the 
future with defining the monitoring and regulating the circle of data to be recorded by financial providers. 
This gives a major help for the authorities for the future supervision of the source and movement of money.
23 The Directive contains obligatory regulations for the member countries which have to be introduced until June 
2017. [30]
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to protect society from crime, the member countries’ regulations have to be in harmony with 
the stability and integrity of the EU’s financial systems; furthermore, there should not be such 
obligations that are legally and financially disproportionate for the companies’ activities. 
To increase the transparency, the Directive introduced new regulations deciding about the 
creation of a public, central EU database, which helps to identify the real possessors of 
companies, trustees and other legal entities. [31] Access to these databases is limitless and 
free of charge for specific Financial Information Units and authorities, but for other natural 
or legal entities access is granted only after proving legitimate interests, online registration 
and payment.24 The limitation of access to these databases is possible only “in exceptional 
circumstances, on occasional cases”, but the emphasized public personas25 and their family 
members are under special jurisdiction in the aspect of fight against corruption. The obliged 
providers are to ask for required personal datas for keeping the records during the client 
scanning, then record these datas; after scanning these datas, suspicious transactions are to 
be reported.
Another purpose of the new Directive is the aspiration for unified and harmonized politics 
expected by member countries for those countries that are outside the EU in which regula-
tions against money laundering and financing terrorism are not effective enough.
Today money laundering and financing terrorism is clearly global and transnational in 
nature, thus the Directive emphasizes the increasing importance of coordination and co-oper-
ation between the member countries’ Financial Information Units, and the share of informa-
tion in case of identifying and monitoring suspicious cash-flow. An important and expected 
requirement in the European Union has become the possibility of ensuring and monitoring all 
financial transactions; with this, informations not only about the owner but the information 
about the beneficiary have to be transmitted as well.
The previously recommended risk-based method26—with this the specific cases of threats 
are to be taken care of according to their risk level—is obligatory to use in the future for the 
providers, thus terminating the earlier mechanical data recording. By introducing this, the 
regulations related to client scanning are getting stricter, and according to the new regulations 
about the use of data, the providers are obliged to check their datas on clients at least every 
five years.27
Under the aspect of the sanctions, it is an important change for the Directive to be extended 
to suspension of licence or deletion from registers, and identifying personal responsibility and 
suspending leadership or withdrawal of the initiative. Besides the above, the Directive disposes 
of maximum amount of fines; the amount of this is at least twice as much as the profit from the 
infringement, or at least 1 million Euros. [32] If the affected entity is a loan bank or financial 
institution, the maximal fine, in the case of legal entity, is 5 million Euros at least, or 10% of the 
yearly income; in the case of natural persons the fine is a maximum of 5 million Euros.
Besides the tightenings, a lightening of specific level is the possibility of the new  Directive 
is handing in the ownership statement via electronic way—with meeting specific expecta-
24 Member countries are given permission to operate public registers.
25 Emphasized public personas are: heads of states, cabinet members, judges of the Supreme Courts and 
Members of Parliaments.
26 Identified threats can be treated most efficiently with risk-based approach (RBA), with which a comprehensive 
and fact-based, purposeful approach can be used.
27 With the introduction of risk-based approach the client-scanning can be conducted in a simplified, normal or 
intensified procedure.
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tions—instead of the earlier exclusive possibility, when client identification was possible in 
person, with handing over the authenticated copy of IDs.
With the extension of the Directive, the previous 15 thousand Euros limit is decreased 
to 10 thousand Euros of cash payment, which is to be used—with extending the vendors’ 
circle—in the cases of commodity merchants and gambling organizers.
As the above shows, several useful changes have been made, but it was soon to be found 
out that in some areas, further and immediate measures are needed; thus, in December 2015 
the EU laws focusing on the fight against money laundering and financing terrorism have 
been revised and confirmed. The elaborated recommendation of the above has been pub-
lished on 5 July 2016 by the European Commission; the most important modifications are 
the following: [33]
• treating the threats of financial transactions via new technologies and virtual currencies;
• the moderation of risks related to non-registered, prepaid devices;
• the increase and harmonization of monitoring and client-scanning of suspicious finan-
cial transactions related to high-risk third countries;
• extending the range of Financial Information Units, and ensuring the limitless and 
immediate access of information;
• confirming transparency.
Transparency is expected to improve with the recommended modifications put in practice, 
which increases the detection of law enforcement authorities related to the areas of money 
laundering and financing terrorism as well.
Conclusion
As it has been demonstrated, a long and difficult way lead to the foundation and actual 
situation of international organizations fighting against money laundering—and organized 
crime, financing of terrorism—in which primarily, besides the European Union (European 
Communities), the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development took and still takes active part. As Directive I of the European Union 
defined the money laundering in the aspect of crime related to drugs and defined obligations 
for financial sector only, the Directive II extended its effect to the cases of professions and 
activities as well. Directive III following the previous road, used the provisions of FATF 
extended to financing of terrorism, and is more focused on client scanning and introduced 
the risk-based approach; the realization of this latter in practice is still in progress. Going 
along this same path, Directive IV, for increasing transparency and repelling corruption, 
besides introducing the central EU database, focused on obligating the risk-based approach 
of client-scanning, and creating a more unified and harmonized policies both among the 
member countries and third countries.
The mission of international organizations founded against money laundering and financ-
ing terrorism is to stop legalization and use of money derived from crimes, and to stand 
against the financial support of terrorism by instituting effective and standardized measures. 
The leaders of the world realized that for the effective fight it is not enough to use legal means 
only; for the success it is necessary to have an extended, harmonized and strong international 
collaboration and co-operation. The signed international agreements and the standardised 
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legal regulations and the increasing number of committed countries show us that the world 
is on the right track to achieve this. The problem is, being an international challenge, an 
international solution would be expedient, but many countries still are not committed to 
any such organizations; the reason of this is that the countries cannot or are unwilling to 
meet the requirements, thus giving up their economical and political interest, and their own 
sovereignity. For successful actions an international concensus is needed as well—even if 
it means introducing political and/or economic retaliations and sanctions—which could 
possibly strenghten the future role and effect of international organizations. For reaching the 
goals—as one of the basis of the fight against money laundering is reaction to the criminal 
methods with following and post factum legislation—it is necessary to introduce regime 
measures, including creating flexible legal and institutional backing, and at the same time 
setting up professional training of financial detectives taking part in the workflow. In addition 
to the above it is necessary to focus on the further communal sharing of acquired informa-
tion, thus stepping over the limits of nation states, raising it to a unional (international) level, 
whereby more significant results could be reached. To sum up, we identify the rejoice due 
to the increasing number of committed members of international organizations, but at the 
same time the quality of co-operation and communication have to improve significantly. And 
finally, let me state another important remark. If merely a fraction of the huge fortunes de-
riving from money laundering—which, according to a rough estimate could reach more than 
a thousand billion dollars annually [34]—could be confiscated by increasing the efficiency, 
this substantial amount could be directly spent on fighting crime…
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The Most Significant International Groups and  
Institutions Taking Part in the Fight against Money 
Laundering and Financing Terrorism
Attila BUGYÁKI1
In the first part of the two-piece study the author examined the emergence of 
the organizational system against money laundering in the European Union. 
In this second part the daily practice of the war against money laundering is 
studied, introducing the major international groups and institutions which, with 
their activities, take active part in the fight against money laundering, financing 
terrorism, and other related crimes.
Keywords: money laundering, financing of terrorism, international organizations, 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, FATF-Style Regional Bodies
The Daily Practice of the Fight against Money Laundering
It is necessary to study the daily practice of the fight, after introducing the emergence of the 
international institutional system fighting against money laundering and terrorism in the first 
part. In this context those major groups and institutions are introduced which, with their ac-
tivities, take active part in the fight against money laundering, financing terrorism, and other 
related crimes. The committed institutions, according to their activities and programmes, can 
be divided into three major groups.2 The first and most important is the Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the second one, based on a similar pattern is the later 
established and currently embracing 9 members, i.e. FATF-Style Regional Bodies  (FSRBs). 
The third group includes: the collaborating international institutions and law enforcement 
authorities which, with their activities—directly or indirectly—effectively contribute to 
achieve success.
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
The basis for founding the international institution FATF (officially in French: Groupe d’action 
financière sur le blanchiment des capitaux—GAFI) was provided by the Vienna Convention, 
created by seven countries—Canada, Germany, Italy France, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States—in Paris on 16 July 1989. To the founding G73 countries further eight 
1 Ph.D. student, National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Military Sciences; e-mail: attila.
bugyaki@freemail.hu
2 It is important to note that, in addition to the above, representatives of the civil sphere are also taking part in 
preventing the increasing security challenges during the fight against money laundering and terrorism—taking 
advantage of business opportunities—organizing different professional educational trainings, forums, events, 
conferences, seminars and webinars, which creates an individual category. One of the most acknowledged 
international member organization is the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists 
(ACAMS), founded in 1989, which is based in Miami and has offices in several capitals around the world.
3 G7 is the abbreviation of the Group of Seven, which was founded in 1976 by the seven most developed 
countries to increase political and economic collaboration.
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countries joined in two years, and as a result of further development, another 31 countries 
in 2000, and today the Paris based institution has 37 members.4 The members, besides each 
other, are in daily contact with several other international and regional organizations, which 
also have interests in the fight against money laundering and financing terrorism. According 
to the initial plan the workgroup was supposed to cooperate for a predetermined period of 
time, but due to the successes, the cooperation in the following years was prolonged, and 
currently the organization is mandated until 2020.
The FATF is such an independent, government-close, specially authorized, particular and 
collaboration Action Group, which, working under the aegis of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD),5 determines the strategy and main elements 
of the fight against money laundering and terrorism. [3] Its legal entity is to be considered as 
qualified, but we cannot state that the situation is the same relative to all the other countries, 
without recognition. Since it is not supranational, it creates no legal sources, but during its 
activities, it creates national and EU-recommendations, which are used as international stand-
ards in more than a thousand countries. Its duty is creating the international standards for the 
fight against money laundering and financing terrorism, studying the related legislation, prac-
tice and measures of the member countries, monitoring and qualifying the development and 
harmonization of these measures in favour of the international collaboration. [4: 112–116]
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering elaborated its recommendations 
about the unified, internationally acknowledged anti-money laundering principle system in 
40 theses, which legally is not obligatory, but the acknowledging countries adjusting their na-
tional legislation to this, which is an essential basis for creating the international cooperation. 
The recommendations emphasize the importance of multilateral cooperation, the need for 
consolidating the international legal systems, the roles of financial institutions and financial 
authorities, and the importance of international informational flow. [5: 2] In October 2001 
the FATF elaborated initially 8, then further one recommendation in October 2004—9 in 
total—against financing terrorism.6 These recommendations—reacting to new and evolving 
danger—are periodically reconsidered, and according to this are reformed so that they can be 
initiated world-wide. For this theoretical and practical elaboration, the organization involves 
three work groups, dealing with independent, legal, financial and foreign relations, so the 
formed theses ensure a wide and flexible context for the countries to adapt according to their 
4 The FATF currently comprises 35 member jurisdictions (Argentina, Australia Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong [China], Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Republic 
of Korea, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States) and 2 regional organisations (the European Commission, the Gulf Co-operation 
Council), representing most major financial centres in all parts of the globe. [1]
5 The legal predecessor of the Paris based international economic organization was founded by 20 countries 
on 16 April 1948, and it is called Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with the goal 
of organizing and monitoring the mutual restoration programme, the proper division of aids and restoring the 
economy after the war—according to the Marshall Plan. It has been operating in its current form since 30th 
September 1961 and mainly takes part in harmonizing the economic, commercial and financial activities. 
Hungary has been a member since 1996. [2]
6 Initially the FATF was established to fight against money laundering, but after the terror attacks against 
the U.S. on 11 September 2001, the world’s leading countries agreed with the European Union—using the 
experiences of the group and its achievements—and they decided to extend the role of the Action Group with 
a further 9 Special Recommendations, which are especially focused on the effective fight against financing 
terrorism.
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capabilities. The FATF, based on the 40 + 9 recommendations and the method system for 
monitoring creates a report about the member countries periodically. The country-monitoring 
is discussed by the representatives of the countries on a plenary assembly, which serves as 
a means for making political-diplomatic pressure. The plenary assembly is used for electing 
the current president as well, whose mandate is valid for one year.
The FATF elaborated its latest international recommendations for the fight against money 
laundering and financing terrorism, meeting the standards and the new methods for evaluating 
the efficiency of the member countries in June 2017, which focuses on technical adequacy 
and efficiency.7 Although the events of the past years required changes, the basic principles 
have not changed.
The members control the execution of the recommendations in two ways, which comple-
ment each other simultaneously. The first is the self-evaluating system, where each member 
country is inspecting its own situation, and the second one is the system of mutual evaluation, 
where the situation of a member country is evaluated and monitored by the professionals of 
another FATF member country. The goal of the monitoring is to unveil those areas—besides 
the objective and comprehensive picture—that still require changes and developments in the 
future.
For creating pressure, the members created the category of Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Regions, with the context of assigning those 25 criteria,8 based on which the non-cooper-
ative countries can be identified.9 The four established regional groups are: American, Asian/
Pacific, European and African/Middle East groups; the countries which do not meet these 
criteria are on a blacklist.10
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs)
Since the FATF does not wish to accept further members to join, instead it is urging the 
formation of regional organizations. As a result of this and the severing proclamations and 
action plans published by the United Nations—using the successes of the FATF—several 
international regions have created their own institutions for fighting against money laun-
dering and financing terrorism, which are called FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). [9] 
7 The FATF published the recommendations for the first time in 1990, then revised it in 1996, 2001 and 2012, 
which was last updated in June 2017. [6]
8 “The initiative is based on the foreign taxation strategy of the EU, and will complement the ongoing efforts 
focusing on the prevention of tax evasion. Creating the EU list, the goal is to create and present those norms, 
which are already obligatory in the EU—said Edward Scicluna. The non-EU countries and regions are 
to be scanned. They will be on the list of the non-cooperative countries, if they do not meet the minimum 
requirements of the EU during the scanning. The Council is due to finalize the list of non-cooperative 
jurisdictions before the end of 2017.” [7]
9 On the actual list—several jurisdictions’ examinations are still in process—because of their high risks and 
the lack of their strategic obligations, nine countries are present: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu and Yemen. [8]
10 Hungary is committed to fight against money laundering and terrorism, but since the Group does not wish 
to extend in this region—they would rather support the fight on a regional and national level—Hungary is 
not a member of the FATF. Despite this fact, the Hungarian government has indicated its willing to join. 
Hungary—as a doubtful glory—was on the blacklist in June 2001 for a short while, since it was possible to 
make anonymous deposits on infinite number of bank accounts up to a limit of 2,000,000 HUF at the time, 
so the financial institutions were unable to identify the owners of the bank accounts. After legal changes, 
Hungary was removed from this list in June 2002.
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The mutual traits of the individual Bodies are the voluntary, cooperative origination based 
on the members’ agreements, and due to this—as they are not obliged by international 
contracts—they are to be seen independent. According to this, the members—aspiring to 
adopting the international and FATF-standards—define their activities and regulations via 
consensus, which cannot be in contrast with their cultural values and constitutional legal 
system.
Although the FATF and the FSRBs are individual organizations, independent from each 
other, they cooperate acknowledging and helping each other’s work efficiently to achieve 
their common goal, repelling money laundering, the financing of terrorism, preventing 
proliferation and identifying and successfully treating the increasing threats in the financial 
system. Achieving this, besides creating unified international legal context, they focus on 
developing the national policies and methods for increasing the collaboration between the 
member countries. As an evaluating body, during its work, they use mechanisms like the 
FATF, and the results are constantly evaluated, monitored and shared with each other in 
favour of mutual aid. In favour of the most efficient compliance and use of the international 
and FATF-standards, besides technical aiding, the members actively support each other in 
execution as well. Furthermore, the members are constantly taking part in developing the 
FATF-standards, harmonizing the collaborative programmes, researches and workshops. 
Today there are nine individual, but parallel working FATF-Style Regional Bodies in the 
world, which, in connection with FATF, create a comprehensive and global network in the 
fight against money laundering and financing terrorism.
Moneyval
One of the oldest and most important regional programmes was founded by the European 
Commission in 1997 called Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). The tasks of the organization was extended in 2002 to 
fight against financing terrorism, thus—after its name did not reflect properly the new func-
tions—was renamed as Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism; Moneyval in short. The role of the commission 
founded by 21 members—which today has 47 constant and 6 monitoring members11—is to 
develop the skills of national authorities for the fight against money laundering and financing 
terrorism. In this context, it controls its own and the mutual surveys and evaluations with the 
members, and makes recommendations for realizing more effective measures and collabora-
tion, and organizes events and trainings (e.g. typological seminars), whose purpose is sharing 
the professional knowledge. [11] Furthermore, since the Moneyval is a crime-focused sub-
committee of the European Commission, it focuses greatly on jurisdiction in the context of 
11 Permanent Members: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, 
Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom. In addition, observer status: Canada, the Holy See, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the United 
States of America. Since Hungary is a member of Moneyval as well, it has to meet the requirements of 
the recommendations by respecting the FATF regionally, and make scanning possible for the international 
organizations against money laundering and financing terrorism. [10]
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the fight against money laundering. “The goal of its function is to evaluate the individual 
member countries’ legislation, practice and measures related to money laundering—based 
on the methods of FATF—and harmonizing and developing these measures, fostering inter-
national collaboration.” [12] During the examination of each country, the delegate of the 
Moneyval evaluates the specific country’s legal system and the Financial Intelligence Units’ 
(FIU) activities on a few days long personal visit. It is discussed and accepted on the plenary 
assemblies, held three times every year. [13: 46] The member countries are authorized to 
send three persons to the Committee. The Moneyval became an Associate Member of the 
FATF in June 2006.
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)/ 
Grupo de Acción Financiera del Caribe (GAFIC)
The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force—with 25 members12—was the first one to 
establish after FATF, in May 1990, on one of the Lesser Antilles islands, Aruba. [15] After 
their establishment, the representatives of the Caribbean and Middle-American countries 
elaborated a special, 19-theses recommendation [16] in favour of repelling money laun-
dering, which amended the earlier 40 FATF Recommendations. To increase efficiency, it 
introduced a special regional supporting and training strategy for the members. It holds its 
plenary assemblies twice a year, where one representative from each country takes part. Its 
highest body is the Committee, led by the president. With its basic activities it focuses on 
new kinds of challenges, like increasing terror threats, illegal gambling, human trafficking 
and fighting the risks of digital currencies. The CFATF/GAFIC became an Associate Member 
of the FATF in 2006.
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG/APGML)
The organization was founded in February 1997 by 13 countries—some were already mem-
bers of the FATF—in Bangkok. [17] The first assembly after the establishment was held in 
Tokyo in 1998, and after that plenary assemblies were held at least annually, where, besides 
the most important decisions, they elaborated work programmes, which were adapted to the 
strategic plans elaborated every 4 years. The current strategic plan, valid 2016–2020, defines 
the organization to function as a regional “government” that focuses its task on moderating 
and repelling money laundering, financing terrorism and the spread of mass destruction 
weapons in the Pacific area, taking the international and national standards into account. [18] 
To accomplish these missions, it has three objectives:
• to work as an efficient multilateral organization, that supports enforcing and executing 
the FATF-standards and the work against money laundering and financing terrorism;
• to collaborate with the members to understand the risk environment of money launder-
ing and financing terrorism, in favour of executing FATF-standards;
• to evaluate the enforcing and execution of FATF-standards, and react to the changes.
12 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, 
the Cayman Islands, Curaçao, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Maarten, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela. [14]
156 (16) 3 (2017)
A. BUGYÁKI: The Most Significant International Groups…
Besides, they regularly organize seminars on the new methods and techniques of money 
laundering and financing terrorism. The group consists of 41 members13—which are divided 
into 5 groups in order of the efficient control: Northern Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, 
Pacific region, CANZUS14—and several international and regional observers. The APG 
became an Associate Member of the FATF in 2006.
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group was founded in August 
1999 in Arusha (Tanzania) and it has 18 members.15 The Group’s decisions are made and 
accepted on the at least annually held assembly by the Ministerial council. [21] The Council 
accepted the fourth 3 yearlong strategic plan between 2017–2020, whose goal, besides con-
firming the previous tasks, is increasing the efficiency level of member countries, to become 
a more efficient member of the global FATF network. [22] To increase the transparency, 
it created risk-based evaluations, analysis and surveys, and constantly monitors the new 
trends in money laundering and financing terrorism. Besides the above, it greatly focuses on 
strengthening the collaboration internationally and regionally between the member countries, 
as well as the possibility of extension. The ESAAMLG became an Associate Member of the 
FATF in June 2010.
Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa/ 
Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en 
Afrique de l’Ques (GIABA)
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)16 was founded by 16 coun-
tries17 in December 1999, based in Dakar. [25] Its main tasks, besides prevention are to 
reinforce and harmonize the capacity of the West African Region, which makes it easier to fit 
the international standards in controlling the money laundering and financing terrorism. The 
measures created in this context provide efficient security against crimes committed against 
banking and financial systems. The GIABA became an Associate Member of the FATF in 
June 2010.
13 Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, the 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Macau (China), Malaysia, Maldives, 
the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor Leste, 
Tonga, the United States, Vanuatu, Vietnam. [19]
14 The word CANZUS is the abbreviation of four countries: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States.
15 Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. [20]
16 The ECOWAS was founded with signing the Lagos Agreement on 28 May 1975, with the purpose of fostering 
the integration of the economic region. In spite of this commerce among the members, in the context of 
economic and monetary union was standardized. [23]
17 The Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Cape Verde, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Republic of the Gambia, the Republic of Ghana, the Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Republic of 
Liberia, the Republic of Mali, the Republic of Niger, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, São Tome and Principe, 
the Republic of Senegal, the Republic of Sierra Leone, the Togolese Republic. [24]
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Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa/ 
Groupe d’Action contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC)
The Group—which is a determinative organization of the Economic and Monetary Com-
munity of Central Africa—was founded in early 2000 with 6 founding members,18 with 
the authorization to fight against money laundering and financing terrorism with executing 
FATF-standards and evaluating their execution. [27] Its tasks are—parallel with technical 
support and international collaboration—identifying money laundering methods and tech-
niques used by terrorist groups and their supporters, exploring their traits, analysing, eval-
uating and sharing them. In October 2015, the FATF recognised GABAC as an FSRB and 
admitted it as an associated member.
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering of Latin America/ 
Grupo de Acción Financiera de Latinoamérica (GAFILAT)
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering of Latin America was founded in 
December 2009 by 9 members19 in Cartagena de Indias (Columbia); later full members 
joined: Mexico (2006), Costa Rica, Panama (2010), Cuba (2012), Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua (2013) and the Dominican Republic (2016). [29] The—today having 17 mem-
bers—Argentine-based regional society was first established as Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering in South America (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamérica, 
GAFISUD) which was changed on the plenary assembly in July 2014, since the new name 
reflected better its extension to all Latin American countries. During its activity, besides 
independency, accuracy, objectivity, quality and keeping deadlines, it is exclusively focused 
on enforcing, executing and monitoring the 40 FATF Recommendations and the 9 Special 
Recommendations, and ensuring the comprehensive communication and mutuality, which 
includes making the documents known as widely as possible. [13: 49] GAFILAT became an 
Associate Member of the FATF in 2006.
Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing  
of Terrorism (EAG)
The Group embracing the Eurasian Region was founded in October 2004 by 9 members20 
in Moscow. [31] The main purpose was to repel money laundering and financing terrorism 
focused into the Eurasian Region, as well as the efficient and comprehensive repelling of 
economic crimes and with increasing transparency the corruption decreases pro rata, just 
like the likeliness of investments in the region. In favour of this, the Group provides help to 
the members in adapting, using and developing the FATF-standards, which makes it easier 
and simpler to cooperate in the key areas. During its work—using the context of communi-
cations and collaboration—it makes mutual evaluation, typological research, comprehensive 
advising and technical support according to the international standards, to reduce the risks. 
18 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo. [26]
19 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. [28]
20 Belarus, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. [30]
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The recommendations, based on the above are used to increase efficiency and development. 
The EAG became an Associate Member of the FATF in June 2010.
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)
The organization was founded in November 2004 with the collaboration of 14 countries, 
based in the capital of the Bahrain Kingdom, Manama. [32] The Group’s goal—extended to 
19 members21 today—is to set up an efficient system in the region, which is capable to stand 
against money laundering, financing terrorism and spreading mass destruction weapons, with 
accepting and executing the FATF-standards and the UN agreements. For this goal, besides 
a strong collaboration, it is obligatory to increase the enforcement of norms, research of 
typologies, identify the regional questions, share the experiences and elaborate solutions. 
The MENAFATF became an Associate Member of the FATF in June 2007.
Collaborating International Institutions and Law Enforcement Authorities
These organizations and authorities—although they are not members of the FATF—also take 
part in the fight against money laundering and financing terrorism on a daily basis. Their role 
is important, as they are actively and effectively taking part in the prevention of global crime 
with their action programmes, shared information and cooperation.
Egmont Group
The Egmont Group, founded in 1995 in Brussels—currently having 156 members [34]—is 
a committed international professional organization, which is important because of ensuring 
the information flow among the members. [35] The independent, voluntary national office’s 
main tasks are receiving, analysing and forwarding the decisive financial information, which 
are connected to several crimes and are important in the fight against money laundering. [36] 
In favour of the purpose, the member countries started establishing their own Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIU),22 which are basically fostering, ensuring and developing the 
communication between the members. During their work—after processing, analysing and 
evaluating the work—they filter suspicious financial transactions which may be connected 
to money laundering activities. The individual financial investigator offices are in constant 
connection with important governmental and private finance institutions, law enforcement 
authorities and foreign FIU units, from whom they may claim data and information, ac-
cording to international agreements.23 The inner information flow is ensured by a specially 
developed, internet-based secret computer software,24 which helps the professionals analyse 
21 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen. [33]
22 According to the EU Council decree elaborated on 17 October 2000 the FIU is: “A central, national unit 
which, in order to combat money laundering, is responsible for receiving (and to the extent permitted, 
requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information 
which concern suspected proceeds of crime or are required by national legislation or regulation.” [37: 124]
23 The members in specific cases—with the obligation of justification—can limit, or can even deny providing 
information, if it offends an ongoing investigation or the interests of the nation. 
24 Egmont Secure Web
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the information with comparing the great amount of partial information. On the annual 
conference they inform each other about the results, experiences and cross-check about the 
further collaborations. Hungary joined the group on 16 December 2007, and became official 
member a few months later, on 10 March 2008.25
FIU.net
The FIU.net is a decentralized computer network initially founded by 5 Financial Intelligence 
Units—France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom—in 1999. Accord-
ing to the 1999 European Council Tampere decision FIU.net was founded under the aegis 
of Europol with the purpose of ensuring the efficient and uninterrupted information and data 
flow between the FIU units during the fight against money laundering and financing terror-
ism. [39] To the initiative, besides the Netherland Security and Law Enforcement Ministry, 
several EU members joined later voluntarily, providing a wider international  opportunity to 
stand against crimes. The system’s work is based on the obligation of the party managing 
money or other value from unusual or suspicious source to report the transaction to the na-
tional FIU unit, which, after scanning, in case of reasonable suspicion of money laundering or 
financing terrorism, immediately forwards it to the proper national authority for prosecution. 
During the measure the members, besides enforcing security are entitled to share information 
among each other. Besides the information flow, a further advantage is that the FIU units can 
compare the collected financial data with the Europol central criminal records, ensuring the 
unveiling of relations and connections, making faster reaction possible. The maintenance 
and development of FIU is today totally financed from the Europol’s budget—counter to the 
previous support of the European Committee.
Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS)
The Group was established in October 1980 by the initiation of the Basel Bank Supervision 
Commission, called Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors which, in the past decades, 
greatly contributed to the Basel Statements and to the introduction of the FATF recommen-
dations. [40] In March 2011 it changed its name to its current form—reflecting its extended 
roles. Although it manages similar tasks as FSRB, it is not a member of any Regional Syn-
dicate. In 2002 it elaborated its own reference value system for creating regulation contexts 
and supervision practices called Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSP), which was 
revised in October 2014 extended with the earned experiences, and is used as a standard, en-
forced on its members. Its purpose is to create a global financial stability, the border-crossing 
supervision of banking and financial services and forming an efficient collaboration with the 
international institutions, and enforcing, fostering and inciting the members to fight against 
money laundering, financing terrorism and the spread of mass destruction weapons. During 
the execution of its tasks, it aspires to use the best practices and norms, developing them, 
increasing transparency, sharing collective and mutual professional knowledge, organizing 
25 In Hungary, between 2004–2007, the police (National Investigational Office, Anti-Money Laundering 
Division) since 15 December 2007 the National Tax- and Custom Office Law Enforcement HQ (Financial 
Information Division) takes care of tasks related to money laundering. Note: until 31 December 2010 the latter 
was called Custom and Financial Police Central Law Enforcement HQ. [38]
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forums and consultations, extending the membership with members with similar interests, 
and increasing the capacity, reaching the most positive results when negotiating with affected 
third parties. The currently 19 members 26 of the association, owning global international 
bank means, owns 10 percent of the market. [42]
European Police Office (Europol)
The Hague-based international organization founded in 1999 is the main institution for the 
police collaboration in the EU. [43] The purpose of the professionally working organiza-
tion27 is to produce results in the area of serious forms of crimes and organized crime in the 
context of an efficient collaboration, and creating a more secured Europe. During managing 
its tasks—due to the excellently trained professional staff and the humongous technical 
analysing capacity—they provide local support and information to the members. Dominant 
operational specializations are: drugs, weapons trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism, Euro 
counterfeiting, cybercrime, tax evasion and fight against money laundering.
European Anti-Fraud Office/Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude (OLAF)
The OLAF, founded as a totally independent international organization in 1999 is protecting 
the financial interests of the EU. [44] The Brussels-based institution’s tasks are to protect 
the EU’s budget from frauds, corruption, organized crime and related illegal activities. 
The  execution of these –which are guides, not obligations—are done after inner and exter-
nal governmental examinations, legislation and creating policies, through coordinating the 
member countries.
The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust)
The organization’s task (founded in 2002, Den Hague) is optimizing the cooperation between 
the member countries’ authorities and prosecutors, fostering the collaboration cross-border in 
the case of serious and organized crime, and elaborating EU legislation units for the virtuous 
and swift impeaching of the criminals. [45]
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
Founded in the Unites States of America, in April 1990, in the context of the Financial 
Ministry. The federal organization’s seat is in Virginia; the European HQ is in Vienna. [46] 
The basic idea of its foundation was initially in order to move forward the American, later 
the international financial world’s transparency and to elaborate, manage and supervise the 
anti-money laundering policies. Its activities, besides the traditional financial systems was 
extended to informal banking systems (e.g. hawala), and to suspicious transactions through 
virtual networks. Its motto is: “Follow the money!” Although its main activity is done in the 
26 Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, 
the Cook Islands, Curacao and Saint Maarten, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Labuan, Macau 
(China), Panama, Samoa, the Terks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu. [41]
27 The staff of Europol has no power to arrest, they attend specific matters as professionals.
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United States of America, but since it is supporting to form other countries’ and organizations’ 
effective anti-money laundering measures, furthermore it aspires to a tight collaboration in 
the area of global crime, thus having a major effect on the European Union institutions.
Conclusion
The parties fighting against money laundering and financing terrorism realized the fact that 
besides corresponding to the stricter security requirements—with increasing efficiency and 
last but not least evading sanctions—they mutually need each other, since this is the only way 
for them to be successful in the future. With the foundation of FATF, it defined and founded 
the global basis of the fight against money laundering, which activities were later extend-
ed to fight against financing terrorism and spreading mass destruction weapons—casting 
a shadow on our everyday life. To the initiative, since 2006, further 9 regional organizations 
have joined, committing themselves to fully enforce and execute the recommendations and 
standards, which result in a positive development in the past years. Their power and influence 
well reflects the fact that the FATF today consists of 37 members, 9 regional organizations 
and 198 jurisdictions, which closely cooperate with the United Nations, the Egmont Group, 
fostering the work of law enforcement authorities.28 Their global effect is increased further 
by the collaborating institutions and law enforcement authorities, which are not members of 
the FATF, but during their activities, they organically join the everyday war against money 
laundering and financing terrorism.
Since the FATF does not wish to accept new members, instead they support the creation 
of collaborative international organizations, working together with them. The regional or-
ganizations created this way—taking the local specialties, work methods and permissions 
into account—can stand against the criminals more efficiently and successfully. With the 
help of the FATF-elaborated standards, the members can utilize such unified methods, which 
help stand against money laundering and financing terrorism as a global coalition. The wide 
utilization of available capacities aspires to help unveiling, interrupting and finally freeze the 
financial backgrounds of terrorist and criminal organizations. During their activities, in order 
to keep up their credibility and show results—with taking the risks pro rata and efficiency 
into account—accountability, consistency, collaborations, sharing information and forming 
a unified thinking when utilizing the standards have become determinative requirements.
The fight against money laundering and financing terrorism is a never-ending process, 
which cannot be fully liquidated, but for every country’s comprehensive interests, it is nec-
essary to repel these with every legal means necessary. Thanks to the past years’ successful 
collaborations, a significant number of countries and organizations have joined the fight, 
which—with adapting the standards—already have the skills and related base of knowledge, 
and help achieving successes when global action is taken. As we can see, the opportunities 
and conditions are available for the fight, the only question is, how can we utilize these 
resources efficiently in the future…
28 Note that the FATF consists of more jurisdictions overall, than the UN. [47]
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